Lessons Learned—A Great Lakes Fishing Vessel Sinks Within Seconds—Part IV

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I, Part II, and Part III.


Lessons Learned/Recommendations
There was evidence the operators of the integrated tug and barge failed to maintain a proper lookout to avoid a collision, as required by Inland Navigation Rule 5. There was also evidence the operators failed to make proper use of the radar equipment to obtain early warning of risk of collision.

It could not be verified whether the Linda E crew maintained a lookout or used installed radar to avoid collision. However, the investigation did determine practices that indicated the crew may not have been standing a proper lookout prior to the collision.

Final recommendations included:

• Promote the use of radars with anti-collision alarm features.
• Reiterate the inherent risks associated with operating a boat that has no watertight subdivision, including the difficulty of egress from a fast-sinking vessel.
• Re-emphasize to all Great Lakes fishing vessel operators the importance of properly displaying a fishing day shape.

MSO Milwaukee published the contents of the supplemental report as a safety advisory to all commercial vessels operating in Lake Michigan. A copy of the report was also provided to the state of Wisconsin and local agencies responsible for investigating boating accidents.

For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned—A Great Lakes Fishing Vessel Sinks Within Seconds—Part III

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click here for Part I and Part II.

An integrated tug and barge (ITB) transited the waters off Port Washington between 11:30 a.m. and 12:05 p.m. on December 11, 1998. Of the 26 vessels investigated, this was the only one in this area around this time.

The visibility of the ITB operator in the pilothouse is restricted for some distance forward of the barge. Even so, the vessel met the visibility requirements of Title 33 CFR 164.15.

Contributing to the Casualty
Lack of visibility from both the ITB and the Linda E most likely contributed to the collision. The window arrangement of the downed vessel, with widely spaced portholes, was not conducive to a wide view of surrounding waters.

It is possible that the sun just off the port bow of the ITB shone directly into the pilothouse and obscured the Linda E. Also, due to the length of the barge, once a small vessel was close off the bow, the tug operator’s view would be obscured, as depicted here.

Additionally, the investigators concluded that the radar on the ITB was not monitored adequately or not used properly. Other contributing factors included the diverted attention of the ITB operator who was standing watch. The mate was performing a non-navigation activity that distracted his attention from activities essential to navigation—like looking out for other vessels.

The Incident
MSC graphic analysis illustrates how the accident may have taken place. Upon collision, the heel of the fishing vessel would have caused rapid downflooding through the submerged large door openings, sinking the vessel within seconds.

It is possible that the crew aboard the ITB neither felt, heard, nor observed the collision. Marks and damage to the barge suggested the collision was brief and light.

Even if the collision were more severe, the resulting change in velocity of the barge would not have been detectable. Noise from generators and activity on the barge may have prevented hearing a collision, and the Linda E most likely sank so quickly that it did not pass far enough aft to be seen by anyone on deck of the barge or in the pilothouse of the tug.

In part IV we will examine the lessons learned from this incident.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned— A Great Lakes Fishing Vessel Sinks Within Seconds—Part II

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Read Part I here.


Discovery of the Linda E
Upon the discovery of the vessel, the Marine Safety Office Milwaukee reopened the investigation into its disappearance. On June 21, 2000, the University of Michigan’s remotely operated vehicle (ROV) obtained video and still photography of the vessel.

The ROV also collected paint samples from the vessel, which were sent to the Wisconsin State Crime Lab. Investigators analyzed the video and photographs from the ROV to determine the cause of the casualty.

Clues Emerge
The vessel was found upright at the bottom of Lake Michigan in 260 feet of water, partially imbedded into the lake bottom, with an approximate 20 degree heel to port. The service door on the aft port side of the vessel was found open. A small tangle of fishing nets extended just outside this door. Additionally, there was significant damage on the starboard quarter along the side of the vessel.

A wedge-shaped inset centered 14 inches forward of the aft, starboard portlight (see picture below) extended six feet vertically down from the top of the lower deckhouse to just below the rub rail. The upper deck was crushed downward near the center of this inset. The deck was torn upward a few feet aft of the center of this inset.

There appeared to be no significant damage to any other part of the vessel. There was no indication of fire on the vessel and no physical remains of the three missing crewmembers were found.

Investigators developed a profile of the damage documented by the ROV, compared the geometry of several vessels with the Linda E’s damage profile, and compared the paint samples with those collected previously from vessels in that area.

