Looking Out for Seafarers—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. Click here for Part I.


In the summer of 2008, Coast Guard Sector Houston/Galveston staff worked with the Apostleship of the Sea to aid a mariner. Excerpts from the e-mail correspondence follow.


5/25/08 Seafarer’s spouse to Coast Guard

Coast Guard, Please help. My husband is aboard a vessel which is travels (sic)
on the high seas between the United States, Europe, and Trinidad. He is very
sick with the flu and the symptoms are causing him to slowly lose his hearing.
He is not able to see a qualified doctor because such doctors are not available
onboard the vessel or in Trinidad.

Now that the vessel has returned to the Gulf Coast of the United States, immigration personnel are unable to sign the referral form before the vessel leaves for the high seas. I do not know what to do because he will not be able to continue his work as a
seafarer with a loss of hearing, and my family of three children greatly needs his full health and support. Please help me and my husband.

—Signed … Wife of foreign crewmember aboard a foreign-flagged chemical carrier calling on the port of Houston in May 2008.


5/28/08 Coast Guard to seafarer’s spouse

Ma’am, we have inspected the vessel aboard which your husband works. During our
crew interviews and competency assessments, we found that he is able to perform
the tasks of his license and watchstanding duties, which are those of a third
engineer. Your husband’s medical needs are presently being taken care of by
doctors here in Houston.

—Signed … Chief, Inspections Division, Coast Guard Sector Houston/Galveston.


5/28/08 Seafarer’s spouse to Coast Guard

Thank you for your great help. Thank you very much because the medical attention
needed by my husband requires constant oversight.

6/3/08 Seafarer’s spouse to Coast Guard

Coast Guard, I am sorry if I interrupted you again but my husband has been
diagnosed by the doctor with a perforated eardrum. He is diagnosed as being fit
for work but is suffering through a lot of pain.

Can you help us to have my husband sent home and have the company provide medical assistance? The ship will be in the United States again on June 10. I am very sorry for my interruption but I do not know where to seek assistance. I hope you understand.

6/3/08 Coast Guard to seafarer’s spouse

Ma’am, researching the Notices of Arrival supplied to the Coast Guard by the
master, I see that the vessel trades regularly in the United States. May I
direct you to seafarer representatives, who will be able to provide you with
options of how to handle such requests? ...

... At the end of our correspondence, I have included a website that lists the people who minister to the needs of seafarers like your husband. I routinely work with two of the Texas port chaplains listed on this page. If you are not able to establish
communication with a port chaplain, please let me know.

6/3/08 Seafarer’s spouse to Coast Guard

Thank you very much. Indeed the information you gave me will give a lot of help
for us. Thank you and God bless.

6/4/08 Coast Guard to the president of the Apostleship of the Sea in the United States

Good morning. Late yesterday, I responded to an e-mail provided to me from the
wife of the third engineer aboard a foreign-flagged chemical carrier. The Coast
Guard has been in contact with the engineer and with the wife and there are some
areas of concern that are outside of Coast Guard jurisdiction.

I bring this to your attention in order to alert you of this ongoing situation, and of the reference I made to your good organization.

—Signed ... Chief, Inspections Division, Coast Guard Sector Houston/Galveston.

6/4/08 Apostleship of the Sea in the United States to Coast Guard

I will keep an eye out for the vessel. Thanks for thinking about us. I will try
to visit the ship when she comes into our port.

I will also pass the word along to other seafarer welfare organizations that might be able to help while the vessel is visiting another country.

—Signed ... president of the Apostleship of the Sea in the United States.

6/25/08 Resolution
Vessel arrives in Vancouver, Wash. Through the efforts of the Coast Guard, the Apostleship of the Sea, the owner of the vessel, and shipping agents, the third engineer of concern is removed and provided the necessary medical treatment in his country of origin.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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Looking Out for Seafarers—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by LCDR Norbert John Pail, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard Sector Houston/Galveston; and Father Sinclair Oubre, J.C.L., President, Apostleship of the Sea of the United States of America.


Seafarer Welfare Organizations
Seafarer welfare organizations, faith-based or secular, welcome journeyers into ports throughout the United States, offering hospitality to mariners who may not have seen land for weeks. In the first picture, Sinclair Oubre and Doreen Badeaux welcome a vessel’s master to port.

Resources include access to transportation and conveniences such as high-speed Internet and pre-paid phone cards. Many seafarer centers also have big screen televisions with international channels. In the second picture, ship crewmembers use the resources at one of the nation’s seafarer centers.

The relations between the local Coast Guard and seafarer centers keep the needs of the seafarer at the top of the list of port priorities.

Seafarer Access and Living Conditions
With the advent of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), critical facilities must outline how access is restricted to secure areas. Coast Guard requirements outline that owners of these facilities ensure coordination occurs to provide for the needs of crewmembers and the vessel.

Additionally, living conditions on a vessel are determined by the economic health of the operator and the cultural traditions of the crew. What is “clean” for one crew may be considered unhealthy or substandard by another.

Without specific international standards for living and working conditions, port stakeholders are left asking questions such as: Do problems exist when vessels do not meet the hyper-clean standards Americans are used to? Is there sufficient quantity and variety of food, or are the dietary needs of the crews being put at risk?

It is much easier to determine whether the lifeboat davits work than to know if the vessel provides adequate accommodations.

Help Is on the Way
The Maritime Labour Convention of 2006 is expected to standardize the living and working conditions for mariners while at sea. These regulations are the first attempt to set minimum requirements for seafarers, including conditions of employment, hours of work and rest, accommodations, recreational facilities, food, health protection, medical care, welfare, and social security protection.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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Improving Coast Guard SAR Capability—The Next Challenge

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine.


Despite the successful deployment of new direction-finding equipment, there are still some problems with the 406-MHz EPIRB—most notably, false alarms.

For example:

• Since 2004, more than 96% of 406-MHz EPIRB activations in the United States were from false or unknown causes.
• Since 2004, 45% of 406-MHz EPIRB activations were from either unregistered EPIRBs or from EPIRBs with obsolete registration information, which delays Coast Guard response.
• The Coast Guard spends 20 to 50 aircraft hours monthly (costing $200,000 to $700,000 dollars) on sorties for false EPIRB activations.

The design of some 406-MHz EPIRBs contributes to a high number of false activations. For example, one model is manufactured so that it can be installed backwards. If installed incorrectly, the model activates upon getting wet. Also, some EPIRBs are manufactured with loose bracket straps that allow moisture to unintentionally activate the EPIRB.

While some poorly designed EPIRBs are slowly being phased out of service, the remaining 406-MHz EPIRBs in the field (over 220,000 U.S.-registered) will continue to waste Coast Guard time and effort until they are properly installed and registered with current contact information.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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Improving Coast Guard SAR Capability—New Technology Supports Rapid Response

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by LT Myles Greenway, Chief, Investigations Division, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Charleston.


