Better Safe Than Sunk—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine.

Safety Training Modules
Most of the training sessions included an at-sea rescue demonstration by a Coast Guard helicopter team and an opportunity to look at the helicopter and speak to the team.

A half-day course consists of an introduction with a short video of vessels sinking and comments from the U.S. Coast Guard safety program officer.

Immersion Suit Module
In this module, participants don immersion suits, jump in the water, swim/float to a raft, and climb in.

Life Raft Module
In this module a trainer displays the contents of a raft, explaining each item and its utility. A raft deployment demonstration using a volunteer participant clearly illustrates the length of rope incorporated into the raft’s housing and the force of the deployment.

Flares and Firefighting Modules
Participants have the opportunity to shoot off a variety of flares and sample the rations kept in the raft. The firefighting module includes practicing a mayday call and extinguishing fires.

Picture 1: Two fishermen participate in the firefighting module.

Damage Control Module

The damage control module offers fishermen a chance to stem the sudden outpouring of water mimicking actual flooding conditions. A trainer also demonstrates stability issues using vessel models.

Picture 2: A fishing vessel stability demonstration.

First Aid Module
Training sessions include a first aid module that addresses basic issues such as how to handle trauma and bleeding.

Handling Immersion Suits
When the safety training courses began, approximately 30 percent of the immersion suits brought to the courses by fishermen failed.

Failures included:

• malfunctioning zippers;
• dried-up neoprene that cracked when unfolded;
• extraneous lights or whistles that were improperly tied to the suit, resulting in tears or holes;
• suits too large or too small for their owners;
• suits so old that the seams ripped when tried on.

Those who had never attended formal training learned that:

The immersion suit is harder to get on than you think. Getting into the raft with the suit on can be challenging. Having your own suit is important.

Picture 3: Instructor Tom Toolis and Dana Collier (not pictured) lead an immersion suit demonstration while U.S. Coast Guard members serve as lifeguards. All pho- tos by Dr. Madeleine Hall-Arber.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/.

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Better Safe Than Sunk—Part 1

Better Safe Than Sunk—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Dr. Madeleine Hall-Arber, Center for Marine Social Sciences, MIT Sea Grant College Program and Dr. Karina Lorenz Mrakovcich, Department of Science, U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

When the New Bedford, Mass.-based commercial fishing vessel Northern Edge sank on December 20, 2004, only one of the six-person crew survived. Reports explained he was the only one to have participated in fishing vessel safety training.

Soon after, New Bedford’s mayor Fred Kalisz visited the head of NOAA Fisheries in Washington, D.C., to discuss improving safety. Subsequently NOAA Fisheries committed to providing $100,000 toward safety training in New Bedford.

A Sea Change
Ultimately more than 1,200 fishermen attended basic hands-on safety training in Massachusetts between 2005 and 2010. All of the sessions were judged useful and clearly presented. The main suggestions were for slightly longer sessions to allow even more hands-on training, particularly for first aid and fire extinguishing.

Two attendees suggested using a more realistic setting for the firefighting simulation; one suggested a vessel and the other an enclosed space. Another recommendation: Add CPR training to the first aid module.

Workshop trainer Ted Williams explains life raft use.

The Take-Aways
The safety project managers found that direct communication with vessel owners and captains by someone they respect is crucial. Crewmember participation was frequently dependent on the captain’s and/or owner’s encouraging or requiring attendance. Timing is also very important, since it is challenging to attract attendance during active fishing periods, but should be available when safety is still on fishermen’s minds.

The workshops also developed “risk knowledge” among participants so that they began to see safety preparation and training as potentially life-saving rather than simply another bureaucratic requirement. Additionally, the significant level of participation in the safety training by the Northeast fishing industry suggests increasing optimism among fishermen about their ability to survive accidents at sea.

A U.S. Coast Guard at-sea rescue demonstration

In part 2—safety training up close and personal.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse-- Part 4

A routine passage turns tragic.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Findings of the Coast Guard Investigation
The Coast Guard investigation cited the failure of both vessels to determine that a risk of collision existed, as well as inadequate communication between the vessels as they approached each other in a meeting situation as factors contributing to the collision. The investigation ruled out mechanical failure and weather as possible culprits.

Lessons Learned
This was an avoidable tragedy. If commonsense precautions had been taken and well-known rules followed, a young woman’s life would not have been lost.

The following are lessons to be learned to avoid such a casualty:

• All mariners should bear in mind that fatal accidents can and do happen in clear, calm weather; letting your guard down can be an invitation to disaster.
• When you are on the water, make sure to use your eyes and ears because radio contact alone does not guarantee that you will avoid a vessel on collision course with you.
• The purpose of a lookout is to detect, assess, and manage risk—most of all, a risk of collision. Night sailing with only a single helmsman/lookout on watch is an invitation to disaster, particularly if you are not using radar, or are unfamiliar with the waters.

Always keep in mind the fundamental principles of the U.S. Coast Guard International and Inland Navigation Rules.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.
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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse-- Part 3

A routine passage turns tragic.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Tragedy strikes the crewmembers
The yacht’s bilge alarms went off, and the vessel began to creak loudly. The captain told the cook to get over to the tender. He then tried to cast off the tender’s line from the yacht’s stern, but at that moment, the yacht sank from under him—throwing him into the water.

As the cook was swimming toward the tender and the mate was reaching out to her, the tender was pulled out from under him, sinking rapidly as the yacht slipped off the bow of the cargo ship. The captain and the mate found each other in the water, but they lost sight of the cook, who had either been dragged underwater by the towline between the yacht and the tender, or been struck by the tender and dragged underwater as the yacht sank.

Rescue
A crewmember on the cargo ship threw the survivors a life ring with a strobe light, and lowered a lifeboat. At 4:25 a.m., a Coast Guard rescue boat arrived and recovered the mate and the cook, both found floating in the water. They moved the cook into the rescue boat, and immediately began administering CPR. The captain of the yacht was brought aboard the cargo ship.

At 5:03 a.m., the rescue team arrived at Sector Long Island Sound with the yacht’s mate and cook. An ambulance took them to Yale-New Haven Hospital, where the cook was pronounced dead. The mate was treated for mild hypothermia and released. Another Coast Guard rescue vessel was sent out to transport the captain, who had minor injuries, from the cargo ship to Sector Long Island Sound.

The cargo ship suffered no damage as a result of the collision. The sailboat sank, and was a total loss.

In part 4 we will reveal the results of the investigation.

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Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse—Part 2

A routine passage turns tragic.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Pre-collision: Aboard the Yacht

On Sept. 19, 2006, the Essence, a 92-foot sailboat, was anchored in Newport, R.I., preparing to depart for Greenwich, Conn., on a southwesterly course. There were three people aboard: a captain, a mate, and a cook.

