Better Safe Than Sunk—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine.

Safety Training Modules
Most of the training sessions included an at-sea rescue demonstration by a Coast Guard helicopter team and an opportunity to look at the helicopter and speak to the team.

A half-day course consists of an introduction with a short video of vessels sinking and comments from the U.S. Coast Guard safety program officer.

Immersion Suit Module
In this module, participants don immersion suits, jump in the water, swim/float to a raft, and climb in.

Life Raft Module
In this module a trainer displays the contents of a raft, explaining each item and its utility. A raft deployment demonstration using a volunteer participant clearly illustrates the length of rope incorporated into the raft’s housing and the force of the deployment.

Flares and Firefighting Modules
Participants have the opportunity to shoot off a variety of flares and sample the rations kept in the raft. The firefighting module includes practicing a mayday call and extinguishing fires.

Picture 1: Two fishermen participate in the firefighting module.

Damage Control Module

The damage control module offers fishermen a chance to stem the sudden outpouring of water mimicking actual flooding conditions. A trainer also demonstrates stability issues using vessel models.

Picture 2: A fishing vessel stability demonstration.

First Aid Module
Training sessions include a first aid module that addresses basic issues such as how to handle trauma and bleeding.

Handling Immersion Suits
When the safety training courses began, approximately 30 percent of the immersion suits brought to the courses by fishermen failed.

Failures included:

• malfunctioning zippers;
• dried-up neoprene that cracked when unfolded;
• extraneous lights or whistles that were improperly tied to the suit, resulting in tears or holes;
• suits too large or too small for their owners;
• suits so old that the seams ripped when tried on.

Those who had never attended formal training learned that:

The immersion suit is harder to get on than you think. Getting into the raft with the suit on can be challenging. Having your own suit is important.

Picture 3: Instructor Tom Toolis and Dana Collier (not pictured) lead an immersion suit demonstration while U.S. Coast Guard members serve as lifeguards. All pho- tos by Dr. Madeleine Hall-Arber.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/.

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Better Safe Than Sunk—Part 1

Better Safe Than Sunk—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Dr. Madeleine Hall-Arber, Center for Marine Social Sciences, MIT Sea Grant College Program and Dr. Karina Lorenz Mrakovcich, Department of Science, U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

When the New Bedford, Mass.-based commercial fishing vessel Northern Edge sank on December 20, 2004, only one of the six-person crew survived. Reports explained he was the only one to have participated in fishing vessel safety training.

Soon after, New Bedford’s mayor Fred Kalisz visited the head of NOAA Fisheries in Washington, D.C., to discuss improving safety. Subsequently NOAA Fisheries committed to providing $100,000 toward safety training in New Bedford.

A Sea Change
Ultimately more than 1,200 fishermen attended basic hands-on safety training in Massachusetts between 2005 and 2010. All of the sessions were judged useful and clearly presented. The main suggestions were for slightly longer sessions to allow even more hands-on training, particularly for first aid and fire extinguishing.

Two attendees suggested using a more realistic setting for the firefighting simulation; one suggested a vessel and the other an enclosed space. Another recommendation: Add CPR training to the first aid module.

Workshop trainer Ted Williams explains life raft use.

The Take-Aways
The safety project managers found that direct communication with vessel owners and captains by someone they respect is crucial. Crewmember participation was frequently dependent on the captain’s and/or owner’s encouraging or requiring attendance. Timing is also very important, since it is challenging to attract attendance during active fishing periods, but should be available when safety is still on fishermen’s minds.

The workshops also developed “risk knowledge” among participants so that they began to see safety preparation and training as potentially life-saving rather than simply another bureaucratic requirement. Additionally, the significant level of participation in the safety training by the Northeast fishing industry suggests increasing optimism among fishermen about their ability to survive accidents at sea.