The Coast Guard received disturbing news following the rescue of the captain of the F/V Still Crazy V, which sank off the coast of South Carolina in 1999. The captain reported that although he held his emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) and saw Coast Guard helicopters, they couldn’t locate him.

Troubled by what the master told him, Greg Johnson, Sector Charleston’s commercial fishing vessel safety examiner, promised to look into the matter.

Mixed Signals
Following this incident, Johnson analyzed data from EPIRB activations and aircraft sorties and identified more than 100 instances in which Coast Guard aircraft detected an EPIRB’s 121.5-MHz homing signal, but were not equipped to detect the stronger 406-MHz signal.

Testing EPIRBs and Coast Guard Equipment
In 2001, the Seventh Coast Guard District forwarded Johnson’s findings to USCG headquarters. Personnel tested 406-MHz EPIRBs and the current Coast Guard aircraft direction-finding equipment.

Testing indicated that signal strength could be affected when the device is held close to a mariner’s body. Additional testing indicated that, under ideal weather conditions, a Coast Guard HH-65 helicopter equipped with the existing direction-finding equipment could locate an unencumbered EPIRB 20 nautical miles away at an elevation of 3,000 feet.

Meanwhile, Back at Sector Charleston
While testing continued, Johnson consulted with Coast Guard aviators and foreign exchange pilots and learned that the Canadian Air Force had begun installing new direction-finding equipment on their C-130s. He also discovered that the Coast Guard Aviation Logistics Center was considering the same equipment that provided 360-degree scanning capability and minimized false bearing indications.

Johnson shared his research with the Aviation Logistics Center. Buoyed by his data, the center installed the prototype aboard a Coast Guard C-130, tail number 1504, and tested off the coast of Charleston. The flight data proved the new equipment performed as designed—it locked onto an EPIRB’s 406-MHz signal at nearly twice the distance as compared to the existing equipment for the 121.5-MHz frequency.

On Scene
On June 10, 2005, the sport fisher Extractor capsized while evading tropical storm Arlene. Coast Guard aircraft searched more than 13,000 square miles of ocean for the two crewmembers with negative results. Before running out of daylight, District Seven requested Coast Guard C-130, tail number 1504.

While transiting to the search area, the prototype unit locked onto the EPIRB’s 406-MHz signal from more than 90 nautical miles away at an elevation of 17,000 feet. C-130 personnel successfully vectored a Coast Guard helicopter to the crew, who had been hanging onto the capsized vessel for more than 26 hours.

Success
As of March 2009, the Coast Guard equipped all of its fixed-wing aircraft with the new direction finders. More significantly, the equipment has assisted Coast Guard in the successful rescue of more than 50 mariners to date.

Pictured: Greg Johnson receives the DHS Secretary’s Award for Excellence for his research.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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Understanding Chlorine

This "Chemical of the Quarter" excerpt is from the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine, by Ms. Suzanne Chang, Chemical Engineer, U.S. Coast Guard Hazardous Materials Standards Division.

Chlorine

What is it?
Chlorine (CLX) is highly reactive and most commonly found combined with other elements, i.e. sodium chloride (table salt), sodium hypochlorite (bleach), and calcium hypochlorite (swimming pool chlorinator).

It is also one of the most essential chemical building blocks in manufacturing many household goods, such as polyvinyl chloride plastics, insecticide, refrigerants, sandwich wrap, carpeting, paints, and house siding.

How is it shipped?
Bulk chlorine is typically shipped as a compressed liquefied gas in tank cars, tank motor vehicles, and barge tanks.

For transporting by barge, the design of the barge is dependent upon whether it is used for inland river routes or for oceangoing routes.

Why should I care?
Shipping concerns. Since chlorine is shipped under pressure, one concern is maintaining cargo pressure. Depending on the capacity of the tanks aboard a barge, at least two pressure relief devices are installed into each cargo tank to prevent any over-pressurization.

Normally, dry chlorine does not corrode steel. However, wet chlorine is highly corrosive because it forms hydrochloric acid, so precautions need to be taken to keep the chlorine and equipment dry and atmospheric moisture out.

Health concerns. Chlorine gas is primarily a respiratory irritant and is highly corrosive when in contact with moist tissues such as the eyes and skin. The extent of damage caused by chlorine depends on the amount a person is exposed to, how the exposure occurred, and the duration of the exposure.

Chlorine can be detected by its odor (it smells like household bleach) at levels of 0.002 parts chlorine per million parts air (ppm). At 1.0 ppm, chlorine is a perceptible irritant. A level of 10 ppm is considered immediately dangerous to life and health—a person exposed to that level should seek protection at once. Continued exposure at that level could result in permanent damage or even death within as little as 30 minutes.

Fire or explosion concerns. Chlorine is not flammable or explosive. However, it is capable of supporting the combustion of certain substances, similar to oxygen. Also, chlorine may react readily with organic chemicals, sometimes violently and with the generation of heat.

What's the Coast Guard doing about it?
The U.S. Coast Guard enforces chlorine barge regulations and inspection standards under the regulations in 46 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations part 151.3.

The Coast Guard is also working with other federal agencies and local authorities to develop measures to protect people, property, and the environment in areas where chlorine barges transit.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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CG Inspectors Help Bring Waterfront Facility Into Compliance—Part III

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I and Part II.


Part III—The Results

The incident commander’s goals were developed in cooperation with the facility representative. The goals stressed:

• safety of nearby populations and response personnel,
• environmental protection,
• teamwork,
• regulatory compliance,
• a safe return to commercial operations.

Follow Up, Follow Through
Improvements were noted each day. Inspectors briefed the facility owner, his representative, and the tenants on progress, which helped increase their cooperation. Other agencies were often present to discuss the facility’s progress and become familiar with its new, safer operations.

The team provided continuous guidance and helped with various tasks to maintain the project’s progress. The facility representative and tenants became excited to show the visiting inspectors their progress, especially when they went above and beyond what was required for the next operational period.

The Results
After 40 days of intense work, more than 25,000 pounds of debris and over 500 drums and totes totaling more than 25,000 gallons of hazardous and flammable liquid waste were removed.

The firefighting system was repaired and fully operational, proper signage and markings were put up around the building, and a cargo stowage plan was implemented for each floor of the warehouse. The basement no longer flooded, the roof was repaired, and waste was no longer stored on the premises.

In completing these improvements, the facility met all requirements to the satisfaction of the captain of the port. Best of all, the clean-up operations were conducted without injury to any personnel or damage to the environment.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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CG Inspectors Help Bring Waterfront Facility Into Compliance—Part II

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I.