Earlier in the day, the mate had been ill with flu-like symptoms and had gone to Newport Hospital, where he was prescribed an antibiotic and a decongestant. He was asleep when the vessel departed Newport at 6 p.m.; the captain was at the helm. The yacht was equipped with two VHF radios, two radar units, a chart plotter, and a GPS unit.

When the vessel departed Newport, one VHF radio was on monitoring channel 16. The other unit, the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid was off; there was no radar reflector set. The vessel was motor sailing; both engines were engaged and the mainsail was set. All lights were working properly.

At 2 a.m., on September 20th, the mate began his watch, and the captain went below to the main salon on the port side to get some sleep. Shortly afterward, the mate noted a vessel ahead, which he believed was about 10 miles away. As he approached, he saw a ship’s green light and two white lights; his first impression was that the ship was on a path to cross his bow from port to starboard. He had visual contact; he did not use the yacht’s radar to track the cargo ship’s movements.

An approaching vessel
At 4:04 a.m., the mate called to the larger vessel on VHF. The pilot on the cargo ship acknowledged him after his second call, and the mate told the pilot that the cargo ship’s port light was out. The mate on the yacht believed he was looking at the bow of the cargo ship, and adjusted his course slightly—approximately 10 degrees to starboard—to show the ship his port side, and to make what he believed would be a port-to-port passage.

The pilot on the larger vessel then called over the radio and asked if the yacht was going to stay clear. After assuring the cargo ship’s pilot that he would do so, the mate made an abrupt 70 to 90 degree turn to starboard without changing speed. Less than 30 seconds later, the two vessels collided.

Post-collision
The captain of the yacht was awakened by the explosive sound of the cargo ship’s bow breaking though the hull of the yacht. The smaller craft was now pinned to the bulbous bow of the cargo ship. The yacht’s captain ran to the pilothouse, where he discovered both other crewmembers awake and uninjured.

All three donned life jackets, but because of the impact site and the collapsed mast and rigging, they could not reach the life raft. The yacht had been towing astern a small 14-foot rigid hull inflatable tender, but the tender’s line had looped so tightly beneath the yacht’s hull that it could not be removed. The captain told the mate to swim over to the tender and use it as a rescue boat. Once aboard the tender, the mate found that he could not start the engine.

In part 3 we will present the results of the collision.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

A routine passage turns tragic.
The pre-dawn hours of Sept. 20, 2006, were clear and calm as cargo ship M/V Barkald set out from Bridgeport, Conn., into Long Island Sound. The pilot was familiar with this ship and crew, having piloted the vessel twice before. The cargo of coal had been unloaded, the anchor heaved, and the ship rode high in the water as she began her voyage. No one could have predicted impending tragedy—a sailboat impaled upon the cargo ship’s bow, and a life lost.

Pre-collision: Aboard the Cargo Ship
At 10 p.m. on Sept. 19, 2006, the captain arrived aboard at Bridgeport. He and the pilot discussed the intended route through the sound, which would have the ship transit north of Stratford Shoals.

Around 2:30 a.m. on September 20, the cargo ship left the anchorage. By 3 a.m., the ship was clearing Stratford Shoals and was brought up to full speed of 15 knots.

A radio call came at 4:04 a.m. The person on the radio referred to “the vessel off my port side.”

At that time, the pilot, who did not respond, was at the port radar; after the call, he went over to the windows on the starboard side of the ship. Both the pilot and the second mate stated that they saw a sailboat’s green and white lights, and both estimated that the smaller vessel was about 1,000 feet off their starboard bow.

Just seconds after the first call, they received a second. After this brief radio exchange, the pilot saw the yacht make a 10-degree course change to starboard, which brought the two vessels even closer together. The pilot responded on the radio, asking if the smaller vessel intended to stay clear of his ship. The yacht’s helmsman assured him that he would stay clear. The pilot then went out to the starboard bridge wing to watch the yacht make what he thought would be a close starboard-to-starboard passing.

Moments later, the pilot saw the yacht come suddenly hard to starboard, crossing in front of his ship. The pilot immediately called to stop the engines, but it was too late. The yacht collided with the cargo ship’s bow, which struck the yacht’s port side at nearly midship.

The cargo ship’s speed at the time of impact was 15knots, and the yacht’s speed was eight knots, making a closing speed of 23 knots. The immediate response aboard the cargo ship was to contact the yacht, call the Coast Guard, and lower a lifeboat.

The story continues in Part 2.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Fish Safe!

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Gina Johansen, Program Manager, Fish Safe BC

“What do you know about fishing?”
Many fishermen live in small fishing communities. They and their neighbors are often fourth-generation fishermen.

At a recent strategic planning session, the first question from the audience to the facilitator (whose only job was to make sure we got through the agenda) was:

“What do you know about fishing?”
If you have an inspection system that does not allow fishermen to use their knowledge of the vessel or have input into what procedures they should have in place, you will undermine their ability to take ownership of a safety program.

So how do we inspire fishermen to incorporate safety aboard? They have to be involved in the development and delivery of education and training programs, and they must be convinced that incorporating safety into their fishing operations will benefit them.

Fish Safe
The Fish Safe BC program uses real fishermen in all aspects of program development and delivery. By providing a forum to discuss safety concerns and work on solutions, regulators are better informed on the realities of fishing, and fishermen provide insight on how to make regulations relevant and effective.

Safest Catch

We recently launched the “Safest Catch” program, which trains fishermen as safety advisors. These advisors provide one- or two-day onboard workshops to their peers, providing tools and direction to the master and crew on how to develop their own safety procedures, emergency drills, and safety equipment orientation.

Pictured: On top, Captain Tim Joys aboard the Sena II takes his crew through an abandon ship drill. On bottom right, Fishermen participate in the stability eduction program. Photos courtesy of Fish Safe.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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The North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association Vessel Safety Program

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Leslie J. Hughes, Director of Government and Industry Affairs, North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association Vessel Safety Program

Crew Safety Training Program
Since 1985, the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association has provided Coast Guard-approved safety training classes to nearly 40,000 mariners. Using hands-on practice to dramatize and enliven the information, the crew safety training program offers shipboard and classroom exercises.

Training includes:

• Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) basic safety training, including personal survival techniques (12 hours), personal safety and social responsibilities (4 hours), firefighting (16 hours), and first aid/CPR (8 hours);
• STCW basic safety training refresher course (24 hours);
• STCW medical care provider (32 hours);
• STCW medical person in charge (40 hours);
• emergency drill instructor workshop (8 hours);
• drill instructor for small boat operators (8 hours);
• onboard drill safety orientation (8 hours);
• proficiency in survival craft (limited) (16 hours);
• HAZWOPER (24 hours and 8-hour refresher);
• shipboard damage control (8 hours);
• shipboard watertight door and hatch maintenance (4.5 hours);
• OSHA compliance workshop (8 hours)

“Safety and Survival at Sea” Series
Videotapes/DVDs are designed to complement hands-on training classes for:

• medical emergencies at sea,
• safety equipment and survival procedures,
• fire prevention and control,
• fishing vessel stability.