A U.S. Coast Guard at-sea rescue demonstration

In part 2—safety training up close and personal.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse-- Part 4

A routine passage turns tragic.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Findings of the Coast Guard Investigation
The Coast Guard investigation cited the failure of both vessels to determine that a risk of collision existed, as well as inadequate communication between the vessels as they approached each other in a meeting situation as factors contributing to the collision. The investigation ruled out mechanical failure and weather as possible culprits.

Lessons Learned
This was an avoidable tragedy. If commonsense precautions had been taken and well-known rules followed, a young woman’s life would not have been lost.

The following are lessons to be learned to avoid such a casualty:

• All mariners should bear in mind that fatal accidents can and do happen in clear, calm weather; letting your guard down can be an invitation to disaster.
• When you are on the water, make sure to use your eyes and ears because radio contact alone does not guarantee that you will avoid a vessel on collision course with you.
• The purpose of a lookout is to detect, assess, and manage risk—most of all, a risk of collision. Night sailing with only a single helmsman/lookout on watch is an invitation to disaster, particularly if you are not using radar, or are unfamiliar with the waters.

Always keep in mind the fundamental principles of the U.S. Coast Guard International and Inland Navigation Rules.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.
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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse-- Part 3

A routine passage turns tragic.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Tragedy strikes the crewmembers
The yacht’s bilge alarms went off, and the vessel began to creak loudly. The captain told the cook to get over to the tender. He then tried to cast off the tender’s line from the yacht’s stern, but at that moment, the yacht sank from under him—throwing him into the water.

As the cook was swimming toward the tender and the mate was reaching out to her, the tender was pulled out from under him, sinking rapidly as the yacht slipped off the bow of the cargo ship. The captain and the mate found each other in the water, but they lost sight of the cook, who had either been dragged underwater by the towline between the yacht and the tender, or been struck by the tender and dragged underwater as the yacht sank.

Rescue
A crewmember on the cargo ship threw the survivors a life ring with a strobe light, and lowered a lifeboat. At 4:25 a.m., a Coast Guard rescue boat arrived and recovered the mate and the cook, both found floating in the water. They moved the cook into the rescue boat, and immediately began administering CPR. The captain of the yacht was brought aboard the cargo ship.

At 5:03 a.m., the rescue team arrived at Sector Long Island Sound with the yacht’s mate and cook. An ambulance took them to Yale-New Haven Hospital, where the cook was pronounced dead. The mate was treated for mild hypothermia and released. Another Coast Guard rescue vessel was sent out to transport the captain, who had minor injuries, from the cargo ship to Sector Long Island Sound.

The cargo ship suffered no damage as a result of the collision. The sailboat sank, and was a total loss.

In part 4 we will reveal the results of the investigation.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse—Part 2

A routine passage turns tragic.

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Pre-collision: Aboard the Yacht

On Sept. 19, 2006, the Essence, a 92-foot sailboat, was anchored in Newport, R.I., preparing to depart for Greenwich, Conn., on a southwesterly course. There were three people aboard: a captain, a mate, and a cook.

Earlier in the day, the mate had been ill with flu-like symptoms and had gone to Newport Hospital, where he was prescribed an antibiotic and a decongestant. He was asleep when the vessel departed Newport at 6 p.m.; the captain was at the helm. The yacht was equipped with two VHF radios, two radar units, a chart plotter, and a GPS unit.

When the vessel departed Newport, one VHF radio was on monitoring channel 16. The other unit, the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid was off; there was no radar reflector set. The vessel was motor sailing; both engines were engaged and the mainsail was set. All lights were working properly.

At 2 a.m., on September 20th, the mate began his watch, and the captain went below to the main salon on the port side to get some sleep. Shortly afterward, the mate noted a vessel ahead, which he believed was about 10 miles away. As he approached, he saw a ship’s green light and two white lights; his first impression was that the ship was on a path to cross his bow from port to starboard. He had visual contact; he did not use the yacht’s radar to track the cargo ship’s movements.