Part II—The Challenges

To avoid a potentially catastrophic fire, the warehouse had to be completely ridden of rubbish, waste, and hazardous material. The facility also needed to provide adequate fire extinguishing capability, and the structural integrity of the building had to be certified.

This situation was made more complex because the facility had five tenants, each involved in independent, uncoordinated hazardous material handling operations.

It Gets Worse Before It Gets Better
Tenants were using different sections of the same floor to mix flammables and other materials that were not compatible with each other. Packing and distribution materials were haphazardly stored, creating a fire hazard and blocking egress and response routes.

The operations varied in size and occupancy space, and there was no way to distinguish between operations. Even the tenants were unclear where one leased space ended and the next began.

The tenants were not familiar with federal hazardous materials regulations, and this was their first interaction with the Coast Guard. All of them were very concerned about going out of business. At first, some tenants did not want to comply.

The Work Begins
Because of this initial resistance and since each operation was so different, Coast Guard members and facility representatives met with each tenant individually. Most of these meetings took place in the warehouse, where inspectors could point out and explain the dangers within each tenant’s area. This allowed the tenants to propose solutions that could be evaluated and, in many cases, approved on the spot.

This approach allowed the tenants to see that the Coast Guard was in support of keeping them in operation, and that the incident management team viewed them as part of the solution. Following the one-on-one meetings, the tenants took ownership of the safety requirements and the response picked up momentum.

In part III, we look at the results.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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CG Inspectors Help Bring Waterfront Facility Into Compliance—Part I

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by LT Tiffany Johnson, Chief, Shoreside Compliance, U.S. Coast Guard Sector New York.


Part I—The Problem

New Operations Trigger Coast Guard Involvement
When facility managers of a waterfront warehouse notified the Coast Guard that it would be receiving barges for biofuel marine transfers after a 13-year hiatus, Coast Guard inspectors were dispatched to conduct a safety and security inspection and found numerous structural, safety, and security problems.

The warehouse contained undocumented and improperly stored hazardous substances, corrosive materials, and flammable liquids. The basement, filled with unlabeled drums and packages, flooded after heavy rainstorms. The roof above the fifth floor was dilapidated, providing little protection to the hazardous materials stored there, and the building’s sprinkler system did not work.

And It Gets Worse
To top it all off, the building was just yards from the Passaic River and one block from a residential area and shopping center. Since the facility was not in a safe condition, it received a captain of the port order to suspend all hazmat and oil transfer activities.

The story could have ended here. Coast Guard inspectors had done their jobs. They identified a hazardous situation and took action to protect the workers within the facility, the many citizens that lived or shopped nearby, and other workers in the area.

Keep the Businesses in Business
But Coast Guard involvement continued. During the initial meeting with the owner/operator, the incident commander explained that the Coast Guard’s intention was to help his facility stay in operation, and an incident management team was created to oversee the clean up.

In part II we will examine the challenges.


For More Information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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Coast Guard Partnerships and the Federal Advisory Committee Act

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Mr. Rich Walter, Attorney Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Regulatory and Administrative Law.


FACA Facts
The Federal Advisory Committee Act was enacted as a way of controlling the many advisory committees established to provide federal agencies with access to the views and recommendations of industry, consumer groups, and other outside experts.

FACA’s aims are simple:

• Provide ground rules for establishing, managing, and overseeing advisory committees.
• Provide fair compensation of non-federal government advisory committee members.
• Open committee meetings to public scrutiny.
• Reduce costs by terminating unnecessary committees.

We want to ensure that all Coast Guard partnerships with people outside the federal government are constructed with this act in mind.

How Do I Tell?
Whether or not the partnership is called an “advisory committee” is irrelevant—any group that involves non-federal government personnel and that gives advice or makes recommendations to the Coast Guard might be a FACA advisory committee, no matter what it calls itself.

Is the Group Established or Utilized by the Coast Guard?
If we fund the group’s activities, determine its composition, or set its agenda, the group may need to follow FACA procedures.

Trade associations generally fall outside the act, and if we meet with an association’s representatives to hear their views on an issue, we can do so without “implicating” FACA. However, if we bring representatives of several trade associations together, we need to ask more questions before determining whether that group will be covered by FACA.

Is the Group Meant to Provide Advice or Recommendations to the Coast Guard?
We often meet with groups of citizens to discuss port safety and security measures, possible new regulations, and the like. If these meetings are called to provide information or exchange individual views, FACA is not implicated. The key is whether we meant for the group to advise us as a group.

Suppose we call a meeting with local industry leaders, environmentalists, and concerned citizens to discuss a proposed regulation. At first, some citizens say they might be agreeable to the proposal, while others say they are firmly opposed. Gradually, the tide swings in favor of the opposition, and by the end of the meeting everyone is telling us the proposal is a bad idea.

Consensus? Group recommendation? Yes, but FACA is unlikely to apply because we called the meeting to hear individual viewpoints, and did nothing to manage the meeting in such a way that attendees felt any need to agree on a single point of view.

Does the Group Fall Within a Recognized FACA Exemption?
The Coast Guard generally can meet with groups of state officials or local civic groups without triggering FACA. Also, if Congress tells the Coast Guard to use private sector committees to help implement certain measures, those committees are also likely to fall outside FACA.

To Be Sure
The Coast Guard’s Office of Regulations and Administrative Law is the office responsible for determining when a collaborative effort should—or should not—be handled under FACA. Coast Guard units should involve this office as they seek to extend stakeholder partnerships.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2009.

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What’s the Coast Guard Done for Me Lately?

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine.


In the next series of blog posts, we will highlight various “grassroots efforts” where the Coast Guard works with other agencies and local mariners and maritime companies to make life better on the waterfront.

We have intentionally focused on the “What’s in it for me?” quotient when framing content. Our goals are to better inform maritime stakeholders about these programs and to stimulate further efforts.

Upcoming in Proceedings

OUT NOW! Fall 2010: Recreational Boating Safety (RBS)
• RBS program synopsis
• State RBS involvement
• RBS partners
• Manufacturing standards
• USCG Auxiliary
• Small vessel security
• Lessons Learned: Barkald/Essence: A routine passage turns tragic.

Winter 2010-11: Fishing Vessel Safety
• Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program synopsis
• Mitigating risk
• Training and outreach
• Collaborative efforts
• Lessons Learned: Lady Luck: A small fishing trawler suddenly sinks and disappears.

Spring 2011: Waterways and Maritime Transportation Systems Management
• Domestic waterways management
• International work and initiatives

Summer 2011: Committee on the Marine Transportation System


Your Opinion
• What do you want to read in Proceedings?
• What area under the Coast Guard’s marine safety, security, and environmental protection missions affects you most?
• What do you want to know more about?

Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

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Lessons Learned—The Grounding of a Cruise Ship—Part III

Part III—A Lesson in Maritime Management

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Read Part I and Part II here.


The ship’s safety management system intends the bridge officers to work as a team, with checks and verifications of tasks accomplished. However, there was evidence that the master’s abrasive personality created reluctance among the crew to disagree or question the master’s decisions. This attitude of unquestioning subservience established an unsafe condition.

As stated in the casualty report:

“The lack of teamwork arose due to the master’s failure to involve the watch standers in the decision-making process regarding the departure route, as well as the master’s overbearing presence. The senior members of the navigational team expressed their surprise at the unusual and more dangerous departure course, but failed to express their concern because they did not feel empowered to voice doubt in the master’s decisions.”

Ergonomic and Human Performance Issues
The officer of the watch’s decision to rely solely on the automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) to plot the Proselyte Reef lighted buoy as the sole reference point was contrary to the rules of good seamanship, his training as a navigational officer, and the vessel’s established standard procedures.

This was combined with a poor layout of the navigation station, which made it much more difficult to use the ARPA as well as the other navigational aids aboard the vessel. The chart table was placed well away from the automatic radar plotting aid, which was at the forward starboard side of the bridge. While this position allowed a good view of traffic, all other navigation instruments as well as the charts were located well away from that position.



It was also discovered that the navigational watch officers relied on the electronic instruments rather than taking terrestrial navigational fixes. Taking terrestrial navigational fixes is time-consuming, requiring placement of the azimuth bearing circles on the gyro repeaters, taking bearings, and then plotting them. On this vessel, the gyro compass repeaters were blocked by equipment cowlings, as depicted here.


The officer of the watch also failed to fully utilize the automatic radar plotting aid’s capabilities. He never ground-locked the ARPA nor did he manually input the wind and current values that would have allowed the ARPA to calculate the vessel’s set and drift. If he had, he might have realized that the ship was a lot closer to the reef than he thought.

Lessons Learned
The investigation report noted more than a dozen different recommendations, which can be summarized:

• Operate as a team and communicate clearly with each other, especially when making an emergency or non-routine operation.
• Separate hotel management responsibilities from the bridge crew to ensure that hotel problems do not compromise the safety of the ship.
• Plan passages and make written records of the plans.
• Keep charts current and corrected.
• Practice good seamanship and do not be over-confident about your abilities or those of your ship or the ship’s instruments.
  

For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Lessons Learned—The Grounding of a Cruise Ship—Part II

Part II—A Lesson in Maritime Management


Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Read Part I here.


Just before the turn that immediately led to the grounding, the officer of the watch (OOW) was distracted by a phone call on the bridge regarding a disturbance related to a loud party in a stateroom. He was also required to silence a smoke alarm that had sounded on the bridge.

As soon as he felt the ship vibrate from contact with the reef, the master returned to the bridge and assumed the watch of the ship. At about 1:35 a.m. all of the watertight doors were ordered closed to prevent further flooding throughout the ship. The photo depicts the water level in an interior stairway.

At 1:47 a.m., the general emergency signal was sounded, and all passengers and crew were told to report to their emergency/abandon ship stations. By 2:20 a.m. all of the passenger cabins had been evacuated.

At 2:35 a.m. the master intentionally grounded the ship on a sandbar. Since this was accomplished successfully, the decision was made to evacuate the passengers by tenders rather than via the lifeboats. The evacuation was carried out by the shore-based tenders in about an hour and a half.

What Went Wrong?
As with many incidents, no single error caused it. There were organizational errors, navigational errors, and individual human errors.

One of the most critical organizational errors was the master’s not following the standards and procedures as laid out in the ship’s safety management system. Specifically, the officers on the bridge:

• did not set down a written passage plan for this particular deviation;
• did not follow the departure checklist;
• did not take a navigational fix;
• relied on only one navigational instrument, the automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA);
• relied on only one navigational aid, the Proselyte Reef lighted buoy;
• had not updated the charts to reflect the information in the latest Notice to Mariners.

This last item was critical, as the latest notice let mariners know that the Proselyte Reef lighted buoy the OOW was using to navigate had moved 125 meters west of the position on the ship’s chart.

The navigational errors were numerous as well. The officer of the watch did not take an initial fix on the ship’s position and did not account for the current and wind in his calculations. He also relied solely on the automatic radar plotting aid and did not take a terrestrial fix or utilize the global positioning system.

Not surprisingly, the human factors were also many. The master decided to sail to the east side of Proselyte Reef, which is the most dangerous side to transit, as the current moves in a westerly direction, the wind is normally easterly, and the lighted buoy they were navigating by is positioned on the west side of the reef. The master also had a managerial style that did not encourage communication of suggestions or questions by his bridge officers.

Additionally, the other officers of the bridge took no initiative to prepare a passage plan, record the passage of the vessel on the navigation charts, or even take readings from any of the other navigational aids to ensure that the ship was where they thought it was.

What’s the Bottom Line?
Of the multitude of mistakes made that led up to the grounding, many might have not occurred if the master had embraced and encouraged his crew to follow the procedures laid out in the ship’s safety management system.

Part III outlines the human errors and lessons learned from this incident.

For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Lessons Learned—The Grounding of a Cruise Ship—Part I

Part I—A Lesson in Maritime Management

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Ms. Kriste Stromberg, special correspondent to Proceedings.


Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

It is important to note that lives were lost in some of the marine casualties we present. Out of respect for the deceased, their families, and surviving crewmembers, we do not mention the name of any person involved.


It’s a beautiful night in the Caribbean. You are aboard a cruise ship, having a wonderful time. You go to bed to rest for the next busy day of port calls and touring. Suddenly, the ship shudders and you are awakened by the captain’s voice over the loudspeaker, stating that there has been an accident and to please move to the emergency stations.

How could this have happened? This is a modern vessel with the latest navigational aids. The officers and crew are all trained and certified. How could this vessel tear open its hull on a well-known coral reef on a clear night with a calm sea? Let’s take a closer look at what happened very early on the morning of December 15, 1998.

The Incident
The ship was on its usual course from St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, to Martinique when one of the passengers suffered a heart attack and required immediate shoreside medical treatment. The master deviated from his course to offload the passenger.

The ship’s doctor returned to the ship about 1:25 a.m., and the master himself piloted the ship to pass to the east of the Proselyte Reef, not the usual departure route of the vessel.

The master decided on this course based on his mariner’s eye and the information from the automatic radar plotting aid. The master felt that this would provide a safe passage around a known hazard and adequate clearance for a sailing vessel in the immediate area, and so he gave the orders to set sail for Martinique on this path.