All but the stability DVD are also available in Spanish.

Pictured above: Students work as a team to control flooding in damage control classes during NPFVOA vessel safety training. Photo courtesy of NPFVOA.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Lessons Learned —Failed Assumptions Lead to a Fatal Sinking at Sea—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Krista Reddington, technical writer.

Man Overboard!
Two able-bodied seamen were looking for a way to help the chief mate up to the emergency deck. Moments later, one able-bodied seaman fell overboard from the ladder leading to the stack deck. Another able-bodied seaman yelled “man overboard,” prompting the captain to notify the Coast Guard of a situation that was becoming increasingly perilous.

The tug Independence was able to relay the mayday message of the floundering vessel to the parent company via the company’s emergency number. By this time, the chief mate had stopped breathing and the second mate began CPR.

The First Rescuers Arrive
The assistant engineer found the chief mate lying at the foot of the ladder with no pulse and, as he arrived in the wheelhouse, he was informed that an able-bodied seaman had fallen overboard. Crew members attempted to pull him back aboard the vessel, but all attempts failed.

Coast Guard Helicopter 6553 arrived. While hoisting the able-bodied seaman from the water, the crew notified Sector North Carolina that the tug was sinking quickly. The helicopter crew determined they did not have enough fuel to rescue the rest of the tug crew and dropped a 20-person life raft prior to departing the scene.

The tug Justine Foss arrived on the scene just after 1:00 a.m. and waited for the crew to abandon the ill-fated tug. Nearly an hour later, the rescue vessel reported seeing the crew of the other tug mustered on the bow, but the captain never gave the order to abandon ship.

Washed Overboard
Several crewmembers were standing at the forwardmost part of the bow when the tug, severely trimmed by the stern, pitched with the bow straight up. One able-bodied seaman was thrown into the water, while another able-bodied seaman and the chief engineer fell from the bow, landing on the superstructure before entering the water. A large wave washed the second mate into the water. The crew of the Justine Foss was able to locate the able-bodied seaman that had fallen into the water, but it was too late.

The captain, assistant engineer, and ordinary seaman were on the fender of the tug when a large wave washed them into the sea. They remained together for about 20 minutes, until the crew of the other tug was able to pull them aboard.

What went wrong

• Communication Problems—Although the chief engineer was conducting ballasting operations without communication with the wheelhouse, additional ballasting operations were ordered by the captain. The chief engineer was not informed of this and continued to report to the second mate, who then failed to report the procedures to the captain.
• Failure to Practice Good Seamanship—The investigation found several instances where the captain failed to make timely decisions that could have saved the lives of his crewmembers.
• Failure to Follow Regulations—A grave mistake was made in allowing the engineers to stop pumping ballast water out of the #18 port ballast tank and start pumping into the #18 starboard ballast tank. At the angle the tug was listing, the ballast pump sea suction was not submerged, and therefore was pumping only a minimal amount of water into the #18 starboard ballast tank, which assured that the vessel would not right itself. Further, the #4 and #5 port and starboard fuel tanks were cross-connected. If they had not been it would have allowed for hydrostatic balancing, making it possible that this casualty may not have occurred.

The Aftermath
Following its investigation, the Coast Guard recommended disciplinary action against the captain of the tug. As a result, a suspension and revocation action was initiated against his license for negligence, misconduct, and a violation of law or regulation. Additionally, the Coast Guard recommended a review against the second mate for negligence and possible incompetence as well as a review against the assistant engineer for misconduct.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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Lessons Learned —Failed Assumptions Lead to a Fatal Sinking at Sea—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Krista Reddington, technical writer.

Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

The Voyage Begins
Early in the morning of January 18, 2006, the uninspected tug Valour sank into the chilly, wind-blown sea off the coast of Wilmington, N.C. Three crewmembers aboard the vessel lost their lives in the incident. Several factors contributed to the sinking of the tug; unfortunately, almost all can be attributed to human error.

On January 17, 2006, the chief mate noticed the vessel was listing slightly to port and ordered the assistant engineer on watch to pump 15 minutes’ worth of ballast into the #18 starboard ballast tank. Nearly five hours later, the captain took over the watch and ordered the chief engineer to pump the #18 starboard ballast tank dry. At 10:30 p.m., the chief mate entered the wheelhouse to inform the captain of the slight starboard list that was consistent with the vessel’s stability letter; the wind and waves pushing the tug and barge due north may have increased this natural list.

Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 p.m., the second mate and captain noticed the tug had first begun to level, then list to port, then roll to port. The captain contacted the chief engineer to determine what actions were being taken at the time and ordered him to pump out all ballast. The captain sounded the general alarm at 11:20 p.m., and crew was informed via the public announcement system that there was an emergency in the engine room and to assist the chief engineer as necessary. At this point, the vessel was listing approximately 15 degrees to port in the increasingly rough waters.

Miscommunication Leads to Mistrust
At 11:30 p.m., the captain radioed the tug Independence, which was approximately 30 miles away, to report they had taken on water but the engineer was working on it. As the captain sent a “mayday” transmission to the Coast Guard, the chief mate went below to retrieve his survival gear. On his way, he fell down the ladder from the wheel house to the stack deck passageway. The captain heard a noise and rushed from the wheel to investigate. He found the chief mate lying on the deck where he had landed.

The second mate immediately went to assist the chief mate while the captain returned to the wheelhouse. He notified the Coast Guard that the tug had an injured crewmember and may require a helicopter. The second mate found the chief mate dazed, with his legs awkwardly folded and apparently broken; he was clutching his chest and said he could not feel his legs and was having trouble breathing.

The story continues in part 2.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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USCG Auxiliary Commercial Fishing Vessel Examiners

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Mr. Matthew Hooper, USCG Marine Safety Transportation Specialist.

The Coast Guard Auxiliary was established by Congress in 1939 and today is comprised of nearly 30,000 members. These men and women volunteer more than two million hours annually.

Auxilarists perform hundreds of commercial fishing vessel safety exams annually. Nationwide, approximately 25 percent of all exams are performed by auxiliary examiners.

Prospective examiners may attend a week-long training course, must complete a “personal qualification standard,” and pass an oral and practical examination to demonstrate the appropriate knowledge. Once qualified, auxiliary commercial fishing vessel examiners join the ranks of those who work diligently to improve fishing vessel safety.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Online Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Information

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by ENS Amy Downton, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

The official United States Coast Guard Fishing Vessel Safety Division homepage is unrestricted and open to the public.

Homeport Helpful Hints
For navigating around the United States Coast Guard Homeport portal:

• Missions—information about the U.S. Coast Guard’s efforts in marine safety, marine security, and environmental protection.
• Port Directory—public information directory for each U.S. Coast Guard port area.
• Library—U.S. Coast Guard marine safety, marine security, and environmental protection regulations, policy, forms, and publications.