An approaching vessel
At 4:04 a.m., the mate called to the larger vessel on VHF. The pilot on the cargo ship acknowledged him after his second call, and the mate told the pilot that the cargo ship’s port light was out. The mate on the yacht believed he was looking at the bow of the cargo ship, and adjusted his course slightly—approximately 10 degrees to starboard—to show the ship his port side, and to make what he believed would be a port-to-port passage.

The pilot on the larger vessel then called over the radio and asked if the yacht was going to stay clear. After assuring the cargo ship’s pilot that he would do so, the mate made an abrupt 70 to 90 degree turn to starboard without changing speed. Less than 30 seconds later, the two vessels collided.

Post-collision
The captain of the yacht was awakened by the explosive sound of the cargo ship’s bow breaking though the hull of the yacht. The smaller craft was now pinned to the bulbous bow of the cargo ship. The yacht’s captain ran to the pilothouse, where he discovered both other crewmembers awake and uninjured.

All three donned life jackets, but because of the impact site and the collapsed mast and rigging, they could not reach the life raft. The yacht had been towing astern a small 14-foot rigid hull inflatable tender, but the tender’s line had looped so tightly beneath the yacht’s hull that it could not be removed. The captain told the mate to swim over to the tender and use it as a rescue boat. Once aboard the tender, the mate found that he could not start the engine.

In part 3 we will present the results of the collision.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Lessons Learned: A Turn for the Worse—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Carolyn Steele.

Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

A routine passage turns tragic.
The pre-dawn hours of Sept. 20, 2006, were clear and calm as cargo ship M/V Barkald set out from Bridgeport, Conn., into Long Island Sound. The pilot was familiar with this ship and crew, having piloted the vessel twice before. The cargo of coal had been unloaded, the anchor heaved, and the ship rode high in the water as she began her voyage. No one could have predicted impending tragedy—a sailboat impaled upon the cargo ship’s bow, and a life lost.

Pre-collision: Aboard the Cargo Ship
At 10 p.m. on Sept. 19, 2006, the captain arrived aboard at Bridgeport. He and the pilot discussed the intended route through the sound, which would have the ship transit north of Stratford Shoals.

Around 2:30 a.m. on September 20, the cargo ship left the anchorage. By 3 a.m., the ship was clearing Stratford Shoals and was brought up to full speed of 15 knots.

A radio call came at 4:04 a.m. The person on the radio referred to “the vessel off my port side.”

At that time, the pilot, who did not respond, was at the port radar; after the call, he went over to the windows on the starboard side of the ship. Both the pilot and the second mate stated that they saw a sailboat’s green and white lights, and both estimated that the smaller vessel was about 1,000 feet off their starboard bow.

Just seconds after the first call, they received a second. After this brief radio exchange, the pilot saw the yacht make a 10-degree course change to starboard, which brought the two vessels even closer together. The pilot responded on the radio, asking if the smaller vessel intended to stay clear of his ship. The yacht’s helmsman assured him that he would stay clear. The pilot then went out to the starboard bridge wing to watch the yacht make what he thought would be a close starboard-to-starboard passing.

Moments later, the pilot saw the yacht come suddenly hard to starboard, crossing in front of his ship. The pilot immediately called to stop the engines, but it was too late. The yacht collided with the cargo ship’s bow, which struck the yacht’s port side at nearly midship.

The cargo ship’s speed at the time of impact was 15knots, and the yacht’s speed was eight knots, making a closing speed of 23 knots. The immediate response aboard the cargo ship was to contact the yacht, call the Coast Guard, and lower a lifeboat.

The story continues in Part 2.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/fall2010.

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Fish Safe!

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Gina Johansen, Program Manager, Fish Safe BC

“What do you know about fishing?”
Many fishermen live in small fishing communities. They and their neighbors are often fourth-generation fishermen.

At a recent strategic planning session, the first question from the audience to the facilitator (whose only job was to make sure we got through the agenda) was:

“What do you know about fishing?”
If you have an inspection system that does not allow fishermen to use their knowledge of the vessel or have input into what procedures they should have in place, you will undermine their ability to take ownership of a safety program.