About three minutes later, the master, not feeling well, left the bridge to retire to his stateroom. On the bridge were the staff captain, the officer of the watch, and two quartermasters as the helmsman and the lookout. Within another two to three minutes, the ship would tear a hole in its hull on the sharp coral of Proselyte Reef.

In part II, we will examine how this happened.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

A Sticky Situation—improving area preparedness through government-initiated unannounced exercises

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by LT Kelly Dietrich, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Incident Management and Preparedness, Oil and Hazardous Substance Division and LT Jason Marineau, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Incident Management and Preparedness.


A complete preparedness program must include exercises that catch responders off-guard. As such, unannounced exercises are a key component of our preparedness program and are called government-initiated unannounced exercises, or “GIUEs,” typically pronounced “gooeys.”

These unannounced drills measure initial response actions compared to written actions in vessel and facility response plans. The intent is to identify gaps in the response plans and the ability of the vessel/facility owner to implement a plan before a real incident occurs.

As we re-energize the GIUE program within the Coast Guard’s sector organization, federal on-scene coordinators (FOSCs) need to ensure they coordinate expertise and daily responsibilities housed in both sector prevention and response divisions during the planning and execution of the GIUE through our marine environmental response technical specialists.

Application in Practice
Once the facility/vessel and USCG GIUE team has been identified, the hard work begins. The team should:

• review the facility or vessel history,


• read through the response plan,


• review the geographic response guidance detailed in the area contingency plan,


• draft an appropriate scenario using the main concepts and discharge amounts listed in the facility or vessel response plan,


• select a day and time to conduct the GIUE.

GIUE team members should understand that they are fulfilling two or three different roles:

• Steward of regulations—reviews plans to ensure compliance with vessel and facility regulations.


• Observer—verifies and observes the execution of the response protocols compared to what is listed in the vessel or facility response plan.


• Facilitator—for the vessel or facility person in charge or tankerman on the receiving end of the GIUE, this is a highly stressful situation.

The verification team should approach this situation with full understanding and clear intentions while ensuring the regulations are met.

This effort should not stop at the conclusion of the exercise. Follow-up efforts should be made to identify areas for improvement in training, equipment, planning, and highlighting superior performance.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

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Proceedings Fall 2010 Available Online

The current edition of Proceedings (Fall 2010 – Recreational Boating Safety) is available online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/.

This “Recreational Boating Safety” issue highlights the myriad ways in which the National Recreational Boating Safety Program serves to improve marine safety.

Additionally, it gives appropriate credit to the Coast Guard's many recreational boating safety partners and contains ample information about their efforts.

After-Action Reports—the story of an exercise and its response—Part III

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard "Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council" magazine. Click here for Part I and Part II.
　

Tips
Reports are only as good as the input received. For a successful evaluation process:

• Identify the correct people to fill the evaluator roles. Each person should be a subject matter expert or have a good working knowledge in the area of the objective that will be tested.
• Ensure that exercise evaluation guides are clear, concise, and contain sufficient information.
• Provide evaluator training prior to the event.
• Review the particulars of the exercise (scenario, location, etc.) with the evaluation team and provide an evaluator handbook.
• Articulate what is expected of an evaluator.
• Conduct data collection immediately or shortly after the event.

By following these basic steps, the evaluation teams will have the necessary tools to accurately capture what happened during the event and be able to provide substantial, quality feedback for the after-action report.

　
For more information:
The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program toolkit is available at http://hseep.dhs.gov/.

The Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information Sharing site is available at http://www.llis.gov/.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.
　
　

After-Action Reports—The story of an exercise and its response—Part II

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I.


The Participant “Hot Wash”
This meeting is typically held immediately following the event. Holding it at the functional area of play enables participants to come together to hear about challenges.

This also is a good time to distribute and collect participant feedback forms. All feedback, whether positive or recommendations for improvement, will aid planners as they design exercises or prepare for actual events.

The Controller and Evaluator Debrief
This event may be held directly after the participant hot wash. The primary focus is to discuss and review the controller’s and evaluator’s observations on how responses to exercise events played out.

The debrief should focus on answering questions such as:

• What response actions were triggered at the start of the event?
• Were problems encountered that complicated coordinating resources?
• Did agencies have a notification system in place?
• Were contingency plans used to address what actions were required?
• Did the contingency plans cover the specific event, or were there gaps?

An exercise should not be looked at as a “pass” or “fail” event, but as a method to determine if all aspects of response efforts were addressed. It is also an opportunity to identify issues for corrective action prior to an actual incident.

Additionally, meeting organizers must reiterate the importance of writing complete and comprehensive exercise evaluation guides and establish a due date for the evaluators to submit them to the lead evaluator.

Vetting and Approval
An after-action conference should be scheduled within one month after the exercise. This conference’s outcomes are to solicit feedback for edits to the AAR, develop the improvement plan, and assign a responsible party and due date for each corrective action.

The plan should be a realistic and prioritized list of corrective actions required to improve preparedness. It’s important to note that the improvement plan may only be the first step. Some items may require additional funding or necessitate developing agreements among agencies that share responsibilities or resources during a response.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

After-Action Reports—The story of an exercise and its response—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CDR Ruby Collins, Supervisor, Exercise Support Branch–Detachment 1, U.S. Coast Guard Force Readiness Command.


Following an exercise or event response, we have a tendency to say, “I’m glad that’s over!” For some, however, the work is just beginning.

The After-Action Report
The after-action report (AAR) is the Coast Guard’s official record of an exercise. How important is the AAR to your organization? This report may be the official document required to obtain grants from the Department of Homeland Security, or to receive exercise funds from other sources.

Additionally, a comprehensive AAR will tell you what occurred during an exercise or real-world event. This will allow you to:

• determine if the exercise met program or regulatory requirements,
• identify the obstacles the participants faced and whether they were able to overcome them,
• reveal shortfalls in the response efforts,
• establish training requirements,
• clarify gaps in the contingency plan.

Data Capturing
Participant meetings should be scheduled as soon as possible after an exercise. Facilitators can draw people into the discussion by asking questions, reading body language, and keeping the group focused.

Initial feedback can be used to develop a “quick look” report—three items that went well and three items that require additional attention—that is helpful in crafting the final after-action report.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Joint Exercises, Half the Headache

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CDR Heather Kostecki, Planning and Force Readiness Department Head, U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Francisco.


In the exercise community, we often hear the term “exercise fatigue,” since with each new regulation and guideline comes a new requirement to conduct exercises. Many planners find themselves overwhelmed about how to meet the requirements and how to balance readiness needs against resource limitations.

More Exercises, Same Resources
One answer is to combine exercises to maximize available funding and manpower. Ports have started pairing area maritime security exercises with oil spill response exercises, and hurricane exercises with mass rescue operation exercises.