Creating a personal Homeport user account allows users to customize content to access area-specific information by port or interest.

Users may also sign up for USCG text message alerts.

How to Register for a Homeport Account
1. From the Homeport homepage click the “register” link in the upper-right corner of the screen.
2. Read the list of requirements, then click “ok.”
3. If you meet the requirements, complete the Homeport registry form.
4. If you wish to receive USCG alerts by SMS/text messaging, check the box.
5. Select “primary Captain of the Port zone” from the drop-down menu.
6. To add one or more COTP zones, check the box or see “adding other COTP zones to the registration form.”
7. If applicable, select a value under “committees.” For the Safety Advisory Committee, enter your title, role, and associated subcommittee.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010

New requirements for commercial fishing industry vessels—Part 3.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by CAPT Eric Christensen, Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Vessel Activities; Mr. Jack Kemerer, Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Fishing Vessel Safety Division

Classing of Vessels
The act amends 46 U.S.C. §4503 to make it applicable to fishing and fish tender vessels in addition to fish processing vessels, requiring survey and classification of a fishing vessel that is at least 50 feet in overall length, built after July 1, 2012, and operates beyond three nautical miles. It also requires the vessel to remain "in class" and have the appropriate certificates on board.

Other Provisions
Title 46 U.S.C. §4502 is amended by also adding requirements for the Coast Guard to establish a Fishing Safety Training Grants Program and a Fishing Safety Research Grant Program. The grants will be awarded on a competitive basis, and the federal share of the activities costs cannot exceed 75 percent.

Title 46 U.S.C. §4508 is amended by renaming the Commercial Fishing Safety Advisory Committee and reauthorizing it until September 30, 2020. The committee is expanded to 18 members and will continue to represent groups with expertise, knowledge, and experience regarding the commercial fishing industry.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010

New requirements for commercial fishing industry vessels—Part 2.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by CAPT Eric Christensen, Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Vessel Activities; Mr. Jack Kemerer, Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Fishing Vessel Safety Division

Examinations and Certificates of Compliance
Dockside safety examinations at least once every two years are now mandatory for vessels operating beyond three nautical miles. Voluntary exams will continue to be promoted for vessels operating inside three nautical miles.

Individuals authorized to enforce Title 46 may remove a certificate from a vessel operating in a condition that does not comply with the provisions of the certificate. And, if the vessel does not have the required certificate on board, or if the vessel is being operated in an unsafe condition, it may be ordered to return to a mooring and remain there until the certificate is issued/reissued or the condition is corrected.

Training for Operators
A new provision applicable to vessels operating beyond three nautical miles requires individuals in charge of the vessel to pass a training program covering, among other things, seamanship, navigation, stability, fire fighting, damage control, safety and survival, and emergency drills. Refresher training is required every five years.

Construction Standards for Smaller Vessels
Vessels built after January 1, 2010 and less than 50 feet overall in length must be constructed in a manner that provides a level of safety equivalent to the standards for recreational vessels established under 46 U.S.C. §4302. Note: “overall in length” means the horizontal distance of the hull between the foremost part of the stem and the aftermost part of the stern excluding fittings and attachments. This is different from “registered length.”

Loadlines
The act amends 46 U.S.C. §5102(b) making assignment of a loadline a requirement on fishing vessels 79 feet or greater in length that are built after July 1, 2012. Further, fishing vessels built on or before July 1, 2012 that undergo a substantial change to the dimension of or type of vessel completed after July 1, 2012, or a later date set by the Coast Guard, must comply with an alternate loadline compliance program.

The list continues in part 3.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010

New requirements for commercial fishing industry vessels—Part 1.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by CAPT Eric Christensen, Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Vessel Activities; Mr. Jack Kemerer, Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Fishing Vessel Safety Division

Parity for All Vessels
Uniform safety standards are established for all vessels, particularly those operating beyond three nautical miles of the baseline of the territorial sea and coastline of the Great Lakes. In Title 46 U.S.C. §4502(b)(1) “documented” is deleted, so there will no longer be different standards for federally documented and state-registered vessels operating on the same waters.

Replacing Boundary Line with Three Nautical Miles
Title 46 U.S.C. §4502(b)(1)(A) is amended by replacing “Boundary Line” with “three nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea of the United States is measured or three nautical miles from the coastline of the Great Lakes.”

Survival Craft
All fishing industry vessels operating beyond three nautical miles are required to carry survival craft that will meet a new performance standard for primary lifesaving equipment. Title 46 U.S.C. §4502(b)(2)(B) is amended by replacing “lifeboats or liferafts” with “a survival craft that ensures that no part of an individual is immersed in water.”

Records
A new provision requires that the individual in charge of a vessel operating beyond three nautical miles maintain a safety logbook—a record of equipment maintenance and required instruction and drills.

The list continues in part 2.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Champion’s Point of View

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by RADM Kevin S. Cook, U.S. Coast Guard Director of Prevention Policy

The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 was four years in the making and contains provisions that will expand the Coast Guard’s authority and involvement with commercial fishing vessels. Among its provisions, it requires fishing vessels operating more than three nautical miles beyond the baseline to be examined at least once every two years.

Up until now, the Coast Guard’s Fishing Vessel Safety Program has relied on voluntary dockside exams. Much of our effort involved conducting outreach and convincing fishing vessel owners to accept a safety exam.

But with implementation of the Authorization Act, fishing vessel owners now will have to seek out examiners.

Our aim is to reduce the number of fishing vessel casualties and fatalities. We do not want the commercial fishing industry to continue to be the most hazardous occupation in the country.

Join me in making prevention of casualties on commercial fishing vessels a priority and a reality.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/
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The Assistant Commandant’s Perspective

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by RADM Paul Zukunft, U.S. Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship.

A recent Department of Labor finding indicates that the fatal injury rate for fishers and fishing-related workers, at 200 per 100,000, is the highest of any occupation. That number stands in sharp contrast to the fatal injury rate for all workers at 3.3 per 100,000, and necessitates a call for action. The Coast Guard 2010 Authorization Act provides one additional vehicle to improve fishing vessel safety.

The following blog posts include a summary of the fishing vessel safety provisions in the Authorization Act, which notes their impact on the industry and outlines tentative plans for implementation. Although many of the articles in the Proceedings fishing vessel safety issue were written before the Coast Guard Authorization Act was signed, the information is still timely, relevant, and vital to addressing fishing vessel safety issues.

Let’s make it our goal in the next commercial fishing safety edition to celebrate a significant decrease in commercial fishermen injured or lost in their profession.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Fishing vessel meets a mysterious end in the Bering Sea—Part 3

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine

ROVs Provide Eyes Under Water
Early in the morning on July 18, 2001, the ROV located the sunken vessel under 400 feet of water approximately 200 miles northwest of St. Paul, Alaska.