The Results
The evidence indicated that the Linda E collided with an integrated tug and barge that transited the waters off Port Washington on December 11, 1998.

The MSC’s comparison of the damage profile and the bow geometry of the barge determined that the most likely angle of heel that the fishing vessel would have experienced, had they collided, to be approximately 51 degrees to port. With this degree of heel, the entire port side would have been submerged.

If both the port service door and part of the stern door were open, the MSC estimated that it would take about two seconds to flood the vessel. This would explain the lack of distress signals or attempts to abandon ship.

In part III, we will examine the incident and contributing factors.

For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2” (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned— A Great Lakes Fishing Vessel Sinks Within Seconds—Part I

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Ms. Betty Lynn Sprinkle, special correspondent to Proceedings.


Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

It is important to note that lives were lost in some of the marine casualties we present. Out of respect for the deceased, their families, and surviving crewmembers, we do not mention the name of any person involved.


On December 11, 1998, the fishing vessel Linda E, with three crewmembers, set out of Port Washington, Wis., to retrieve and set gill nets. Ordinarily, the vessel would have returned by 3:00 p.m. At 8:00 p.m. the Coast Guard was notified that the vessel was overdue.

The Mystery
The Coast Guard immediately initiated a search that ultimately covered 3,000 square miles of Lake Michigan. Searchers found no sign of the vessel, pollution, or debris. The last contact with the vessel was at 9:45 the morning of the 11th, when a representative of the owners talked to a crewmember on a cell phone.

Typical of Great Lakes commercial fishing boats, the vessel was fully enclosed. A main deck ran its length and a raised platform was at the wheelhouse. The superstructure was fitted with portholes along the port and starboard side of the main superstructure and in all directions in the wheelhouse. The portholes were the only means of seeing out of the wheelhouse.

Four sliding metal doors—one aft, one amidships on the port side, and two forward—were opened for the crew to work the gill nets. The forward doors were used to retrieve nets, and the stern door was used to set nets.

The Investigation
The Coast Guard looked at commercial vessels that may have been in that portion of Lake Michigan, and investigators interviewed the crews of several.

The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Center (MSC) determined that the missing vessel met stability, severe wind, and rolling criteria. The MSC also determined that, even if the vessel had its bilges flooded and had accumulated ice upon its superstructure, it still would have substantial positive stability. The weather conditions did not contribute to ice accumulation, and no vessel in the area reported icing on that day.

Because fishing vessels like this one have no longitudinal watertight subdivisions, any breach of the watertight envelope would allow the vessel to sink. MSC calculations indicated that flooding through an opening the size of the sliding doors would cause the vessel to sink within seconds, while flooding through an opening of 2.5 inches in diameter, such as that from a failed fitting, would take over an hour to sink the vessel.

Initial Conclusions
The Linda E was presumed to have sunk off Port Washington. Three crewmen were missing and presumed dead. The lack of a distress call and fact that no survival equipment was located indicated that the vessel sank quickly. Weather and sea state did not appear to be factors in this casualty.

Based on information gained at the last contact with the crew, it was not likely that the vessel was overloaded or suffered from inadequate stability. However, if the Linda E had carried an electronic position-indicating radio beacon, the Coast Guard might have been able to condense the search area.

For 18 months, the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Milwaukee monitored local commercial salvors’ efforts to locate the vessel. Despite these efforts, the location of the vessel remained unknown until June 18, 2000, when the USS Defender, a Navy minesweeper performing an underwater search, located it 260 feet below the surface.

In Part II, we will explore what happened to the Linda E.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2006 Volume 63, Number 2" (Summer 2006).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Abandonment of Seafarers—Part 2: Three Cases of Abandonment

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by RDML Charles D. Michel and LT Amber S. Ward, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Maritime and International Law. Read Part I here.


Case #1
In October 1998, the Coast Guard detained a Panamanian freighter off Long Beach, Calif., after finding a number of safety violations and unsafe working conditions including overcrowded living quarters, polluted drinking water, stale food, overflowing toilets, and cockroach infestation.

At the request of a seafarers union, which alleged that the owners had failed to pay the crew’s earned wages, the federal district court ordered the vessel seized. Under U.S. law, vessels can be seized by authorities to recover unpaid earnings.

Several crewmembers reportedly fled into the U.S. after receiving medical attention. The remaining crew survived on donations of food and supplies. After approximately two months, the vessel was sold for scrap value, less than the amount of the pending claims against it for back wages, maritime supplies, and medical assistance for its crew.