However, exercise creep (attempting to address too many issues within one exercise) can rapidly derail the exercise. Also, if not planned with a focus on coordinated operations, a combined exercise can turn into two exercises taking place at the same time.

Failure to establish interconnectivity between the exercises results in lost opportunities to explore the “rub points” that will occur when actual operations with different goals occupy the same space and compete for the same resources.

A Long-Term Solution
One way to address the issue is by producing a long-term exercise schedule that is systematic and regional in nature to achieve economies of scale and synergy.

FEMA regional training and exercise plan workshops, for example, allow regional partners to see what other exercises may be occurring that cover the same territory as their own, with the opportunity to combine efforts.

Combining exercises can be accomplished successfully if planners link exercises very deliberately and thoughtfully. All parties need to be apprised of the scope of play from the beginning, and must hold firm to that scope despite pressure to tack on “just one more” issue. Most importantly, the issues being evaluated must continue to meet all statutory requirements for each of the participating programs.

Members of different response communities in a port should meet well in advance of a planned combined exercise to learn what each community does during a response, what their jurisdictional boundaries are, and each community’s authorities and capabilities.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Upcoming in Proceedings

Fall 2010: Recreational Boating Safety (RBS)
• RBS program synopsis
• State RBS involvement
• RBS partners
• Manufacturing standards
• USCG Auxiliary
• Small vessel security
• Lessons Learned: Barkald/Essence: A routine passage turns tragic.

Winter 2010-11: Fishing Vessel Safety
• Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program synopsis
• Mitigating risk
• Training and outreach
• Collaborative efforts
• Lessons Learned: Lady Luck: A small fishing trawler suddenly sinks and disappears.

Spring 2011: Waterways and Maritime Transportation Systems Management
• Domestic waterways management
• International work and initiatives


Your Opinion
• What do you want to read in Proceedings?
• What area under the Coast Guard’s marine safety, security, and environmental protection missions affects you most?
• What do you want to know more about?

Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp

Understanding Benzene—the chemical with a license to kill

This "Chemical of the Quarter" excerpt is from the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine and was written by Dr. Alan Schneider, formerly of the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Operating and Environmental Standards.


Benzene

What is it?
Benzene is a flammable liquid used to make many chemicals that, in turn, go into common consumer products like plastics, rubber, nylon, dyes, detergents, drugs, synthetic fibers, and pesticides. It’s used as a solvent in paints, varnishes, and lacquer thinners. Because it is so versatile, benzene is shipped in very large quantities as a pure chemical, as well as in mixtures.

How is it shipped?
Benzene boils at 176°F, so it is typically carried unpressurized at room temperature in tank ships and tank barges.

Why should I care?
Benzene is a very common cargo. It is also very dangerous. For example:

• Benzene is flammable and explosive.
• Benzene is a known carcinogen.
• Benzene attacks the lungs, blood, bone marrow, central nervous system, liver, kidneys, and women’s reproductive organs.
• It irritates skin and eyes.
• Ingesting benzene may lower blood pressure and cause vomiting, nausea, dizziness, and loss of consciousness.

Shipping concerns. Benzene vapor may be released during normal cargo venting and transfer operations and during tank cleaning. Because it is heavier than air, the vapor can accumulate on the deck, possibly in concentrations high enough to be damaging or fatal.

Health concerns. How much benzene is “bad”? The official exposure level to avoid is more than 0.5 ppm (parts per million). That's the amount that can be in the air you breathe every day at work (for up to a 30-year career) and not get sick.

Benzene is a dangerous chemical, but years ago people didn’t know this. At one time it was a standard practice for workers to wash grease and oil off their hands with benzene.

What’s the Coast Guard doing about it?
The Coast Guard has detailed rules regarding benzene. You'll find these in the Code of Federal Regulations (46 CFR Subchapter D, 46 CFR Subchapter O, 46 CFR 197 Subpart C).

Benzene safety depends on you. The rules can be inconvenient. For example, it can be uncomfortable wearing a respirator continuously during warm weather, but you have to follow the rules if you want to live to retirement age. Too many marine workers have died from leukemia and other diseases linked to benzene exposure.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Exercise Program Management—how to plan, participate in, and learn from response exercises

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Mr. Joseph Pancotti, Exercise Program Technical Advisor to the Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Contingency Exercises.


Many cities conduct annual training and exercise plan workshops to develop their multi-year training and exercise plans. These workshops typically include a spectrum of exercise stakeholders, including federal, state, local, and tribal officials; representatives from first responder organizations; public health and medical community representatives; volunteers and non-governmental agencies and organizations; and the private sector.

The Plan
A well-designed multi-year exercise plan employs a building-block approach of linked training and exercise activities. As the plan is executed, the training and exercise activities increase in complexity, so the community’s response capability grows.

Types of Exercises
Discussion-based exercises are generally the least complex, but their value should not be underestimated. Tabletop exercises can be used to test plans, policies, or procedures that come into play in a specified incident. During a tabletop exercise, participants apply their knowledge and skills to a problem or series of problems presented by a facilitator in a low-stress environment. The problems are discussed and the resolutions summarized.

Operations-based exercises represent an increased level of complexity, as they include personnel and equipment deployment. The most basic operations-based exercise is the drill, which provides specific training to a limited audience to develop a particular capability.

Next in order of complexity is the functional exercise. Real operations are simulated. Exercise players may participate from command centers or emergency operations centers. Realistic problems are presented to trained personnel, requiring quick thinking and solutions.

The most complex type is the full-scale exercise, which is used to test preparedness across agencies and jurisdictions. Complex, realistic problems are presented to participants, requiring rapid and effective response operations in a real-time, stressful environment.

Lessons Learned
In all cases, the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program requires that exercises be evaluated to assess current capabilities. Deficiencies are noted and included in an improvement plan.

In addition, best practices should be noted so that they can be shared with other response communities.


For more information:
For further information about the types of exercises, exercise planning, and best practices, refer to Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program manuals and the Lessons Learned Information System.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online Preparedness Exercise Databases

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CDR Jane Wong, Chief, Exercise Support and Coordination Branch, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area.


The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Lessons Learned Information Sharing database allows users to share important lessons learned with the entire response community—not just the specific participants of the exercise from which the lesson was extracted. The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a similar database, its Joint Lessons Learned System.

The Coast Guard’s Contingency Preparedness System (CPS) provides the same information sharing capability, capturing elements of the exercises conducted from the original design to the remedial actions required to correct problems identified in exercises.

In the CPS, the CGSAILS database allows Coast Guard personnel to post lessons learned and best practices to enable other units to benefit from their acquired knowledge. Units who observe a partner agency or member of their own command employing a technique or process that allows the response to proceed with greater efficiency and effectiveness can—and should—share that discovery with the rest of the response community.