As the vehicle surveyed the wreck, it found that the aft starboard door in the processing space was open and the guillotine closure for the starboard discharge chute was more than half open.

Unraveling a Mystery
Because there were no survivors or surface evidence to reveal what happened, the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Center conducted an analysis that suggested the vessel likely flooded rapidly through the open door in the bulkhead of the processing space, galley, and engine room, through non-watertight doors.

It is likely that the vessel lost all positive stability between one minute forty seconds and two minutes forty seconds, and sank in as few as four minutes six seconds after the progressive flooding began.

Recreating the Tragedy
The layout of the vessel increased the likelihood of the progressive flooding from the processing space. The door leading from the processing space to the aft deck was far outboard on the starboard side, which would have reduced the heel angle at which water would enter the processing space.

The doors leading forward into the galley and engine room were also located on the starboard side. The angle to starboard caused by the inflow of water through the aft door combined with the free surface effect inside the processing space would cause the water to spill forward into the galley, into the engine room, and eventually into the fish hold.

Likely causes of progressive flooding into the processing space:

• a wash-up hose was left on or the water supply from the plate freezers may have caused the processing space to flood internally,
• the processing space could have flooded by boarding seas flooding from the aft deck,
• the space could have flooded through the open aft door if the vessel had rolled to starboard by at least 23 degrees.

No matter the means by which the water entered the processing space, the subsequent stability would have been reduced and the flooding continued until the vessel sank. Had the processing space been weathertight, the vessel would not have sunk.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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Fishing vessel meets a mysterious end in the Bering Sea—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine

A Call for Help
The Coast Guard received an Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) notification from the Arctic Rose via telex at 3:35 a.m. on April 2.
Air Station Kodiak launched a C-130 at 4:00 a.m. to begin the search for the missing vessel and continued to try to contact it, without success.

Shortly before the C-130’s arrival on scene at 7:30 a.m., it contacted the
Alaskan Rose via VHF radio. The mate told the C-130 crew that he had not heard a “mayday” from the sister vessel and altered his own vessel’s course to intercept the EPIRB.

As they traveled the 11 miles south to the EPIRB position, the mate continued, unsuccessfully, to try to hail the other vessel on VHF radio.

Captain Recovered
Approximately one hour after receiving the Coast Guard transmission, the Alaskan Rose entered a debris field and the crew spotted the captain of their sister ship in the water.

The mate donned an immersion suit and swam to the captain. The crew threw a ring buoy to the mate and hoisted him and the captain aboard, where they administered CPR, to no avail.

When his body was recovered, the captain was fully clothed, wearing boots, but his immersion suit was filled with water. The cause of death was later determined to be salt water drowning.

A Desperate Search
For the next 36 hours, the crew of the rescue vessel searched for survivors. Several miles south of the debris field, they came across an inflatable life raft belonging to the vanished fishing boat, but it was empty.

As there was nothing for them to recover on the surface, the Coast Guard conducted two expeditions using a remote operated vehicle (ROV) to collect data for the marine board’s investigation.

Continued in part 3.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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Fishing vessel meets a mysterious end in the Bering Sea—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Krista Reddington, Technical Writer

In late March 2001, the F/V Arctic Rose departed Dutch Harbor in Unalaska, Alaska, with a crew of 15 and made several trawls in an area of the Bering Sea known for producing small amounts of yellow fin sole.

On March 31, the vessel took on 3,591 gallons of fuel and an unknown amount of water, but did not offload cargo at the last port of call—St. Paul, Alaska. The vessel then sailed to the Zemchug Canyon Bering Sea fishing grounds to participate in the flathead sole season, which opened on April 1.

The vessel Alaskan Rose, owned and operated by the same company, was fishing within 10 to 15 miles of the Arctic Rose. The captains spoke late in the evening of April 1, when Arctic Rose’s captain expressed his irritation at the garbage that had been left in the processing space, clogging the chopper sump pump.

In a discussion of the day’s events between the Arctic Rose captain and the other vessel’s mate around 10:30 p.m., the captain did notreport any mechanical problems or other concerns, and the problems with the sump pump had been resolved. The mate later testified that he last saw the Arctic Rose on radar around 11:59 p.m.

Vessel Versus Nature
A forecast from the National Weather Service (NWS) called for a gale warning, with seas building to 16-24 feet by the morning of April 2. The NWS typically generates forecasts that are conservative in nature to compensate for the lack of data buoys and weather stations in the region. Because of the cautious nature of the forecasts, fishermen tend to discount them.

However, a “hindcast” that examined the actual weather in the vicinity of the sunken vessel, showed that a weather “triple point” occurred at the vessel’s last known position. This a frontal system where a cold, warm, and occluded front join together, and is usually associated with severe weather. It is likely that the vessel experienced these three distinct weather patterns in a short period of time.

The story continues in part 2.

PICTURED: National Weather Service surface analysis for 4 a.m. on April 2, 2001. The red star indicates the approximate position of the Arctic Rose. Graphic courtesy of the National Weather Service.

For more information:

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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Vessel adrift in fog leads to tragedy—Part 3

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine

The Coast Guard cited violations of Inland Navigation Rules by the operators of the towing vessel, including:

• Rule 5—Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.
• Rule 19(c)—Every vessel shall have due regard to the prevailing circumstance and conditions of restricted visibility....

In addition to possible violations of rules 5 and 19c, the Coast Guard cited possible violations of the following Inland Navigation Rules by the operator of the recreational vessel:

• Rule 9(b)—A vessel of less than 20 meters in length or a sailing vessel shall not impede the passage of a vessel that can safely navigate only within a narrow channel or fairway.
• Rule 23(c)(i)—A power-driven vessel of less than 12 meters in length may in lieu of the lights prescribed in paragraph (a) of this rule exhibit an all-round white light and sidelights.
• Rule 35(b)—A power-driven vessel underway but stopped and making no way through the water shall sound at intervals of not more than two minutes two prolonged blasts in succession with an interval of about two seconds between them.

Lessons Learned
Employ a designated lookout. As this story illustrates, radar alone cannot take the place of human eyes and ears when a vessel is pushing ahead nearly 1,000 feet of barges at night in heavy fog.

Both the captain and the pilot were well aware that visibility was a problem: They later told investigators that they could not see either riverbank 1,000 feet away. As seasoned professional mariners, they should have been aware that both the large visual and the radar blind spots further diminished their ability to see.

Practice good seamanship. Fundamental principles of good seamanship apply to all mariners, regardless of vessel or crew size. Boaters should have at least one person aboard who is alert at all times—to do otherwise risks your own and other boaters’ safety. Boating without proper equipment is also extremely dangerous, particularly at night, in inclement weather, and on busy commercial waterways.

No one from the smaller vessel’s crew survived to be held accountable, so the licensed crewmembers on the towboat shouldered most of the blame for the accident. Certainly they made errors, for which they were censured.