So how do we inspire fishermen to incorporate safety aboard? They have to be involved in the development and delivery of education and training programs, and they must be convinced that incorporating safety into their fishing operations will benefit them.

Fish Safe
The Fish Safe BC program uses real fishermen in all aspects of program development and delivery. By providing a forum to discuss safety concerns and work on solutions, regulators are better informed on the realities of fishing, and fishermen provide insight on how to make regulations relevant and effective.

Safest Catch

We recently launched the “Safest Catch” program, which trains fishermen as safety advisors. These advisors provide one- or two-day onboard workshops to their peers, providing tools and direction to the master and crew on how to develop their own safety procedures, emergency drills, and safety equipment orientation.

Pictured: On top, Captain Tim Joys aboard the Sena II takes his crew through an abandon ship drill. On bottom right, Fishermen participate in the stability eduction program. Photos courtesy of Fish Safe.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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The North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association Vessel Safety Program

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Leslie J. Hughes, Director of Government and Industry Affairs, North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association Vessel Safety Program

Crew Safety Training Program
Since 1985, the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association has provided Coast Guard-approved safety training classes to nearly 40,000 mariners. Using hands-on practice to dramatize and enliven the information, the crew safety training program offers shipboard and classroom exercises.

Training includes:

• Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) basic safety training, including personal survival techniques (12 hours), personal safety and social responsibilities (4 hours), firefighting (16 hours), and first aid/CPR (8 hours);
• STCW basic safety training refresher course (24 hours);
• STCW medical care provider (32 hours);
• STCW medical person in charge (40 hours);
• emergency drill instructor workshop (8 hours);
• drill instructor for small boat operators (8 hours);
• onboard drill safety orientation (8 hours);
• proficiency in survival craft (limited) (16 hours);
• HAZWOPER (24 hours and 8-hour refresher);
• shipboard damage control (8 hours);
• shipboard watertight door and hatch maintenance (4.5 hours);
• OSHA compliance workshop (8 hours)

“Safety and Survival at Sea” Series
Videotapes/DVDs are designed to complement hands-on training classes for:

• medical emergencies at sea,
• safety equipment and survival procedures,
• fire prevention and control,
• fishing vessel stability.

All but the stability DVD are also available in Spanish.

Pictured above: Students work as a team to control flooding in damage control classes during NPFVOA vessel safety training. Photo courtesy of NPFVOA.

Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/winter2010-11/

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Lessons Learned —Failed Assumptions Lead to a Fatal Sinking at Sea—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Krista Reddington, technical writer.

Man Overboard!
Two able-bodied seamen were looking for a way to help the chief mate up to the emergency deck. Moments later, one able-bodied seaman fell overboard from the ladder leading to the stack deck. Another able-bodied seaman yelled “man overboard,” prompting the captain to notify the Coast Guard of a situation that was becoming increasingly perilous.

The tug Independence was able to relay the mayday message of the floundering vessel to the parent company via the company’s emergency number. By this time, the chief mate had stopped breathing and the second mate began CPR.

The First Rescuers Arrive
The assistant engineer found the chief mate lying at the foot of the ladder with no pulse and, as he arrived in the wheelhouse, he was informed that an able-bodied seaman had fallen overboard. Crew members attempted to pull him back aboard the vessel, but all attempts failed.

Coast Guard Helicopter 6553 arrived. While hoisting the able-bodied seaman from the water, the crew notified Sector North Carolina that the tug was sinking quickly. The helicopter crew determined they did not have enough fuel to rescue the rest of the tug crew and dropped a 20-person life raft prior to departing the scene.

The tug Justine Foss arrived on the scene just after 1:00 a.m. and waited for the crew to abandon the ill-fated tug. Nearly an hour later, the rescue vessel reported seeing the crew of the other tug mustered on the bow, but the captain never gave the order to abandon ship.