Also in CPS, the Remedial Action Management Program database allows units to identify planning, funding, personnel, or equipment shortfalls.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Exercises—what’s all the fuss about?

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CDR Jane Wong, Chief, Exercise Support and Coordination Branch, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area.


We may believe that exercises allow people to “practice” what they do in real life, learn more about their response partners, and take their procedures on a test run. Generally, that’s what most exercises attempt—to validate a contingency plan and its implementation.

Once this is accomplished, many participants often return to their offices, congratulating each other on a job well done. But this only marks the halfway point of an exercise.

Pictured above: During an exercise, staff must ensure progress through the “planning P,” a visual representation of the Incident Command System planning process.

Mission Accomplished?
To improve preparedness, the lessons learned and best practices must be identified and—most importantly—acted upon. Validating plans, policies, and procedures is not complete if areas of improvement are not then incorporated back into the applicable plans, policies, and procedures.

In a perfect world, this information would always be incorporated into future plans so that others may benefit. Sadly, plans are often left as they are, and great new ideas are known only by those who participated in the exercise.

Redefining “Failure”
There are some who view identification of weaknesses in their plans as failure. If an exercise is undertaken with the goal that no problems should be found, then participants should identify other projects that would be a better use of their resources.

The only exercise that can be considered a failure is one that doesn’t identify opportunities to improve applicable procedures or plans. It is not a failure to stumble over a roadblock. It is a failure to refuse to remove the roadblock and continue to allow people to stumble over it.

Actionable After-Action Reports
Once participants draft the after-action report, they must then develop an improvement plan, which is arguably one of the most important components of the exercise cycle. These actions often involve multiple agencies and should be developed with participation from relevant planning partners to fully capture each agency’s role in the corrective action.

Don’t Just Stand There, Do Something
Most importantly, each and every responsible agency should be identified to ensure completion of the recommended corrective actions. The final data point in the plan is a completion date.

When the plan is followed faithfully, problems are not allowed to fall through the cracks, nor are they identified at subsequent exercises.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

The Mobilization Readiness Tracking Tool—modernizing Coast Guard response efforts

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Mr. Samuel J. Korson, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Incident Management and Response.


The Coast Guard’s mobilization readiness tracking tool (MRTT) represents a modernization of force readiness. MRTT is a web-based tool that:

· streamlines Coast Guard personnel mobilization;
· captures mobilization-related data;
· provides stakeholders process visibility;
· is capable of tracking active duty personnel assigned temporary duty.

The Process
The MRTT will take a request, match an appropriate individual, and assign him or her to a billet. It will also prevent others from filling the same position. The system will track an individual if he or she is sent elsewhere and ensure that the individual is demobilized properly.

It is also capable of creating force packages (such as incident management teams and joint field office support teams) to facilitate response efforts.

The Contingency Personnel Requirements List
The tool will help tie the Coast Guard’s personnel database to the contingency personnel requirements list, a systematic process to analyze what personnel and equipment support a unit will need for a contingency response.

The MRTT matches the requirements from a unit meeting a surge situation to those on the contingency personnel requirements list. These lists can be uploaded into the mobilization readiness tracking tool, and the planner can then download the appropriate list or create force packages from that list to meet response efforts.

The Voyage Ahead
By providing an automated mechanism by which Incident Command System requirements can match selective criteria, the MRTT enables the Coast Guard to meet the needs associated with a given incident. Logistics section chiefs can remain at their stations within the incident command post and fulfill requests for personnel by entering the web-based system and requesting the appropriate competencies.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Upgrading the Mobile Command Center

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by LCDR Richard Sundland, Command and Control Branch Chief, and LCDR Andre Whidbee, Communications and Sensors Branch Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of C4 and Sensor Capabilities.


Developed as a “system of systems,” the Coast Guard mobile command center (MCC) project supports an array of product lines while maintaining interoperability with partners through compatible communications and network systems and standards.

The MCC project consists of four main subsystems:

· enhanced mobile incident command post (eMICP, pictured above),
· mobile communications vehicle,
· portable SIPRNet,
· portable computer store.

The eMICP is an incident command post that contains temporary office and conference room facilities and a robust communications suite that includes Internet, intranet, SIPRNet, phone, and radio systems.

When used in concert, the mobile command center subsystems provide scalable resources to establish a Coast Guard operational presence in an area with damaged or non-existent communication infrastructure.

Ongoing Support
Incident management, contingency preparedness, continuity of operations, and surge operations have proven to be more effective with the new and improved mobile command center.

The robust communications, terrestrial and satellite network connections, and capability for unclassified and secure communications has enabled the Coast Guard to reach a higher level of interoperability with partners while better allocating and managing resources.

For example, the Coast Guard’s “blue force” tracking technology provides real-time status of all assets in an operational environment, enhancing the situational awareness necessary for tactical decisions.

The Coast Guard will expand the mobile command center project, building a total of three enhanced mobile incident command posts and three mobile command vehicles.

Ultimately, the Coast Guard will have one eMICP and mobile command vehicle on the West Coast and two eMICPs and two mobile command vehicles on the East Coast. This geographic distribution of assets will help ensure Coast Guard incident commanders have the proper command center capabilities for their mission responsibilities.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

USCG’s Preparedness Campaign

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by LT Kristina Hynes and LT Kim Wheatley, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Incident Management and Preparedness.


Readiness vs. Preparedness
The Coast Guard motto “Semper Paratus”— or “Always Ready”—guides its missions and efforts. However, being “ready” is different from being “prepared.”

If individual air and boat crews and shore teams are ready, equipped, and deployed to execute their mission functions, they must also be fully prepared to respond—to combine individual unit and mission area functions into a smoothly operating and consistent whole to ensure a coherent federal response.

Achieving Preparedness
Configuring preparedness to align with both Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard strategic preparedness goals is achieved through the preparedness planning cycle, which links missions to plans, capabilities, exercises, and evaluations.

As the Coast Guard modernizes and DHS refines the planning process and adopts the planning cycle, preparedness will become an increasingly integral component of mission execution.

The Campaign Plan
The Coast Guard is establishing a preparedness campaign plan to outline the preparedness program’s mission and vision, scope and impact, goals and objectives, elements and functions, challenges and initiatives, and its alignment and coordination with national preparedness.

Goals for the next five years include:

• Proactively engage with stakeholders to sustain a cooperative unity of effort to protect, prevent, respond to, and recover from all threats and hazards.
• Integrate Coast Guard contingency plans with appropriate departments, agencies, and jurisdictions.
• Maintain required Coast Guard preparedness program capabilities, including staffing, training, and utilization.
• Enhance preparedness through standard exercise delivery that validates plans, concepts, and capabilities; reinforces training; and provides a measure of readiness.
• Produce lessons learned and best practices that incorporate all elements of Coast Guard preparedness and individual mission readiness.