However, those on the unlit vessel—drifting slowly into the path of an oncoming barge in the foggy darkness of that July morning—made many mistakes as well. Unfortunately, they paid the ultimate price for their lapse in judgment.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2010.
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Vessel adrift in fog leads to tragedy—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine

Coast Guard Investigation
The Coast Guard’s investigation determined that the center lead barge in the tow collided with the recreational vessel, rolling the smaller boat. Tragically, the swamping of the boat, combined with the force of the collision with the tow, drowned all six men aboard.

Problems on the towboat
Visibility: Fog in the area limited visibility to less than half a mile, so the pilot activated the towboat’s automatic fog signal. The captain and the pilot testified that they were unable to see either riverbank at a distance of approximately 1,000 feet.

Blind spot: The captain was serving as the sole lookout from the pilothouse at the time of the collision, and the towboat’s empty barges were riding high in the water, making it harder to see objects in front of them.

Radar clutter: Open hopper barges can cause radar signals to bounce off the inside plating, producing a “cluttered” image that can make the tow appear larger than it is. This effect can obscure radar contacts that fall within the oversized image.

The lack of a forward lookout and radar clutter on the towboat notwithstanding, the condition of the recreational vessel and its crew significantly contributed to the tragedy.

Problems on the recreational vessel
Lights: Investigators determined that the recreational vessel did not have any navigation lights on at the time of the collision.

Sound-producing mechanism: There was no fog signal in place aboard the vessel. The boat was equipped with a conventional horn; however, as fog absorbs sound, it was unlikely that this would have been heard even if it had been used.

Radar: The vessel was not equipped with VHF radio or radar, and had no radar reflector.

Overload: The recreational vessel’s loading exceeded the maximum weight rating recommended by the manufacturer by approximately 229 pounds, which would have decreased both the vessel’s radar signature and its visibility.

Unanchored vessel: The anchor and line were found inside the vessel when it was recovered, revealing that it was adrift at the time of the collision.

Situational awareness: The victims may have had severely diminished situational awareness at the time of the collision. The men had been out all night, and two of them had been on the water for approximately 16 hours, so fatigue may have been a factor.

Lifesaving apparatus: No one aboard the recreational vessel was wearing a personal flotation device at the time of the accident.

In part 3, we will highlight the Coast Guard’s conclusions.

Caption: The towboat’s empty barges were riding high in the water, making it
hard to see objects in front of it.

For more information:

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2010

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Vessel adrift in fog leads to tragedy—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele, Technical Writer

A cry in the dark
In the foggy pre-dawn darkness of July 12, 2001, the captain of the towboat M/V Elaine G heard a cry from the dark water of the Ohio River. It was 5:25 a.m., and the vessel was traveling at a speed of six knots, pushing 14 empty hopper barges along that stretch of river in Kentucky.

The captain sounded the general alarm, brought the engines to all stop, and maintained position in the river while the crew searched for the source.

At 5:50 a.m., having failed to find anyone in the water, the captain backed the 998-foot tow onto the Kentucky bank and contacted Coast Guard Group Ohio Valley by VHF radio, and reported that the tow was stopping to investigate.

Crewmembers discovered two seat cushions floating in the water between the starboard and center strings and the port and center strings of the barges. After the fog lifted, more items were found floating in the water, including two paddles, a plastic bucket, and a ball cap.

The Indiana Department of Natural Resources arrived first on the scene at 8:00 a.m., followed by the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office (MSO) Louisville investigators. The MSO investigators determined that only the tow and a nearby recreational vessel could have been involved in the incident.

Sad discovery
On July 18, 2001, a 17-foot recreational vessel was recovered approximately three miles away. It was found floating awash in a vertical position with the stern down.

The body of a man was found under the starboard side steering console, and a large dog was found under the port side console. Over the next three days, the bodies of five other men were recovered from the Ohio River in that vicinity.

Damage to the Vessels
The initial investigation revealed damage that told a decisive story. While the towboat itself sustained no damage, when they examined its string of barges, investigators observed scrape marks on the bow rake of the center lead barge. These marks, which began at 42.5 inches above the waterline and extended down approximately 20 inches, were consistent with the damage found on the recreational vessel.

The recreational vessel had scrapes in an 80-degree pattern on the port gunwale beginning approximately 19 inches from the stern and continuing forward three feet and four inches further. This was believed to be the initial contact point with the rake of the center lead barge.

A similar pattern of 85-degree scrapes appeared on the port transom top, indicating a slight twisting motion around the time of the initial contact. The windshield was shattered and bent to starboard, and part of the forward handrail was missing, compressed, and bent at a 75-degree angle. The starboard forward handrail, also partially missing, was bent forward and down, puncturing the hull coaming at the bow.

In part II we will outline the subsequent Coast Guard investigation.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2010.

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USCG Proceedings NEW DIGITAL EDITION now online

Proceedings now offers an online digital edition that can be read from laptop and desktop computers as well as mobile devices, including:

iPad, iPod Touch, iPhone, Blackberry Torch and Playbook, and most Android-powered phones and tablets.

Go to www.uscg.mil/proceedings and click on the cover picture to view.

Nautical Deck Queries Answers Part—2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. Nautical Deck Queries Answers Part—2.

1. A star is observed at lower transit. The line of position derived from this sight is_____.

A. on the prime vertical
Incorrect answer.
B. a latitude line
Correct answer. A sight taken when a body is either due north or due south of the observer, while transiting the observer’s meridian, yields a line of position extending in an east-west direction. This is a parallel of latitude when plotted.
C. a longitude line
Incorrect answer.
D. of no special significance
Incorrect answer.

2. BOTH INTERNATIONAL & INLAND: Which signal may at some time be exhibited by a trawling vessel?

A. two white lights in a vertical line
Incorrect answer.
B. a white light over a red light in a vertical line
Incorrect answer.
C. two red lights in a vertical line
Incorrect answer.
D. all of the above
Correct answer. Annex II of the Navigation Rules defines additional signals for fishing vessels fishing in close proximity. The annex includes signals for trawlers and states: “Vessels of twenty meters or more in length when engaged in trawling, whether using demersal or pelagic gear, shall exhibit:

(i) when shooting their nets: two white lights in a vertical line
(ii) when hauling their nets: one white light over one red light in a vertical line
(iii) when the net has come fast upon an obstruction: two red lights in a vertical line.”

3. An International Tonnage Certificate will be issued to a vessel when it meets several requirements, one of which is that the vessel must__________.

A. admeasure over 100 GT
Incorrect answer.
B. be 79 or more feet in length
Correct answer. As per 46 CFR 69.69, on request of the vessel owner, an International Tonnage Certificate (1969) is issued for a vessel measured under this subpart that is 79 feet or more in registered length and that will engage on a foreign voyage. The certificate is issued to the vessel owner or master and must be maintained on board the vessel when it is engaged on a foreign voyage.
C. engage in intercoastal or international trade
Incorrect answer.
D. be issued a certificate of inspection
Incorrect answer.