Washed Overboard
Several crewmembers were standing at the forwardmost part of the bow when the tug, severely trimmed by the stern, pitched with the bow straight up. One able-bodied seaman was thrown into the water, while another able-bodied seaman and the chief engineer fell from the bow, landing on the superstructure before entering the water. A large wave washed the second mate into the water. The crew of the Justine Foss was able to locate the able-bodied seaman that had fallen into the water, but it was too late.

The captain, assistant engineer, and ordinary seaman were on the fender of the tug when a large wave washed them into the sea. They remained together for about 20 minutes, until the crew of the other tug was able to pull them aboard.

What went wrong

• Communication Problems—Although the chief engineer was conducting ballasting operations without communication with the wheelhouse, additional ballasting operations were ordered by the captain. The chief engineer was not informed of this and continued to report to the second mate, who then failed to report the procedures to the captain.
• Failure to Practice Good Seamanship—The investigation found several instances where the captain failed to make timely decisions that could have saved the lives of his crewmembers.
• Failure to Follow Regulations—A grave mistake was made in allowing the engineers to stop pumping ballast water out of the #18 port ballast tank and start pumping into the #18 starboard ballast tank. At the angle the tug was listing, the ballast pump sea suction was not submerged, and therefore was pumping only a minimal amount of water into the #18 starboard ballast tank, which assured that the vessel would not right itself. Further, the #4 and #5 port and starboard fuel tanks were cross-connected. If they had not been it would have allowed for hydrostatic balancing, making it possible that this casualty may not have occurred.

The Aftermath
Following its investigation, the Coast Guard recommended disciplinary action against the captain of the tug. As a result, a suspension and revocation action was initiated against his license for negligence, misconduct, and a violation of law or regulation. Additionally, the Coast Guard recommended a review against the second mate for negligence and possible incompetence as well as a review against the assistant engineer for misconduct.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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Lessons Learned —Failed Assumptions Lead to a Fatal Sinking at Sea—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine by Ms. Krista Reddington, technical writer.

Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

The Voyage Begins
Early in the morning of January 18, 2006, the uninspected tug Valour sank into the chilly, wind-blown sea off the coast of Wilmington, N.C. Three crewmembers aboard the vessel lost their lives in the incident. Several factors contributed to the sinking of the tug; unfortunately, almost all can be attributed to human error.

On January 17, 2006, the chief mate noticed the vessel was listing slightly to port and ordered the assistant engineer on watch to pump 15 minutes’ worth of ballast into the #18 starboard ballast tank. Nearly five hours later, the captain took over the watch and ordered the chief engineer to pump the #18 starboard ballast tank dry. At 10:30 p.m., the chief mate entered the wheelhouse to inform the captain of the slight starboard list that was consistent with the vessel’s stability letter; the wind and waves pushing the tug and barge due north may have increased this natural list.

Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 p.m., the second mate and captain noticed the tug had first begun to level, then list to port, then roll to port. The captain contacted the chief engineer to determine what actions were being taken at the time and ordered him to pump out all ballast. The captain sounded the general alarm at 11:20 p.m., and crew was informed via the public announcement system that there was an emergency in the engine room and to assist the chief engineer as necessary. At this point, the vessel was listing approximately 15 degrees to port in the increasingly rough waters.

Miscommunication Leads to Mistrust
At 11:30 p.m., the captain radioed the tug Independence, which was approximately 30 miles away, to report they had taken on water but the engineer was working on it. As the captain sent a “mayday” transmission to the Coast Guard, the chief mate went below to retrieve his survival gear. On his way, he fell down the ladder from the wheel house to the stack deck passageway. The captain heard a noise and rushed from the wheel to investigate. He found the chief mate lying on the deck where he had landed.

The second mate immediately went to assist the chief mate while the captain returned to the wheelhouse. He notified the Coast Guard that the tug had an injured crewmember and may require a helicopter. The second mate found the chief mate dazed, with his legs awkwardly folded and apparently broken; he was clutching his chest and said he could not feel his legs and was having trouble breathing.

The story continues in part 2.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2010.

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