For more information:

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Biometrics at Sea—closing the revolving door

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CAPT Mark Higgins and LCDR Fair Kim, 7th Coast Guard District.


A Revolving Door
During 2004 and 2005, the Coast Guard interdicted more than 9,000 migrants attempting to illegally enter Puerto Rico from the Dominican Republic—nearly 40 percent of the undocumented migrants intercepted. These migrants were typically repatriated to the Dominican Republic within days of apprehension. In the USCG photo above, this small boat has more than 100 illegal migrants aboard.

The cutters were able to return to their patrols, but many of those interdicted were recidivists. This repeating cycle severely overburdened law enforcement units, provided little incentive for migrants to seek legal immigration avenues, and enabled migrant smugglers to continue to ply their trade.

Without clear consequences, the flow of migrants appeared destined to continue unabated. From a security standpoint, the U.S. did not have a clear idea of exactly who was attempting to penetrate its borders, and whether a would-be migrant was an itinerant worker, deported felon, or terrorist.

Closing the Door
In early 2006, the Coast Guard embarked on an ambitious endeavor to curb these attempts by using biometric equipment at sea to facilitate prosecutions. Biometrics are readily identifiable traits unique to an individual, such as a fingerprint.

This would enable the Coast Guard to track individuals by ascertaining their history of attempted entries into the U.S. and screening each against criminal and immigration databases.

Testing the System
The Coast Guard acquired the biometrics hardware, conducted training, and made other preparations to a prototype cutter. Meanwhile, the service engaged local partner agencies in Puerto Rico including the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Investigations, ICE Office of Detention and Removal, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Office of Field Operations, and Border Patrol. The agencies formed the Caribbean Border Interagency Group to formulate a standard procedure for taking action in response to a biometric “hit” from a Coast Guard interdiction.

In November 2006, USCGC Key Largo got underway with the portable biometrics collection equipment. Within days, the Coast Guard had interdicted three small boats attempting to enter the U.S. with 36 migrants aboard—business as usual in the Mona Pass.

Cutter personnel took biometric scans and a digital photo of each migrant and annotated data packets with information about the interdiction.

Five “Hits”
Five of the migrants had interacted with law enforcement or immigration authorities in the past—four were recidivists, and the fifth migrant’s file revealed a felony drug conviction and previous deportation.

Emboldened by this success, the Coast Guard deployed portable collection units to all five cutters based in San Juan.

Program Successes
From deployment of the Biometrics-at-Sea initiative in November 2006 through the end of 2008, the Coast Guard interdicted 1,986 migrants attempting to enter the United States. Of this group, 459 (more than 23 percent) were recidivist entrants, prior deportees, felons, or otherwise had some derogatory information within the database. As appropriate, these were forwarded for prosecution. In the USCG photo above is a Coast Guard cutter with migrants on deck. The vessel was turned over to local police.

Since the introduction of biometrics, the migrant flow decreased nearly 75 percent.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Upcoming in Proceedings

Fall 2010: Recreational Boating Safety (RBS)
• RBS program synopsis
• State RBS involvement
• RBS partners
• Manufacturing standards
• USCG Auxiliary
• Small vessel security
• Lessons Learned: Barkald/Essence: A routine passage turns tragic.

Winter 2010-11: Fishing Vessel Safety
• Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety program synopsis
• Lessons learned
• Training and outreach
• Collaborative efforts/improvements

Your Opinion
• What do you want to read in Proceedings?
• What area under the Coast Guard’s marine safety, security, and environmental protection missions affects you most?
• What do you want to know more about?

Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Lessons Learned—A Great Lakes Fishing Vessel Sinks Within Seconds—Part IV

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I, Part II, and Part III.


Lessons Learned/Recommendations
There was evidence the operators of the integrated tug and barge failed to maintain a proper lookout to avoid a collision, as required by Inland Navigation Rule 5. There was also evidence the operators failed to make proper use of the radar equipment to obtain early warning of risk of collision.

It could not be verified whether the Linda E crew maintained a lookout or used installed radar to avoid collision. However, the investigation did determine practices that indicated the crew may not have been standing a proper lookout prior to the collision.

Final recommendations included:

• Promote the use of radars with anti-collision alarm features.
• Reiterate the inherent risks associated with operating a boat that has no watertight subdivision, including the difficulty of egress from a fast-sinking vessel.
• Re-emphasize to all Great Lakes fishing vessel operators the importance of properly displaying a fishing day shape.

MSO Milwaukee published the contents of the supplemental report as a safety advisory to all commercial vessels operating in Lake Michigan. A copy of the report was also provided to the state of Wisconsin and local agencies responsible for investigating boating accidents.

For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned—A Great Lakes Fishing Vessel Sinks Within Seconds—Part III

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I and Part II.

An integrated tug and barge (ITB) transited the waters off Port Washington between 11:30 a.m. and 12:05 p.m. on December 11, 1998. Of the 26 vessels investigated, this was the only one in this area around this time.

The visibility of the ITB operator in the pilothouse is restricted for some distance forward of the barge. Even so, the vessel met the visibility requirements of Title 33 CFR 164.15.

Contributing to the Casualty
Lack of visibility from both the ITB and the Linda E most likely contributed to the collision. The window arrangement of the downed vessel, with widely spaced portholes, was not conducive to a wide view of surrounding waters.

It is possible that the sun just off the port bow of the ITB shone directly into the pilothouse and obscured the Linda E. Also, due to the length of the barge, once a small vessel was close off the bow, the tug operator’s view would be obscured, as depicted here.

Additionally, the investigators concluded that the radar on the ITB was not monitored adequately or not used properly. Other contributing factors included the diverted attention of the ITB operator who was standing watch. The mate was performing a non-navigation activity that distracted his attention from activities essential to navigation—like looking out for other vessels.

The Incident
MSC graphic analysis illustrates how the accident may have taken place. Upon collision, the heel of the fishing vessel would have caused rapid downflooding through the submerged large door openings, sinking the vessel within seconds.

It is possible that the crew aboard the ITB neither felt, heard, nor observed the collision. Marks and damage to the barge suggested the collision was brief and light.

Even if the collision were more severe, the resulting change in velocity of the barge would not have been detectable. Noise from generators and activity on the barge may have prevented hearing a collision, and the Linda E most likely sank so quickly that it did not pass far enough aft to be seen by anyone on deck of the barge or in the pilothouse of the tug.

In part IV we will examine the lessons learned from this incident.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.