4. Wages due a seaman may be attached by the court for the__________.

A. payment of any fines imposed by the court
Incorrect answer.
B. payment of back taxes to the IRS
Incorrect answer.
C. support of a spouse
Correct answer. As per 46 USC Sec 11109(a), wages due or accruing to a master or seaman are not subject to attachment or arrestment from any court, except for an order of a court about the payment by a master or seaman of any part of the master’s or seaman’s wages for the support and maintenance of the spouse or minor children of the master or seaman, or both.
D. all of the above
Incorrect answer.

To see the questions to these Nautical Deck Queries click here.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/articles/91_DeckAnswers.pdf.



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Nautical Engineering Deck Questions Part—1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. Nautical Engineering Deck Questions Part—1.

1. A star is observed at lower transit. The line of position derived from this sight is_____.

A. on the prime vertical
B. a latitude line
C. a longitude line
D. of no special significance

2. BOTH INTERNATIONAL & INLAND: Which signal may at some time be exhibited by a trawling vessel?

A. two white lights in a vertical line
B. a white light over a red light in a vertical line
C. two red lights in a vertical line
D. all of the above

3. An International Tonnage Certificate will be issued to a vessel when it meets several requirements, one of which is that the vessel must__________.

A. admeasure over 100 GT
B. be 79 or more feet in length
C. engage in intercoastal or international trade
D. be issued a certificate of inspection

4. Wages due a seaman may be attached by the court for the__________.

A. payment of any fines imposed by the court
B. payment of back taxes to the IRS
C. support of a spouse
D. all of the above

Stay tuned to see the answers to these Nautical Deck Queries.

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Nautical Engineering Queries Answers Part—2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. Nautical Engineering Queries Answers Part—2.

1. Amortisseur windings are installed in a synchronous motor to __________.

A. reduce eddy current losses
Incorrect answer. To reduce eddy current losses, the core of the synchronous motor stator is built up from many thin steel sheets that are insulated from each other with a coating of varnish.
B. produce a higher power factor
Incorrect answer. To adjust the power factor of a synchronous motor, a DC exciter varies the amount of current to the rotor field windings. Low values of field current result in less hold-in strength and a lagging (lower) power factor. Conversely, high values of field current result in greater hold-in strength and a leading (higher) power factor.
C. provide a means for starting
Correct answer. The amortisseur winding is a squirrel-cage winding consisting of copper bars embedded in the rotor pole faces, and is used to start and accelerate the synchronous motor to near synchronous speed.
D. eliminate arcing between
Incorrect answer. Any arcing would occur at the DC exciter circuit breaker when opened. To prevent this, a “field-discharge resistor” converts the energy stored in the magnetic field of the rotor to heat energy that is harmlessly dissipated to the atmosphere.

Note: Synchronous motors are utilized in applications in which constant speed is essential, or where the power factor of a system must be maintained at a high level. Large machines that are in continuous service for long periods of time operate more efficiently when driven by synchronous motors.

2. Coast Guard regulations (46 CFR) define several acceptable means of closure for ballast and fuel oil tank vents. One of the acceptable means is by the use of a/an __________.

A. manually operated ball
Incorrect answer. 46 CFR 56.50-85(a)(7)(i) states: “A ball check valve where the ball float, normally in the open position, will float up and close under the action of a submerging wave.” A ball float check valve that will float up and close under the action of a submerging wave is an automatically operated valve.
B. automatically operated
Correct answer. 46 CFR 56.50-85(a)(7)(ii) states: “A hinged closure normally open on the outlet of the return bend, which must close automatically by the force of a submerging wave …”
C. permanently installed
Incorrect answer. A permanently installed canvas hood over the vent would prevent proper venting of the ballast and/or fuel oil tank under normal operating conditions.
D. corrosion-resistant wire screen I
ncorrect answer. A corrosion-resistant wire screen is a permeable material, and would not prevent the entrance of water into the ballast and/or fuel oil tank from a submerging wave or other source.

3. A continuous blow is used to __________.

A. regulate the density or salinity
Correct answer. A continuous blow, as the term implies, is the continuous removal of water from the boiler via a tapped connection close to the boiler water surface. A continuous blow allows for the regulation of the salinity of the boiler with minimal loss of water and heat from the boiler.
B. remove scum from the surface
Incorrect answer. A surface blow is used to remove scum and light solids from the surface of the boiler water via a tapped connection at the boiler water surface.
C. permit air to escape while
Incorrect answer. Venting of the boiler through the “aircock” permits the escape of air from a cold boiler when raising steam. The “aircock” is a high-pressure globe valve installed at the highest point of the steam drum.
D. remove sludge from the bottom
Incorrect answer. A bottom blow is used to remove heavy solids and sludge via a tapped connection at the bottom of the water (mud) drum.

Note: Boiler blowdown is the removal of water from a boiler to control boiler water parameters within prescribed limits to minimize scale, corrosion, and carryover.

4. What type of engine lubrication oil filter system sends filtered oil directly back to the high-pressure discharge
manifold?

A. centrifugal purifier system
Incorrect answer. The centrifugal purifier filtering system is a “sump”-type filtering system. The purifier is supplied lubricating oil from the engine sump, purifies same, and then discharges the clean oil back to the engine sump.
B. bypass system
Incorrect answer. In a “bypass”-type filtering system, a portion of the oil discharged by the lube oil supply pump is continuously passed through filter(s) and then discharged back into the sump. To ensure that sufficient oil is supplied to the engine bearings, the amount of oil passed through the filter(s) is limited through the use of a flow-restricting orifice.
C. shunt system
Correct answer. In a shunt-type filtering system, oil taken from the engine sump by the lube oil supply pump is discharged first into a strainer, then through a filter and cooler, and finally to the high-pressure discharge (supply) manifold. To ensure that an adequate flow of oil will be delivered to the engine at all times, the filter and strainer are fitted with pressure relief valves.
D. batch system
Incorrect answer. The “batch” system of filtering lubricating oil is a reclamation process performed periodically. When the engine oil has become too contaminated, it is drained and the system refilled with fresh oil. After the drained oil has been permitted to settle, any water or contaminants are removed through filtering and/or centrifuging. After the reclamation process is complete, the oil is stored for reuse.

To see the questions to these Nautical Engineering Queries click here.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/articles/90_EngineeringAnswers.pdf.

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Fall 2011 Search and Rescue is available online!

The current edition of Proceedings (Fall 2011 Search and Rescue) is available online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/. This edition highlights search and rescue agencies, partners, and the Good Samaritans who work alongside Coast Guard responders to improve response time to distressed boaters/sailors all around the world.

This issue is very exciting for Proceedings, since changes have been made to the way readers will view our editions. This edition officially kicks off our digital viewing option, which is more reader-friendly. To view our digital edition, click on the Fall 2011 headline icon, the magazine cover, or the link beneath the magazine cover to be directed to the digital magazine. We hope you enjoy this new edition and new format!

Nautical Engineering Queries Questions Part—1.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. Nautical Engineering Queries Questions Part—1.

1. Amortisseur windings are installed in a synchronous motor to __________.

A. reduce eddy current losses
B. produce a higher power factor
C. provide a means for starting
D. eliminate arcing between the stator and the rotor

2. Coast Guard regulations (46 CFR) define several acceptable means of closure for ballast and fuel oil tank vents.
One of the acceptable means is by the use of a/an __________.

A. manually operated ball check valve
B. automatically operated hinged closure
C. permanently installed canvas hood
D. corrosion-resistant wire screen

3. A continuous blow is used to __________.

A. regulate the density or salinity of boiler water
B. remove scum from the surface of boiler water
C. permit air to escape while raising steam in a cold boiler
D. remove sludge from the bottom of the water drum

4. What type of engine lubrication oil filter system sends filtered oil directly back to the high-pressure discharge
manifold?

A. centrifugal purifier system
B. bypass system
C. shunt system
D. batch system

Stay tuned to see the answers to these Nautical Engineering Queries.

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Yes We CAN! The Citizens’s Action Network Part—2.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Judy Darby, Program Coordinator, U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, District Eight.

The success of the Citizen’s Action Network program is proportional to the number of members in the network, the extent of their training, and their familiarity with their particular waterway. A member’s contribution is not dependent on his or her ability to confront a situation or fix a problem, but on the ability to report appropriate information to the Coast Guard investigator.

CAN members might be called upon to aid search and rescue efforts, verify radio calls and flare sightings, and note unsafe vessel operation, aids to navigation equipment outages/abnormalities, suspicious activity, and marine pollution.

After training, a member receives the Coast Guard sector communications emergency number to be used for reporting purposes. CAN reporting uses the acronym “LAST” to describe the information to be reported:

• location of the incident,
• activity,
• size and identification information of the vessel involved in the incident,
• time, date, and conditions at the scene of the incident.

As well-trained members are best prepared to aid Coast Guard watchstanders, the committee provides a CAN observers’ manual that instructs members as to the order in which the watchstander will ask for pertinent information and terminology that will be used.

See Part 1 here.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Yes We CAN! The Citizens Action Network Part—1.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Judy Darby, Program Coordinator, U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, District Eight.

The area of District Eight encompasses the New Orleans metropolitan area north to the Red River and west to Lafayette, La. Within this area, there are thousands of acres of sparsely populated marshland and swamp near the cities of Baton Rouge, Port Fouchon, Lafayette, Morgan City, and New Iberia.

Citizen’s Action Network (CAN) USCG Auxiliarists worked to launch a small committee of citizens who volunteer to help the U.S. Coast Guard save lives and property, report oil spills, and protect wildlife, in an effort to improve area maritime security.

The committee focused its early recruiting efforts on auxiliarists who live, work, and recreate on the water, and on large entities with permanent water presence and an interest in adding another layer of security. These partners include:

The Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission—which manages the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway, a double span that stretches 24 miles entirely over open water from Jefferson Parish to St. Tammany Parish in the New Orleans metropolitan area.

NASA/Michoud Assembly Facility—located on an 800-acre tract in East New Orleans, the facility has direct access to the Intracoastal Waterway.

The Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation—This non-profit foundation had partnered with the Coast Guard in environmental efforts.

Recruitment Efforts
Recreational boaters, fishermen, and waterfront homeowners were reached through vendors who display tri-fold Citizen’s Action Network information brochures and application forms at checkout counters.

Anyone interested in joining can now fill out the form online and send it directly to the local CAN coordinator, who verifies that the applicant contact information is correct and vets the applicant for program participation.

Stay tuned for Part 2.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Understanding Acrylonitrile

This "Chemical of the Quarter" excerpt is from the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine, by LCDR Gretchen Bailey, Marine Inspector, U.S. Coast Guard Hazardous Materials Standards Division

What is it?
Acrylonitrile is a colorless to pale yellow volatile liquid that is soluble in water and used in common solvents. Technical-grade acrylonitrile is more than 99 percent pure and always contains a polymerization inhibitor.

Acrylonitrile is a reactive chemical that polymerizes (converts one compound into another) spontaneously, either when heated or in the presence of a strong alkali. I

How is it shipped?
Acrylonitrile is typically shipped as a liquid in low-pressure tank railcars, as liquid in tank barges, or by truck as liquid in non-pressure liquid tanks.

Why should I care?
Shipping concerns.
Acrylonitrile is a polymerizing cargo that can become explosive when heated or involved in a fire. This product has a very low flash point—30 degrees Fahrenheit—and using water to fight the fire may be inefficient. When this cargo is heated or burned, it may produce a toxic vapor of hydrogen cyanide gas, so it is essential to keep a safe distance during a fire. Additionally, its vapor is heavier than air and has been known to travel a considerable distance to an ignition source, then flash back to the spill.

Health concerns.
It is very toxic by ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through the skin. Symptoms of poisoning will begin with irritation of the eyes, limb weakness, difficulty in breathing, dizziness, and impaired judgment. If the degree of poisoning increases, the symptoms will progress to cyanosis, nausea, collapse and loss of consciousness, irregular breathing, convulsions, and respiratory arrest.

Because it is lighter than water, acrylonitrile will form a light surface sheen when spilled on the water. Sorbent booms, pillows, and other containment tools will be contaminated and must not be handled without appropriate personnel protective equipment. However, due to its moderately high solubility, acrylonitrile will quickly dissolve into the water column.

Fire or explosion concerns.
Acrylonitrile is flammable and has the capability to explode. This happens when the cargo is heated, causing a polymerization reaction, which is highly exothermic. If the cargo is involved with a fire, the fumes from the cargo are a poisonous gas and should be avoided.

It is essential for emergency responders to wear self-contained breathing apparatus and rubber overclothing (including gloves), and to combat the fire from a safe distance or protected location. The most efficient way to extinguish the fire is with dry chemical foam, alcohol foam, or carbon dioxide. With water, use spray or fog; do not use straight stream.

What is the Coast Guard doing about it?
Acrylonitrile is categorized as a “Subchapter D” cargo, regulated in 46 Code of Federal Regulations Part 30.25. This cargo is carried in tank barges and ships that are required to be inspected by the Coast Guard.

Required design and construction standards for these vessels include:
· being double-skinned,
· having spacing between the hull and the inner tank wall,
· employing individual tank manifolds and pumps to avoid cross-contamination,
· utilizing a separate tank venting facility,
· being capable of internally circulating the tanks,
· being capable of being ventilated.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.