Case #2
Just weeks after the Panamanian freighter was detained, a Pakistani-flagged freighter arrived offshore Brownsville, Texas, after being abandoned in Mexico by its bankrupt owners. After being held offshore for five months, with food and water nearly gone and the crew in despair, the captain fled Mexico and made the risky voyage to the U.S. in hopes of finding haven and help.

The 22 crewmembers aboard survived on rainwater and fish, and were suffering from sores and skin rashes. Many had not been paid in two years, and had not been home in nearly as long. The local community rallied around the crew, providing donations of food, fuel, and clothing. Finally, in August 1999, after being stranded at sea for months and in Texas for several more, the last of the crewmembers returned home, although still without their full wages.

Case #3
In October 2008, two U.S.-flagged ships owned by the same company were abandoned in The Netherlands. According to the U.S. crewmembers aboard, the owner ceased paying the crew their earned wages and providing for basic necessities. The crewmembers were forced to rely upon a local charity for sustenance.

U.S. Coast Guard officials visited both ships, offered to provide assistance, and advised the seafarers of the availability of further potential assistance from the U.S. consulate. They also identified numerous safety deficiencies aboard and attempted to work with the shipowner to resolve crew and safety issues. As required by applicable treaty, Coast Guard headquarters staff reported both cases of abandonment to the International Labor Organization.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009.

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Abandonment of Seafarers—Part 1

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by RDML Charles D. Michel and LT Amber S. Ward, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Maritime and International Law.


Despite years of prosperity in the shipping industry and international guidelines designed to prevent the shameful practice of abandoning seafarers, crews are still being abandoned in foreign ports worldwide. Between 1990 and 2006, approximately 1,000 ships and 150,000 seafarers and fishers are believed to have been abandoned.

Just since 2004, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Labor Organization (ILO) tracking database reported more than 60 vessels were abandoned.

Economic Value vs. Value of Human Life
Abandonment is often a calculated economic decision by a shipowner facing bankruptcy, insolvency, or arrest of its vessel by creditors. In some cases, seafarers are abandoned along with their vessel after a port state determines the vessel unseaworthy and detains it for repairs.

At best, abandoned seafarers are often subject to cruel and degrading treatment. At worst, they may find themselves in life-threatening conditions.

What’s to Stop This?
Despite a customary international law right to seek redress through national legal systems, abandoned seafarers often do not have access to remedies because they cannot afford the litigation expenses. Even if seafarers have access to justice, the abandoned vessels are often of little value, and those who take legal action may be blacklisted.

Port states, including the United States, are typically ill-equipped to handle the humanitarian situation, disposal of the derelict vessels, or the immigration issues associated with abandonment. Although most ships are insured, coverage typically ceases upon insolvency or non-payment of premiums.

The Broader Impact
While the increasing complexity of global shipping has created an unprecedented demand for seafarers, the scourge of abandonment is a blight on the seafaring occupation. It serves as an indication of how, even today, seafarers can be exploited by their employers without remedy. This reduces the attractiveness of seafaring during a time of critical shortage of qualified mariners.

Interim Efforts
Port states can help combat the problem by unilaterally denying entry into port those ships not in compliance with international standards. Before vessels are allowed entry into a port, they should be required to prove their financial capability to repatriate and care for their crews should a problem develop. A certificate showing insurance coverage, a bond, or a port entry tax might provide sufficient security for this purpose.

For the first time since humans first began going to sea, there is a real opportunity to provide a comprehensive, mandatory international mechanism to provide for the basic humanitarian needs of the uniquely vulnerable class of seafaring workers abandoned in foreign ports. We all benefit from the service of seafarers who keep vital commerce flowing, and we owe it to them to terminate this shameful practice.

Part II gives three examples of the abandonment of seafarers.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Say No to Drugs, Say Yes to Shipriders—Part 2: Success Stories

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Read Part I here.


O, Canada
The waterways between Canada and the U.S. have long been a haven and profitable avenue for gangs and other criminals to smuggle anything of value. In another age, Al Capone made his fortune illegally importing Canadian whiskey over the northern border, often using maritime routes.

Enter the Canada–U.S. Shiprider Program
In a recent pilot program, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and U.S. Coast Guard conducted cross-border maritime law enforcement operations.

During these ops, USCG and RCMP personnel embarked on each other’s patrol vessels so that both Canadian and U.S. patrol craft had law enforcement officers from both countries aboard, available to enforce the laws of both countries.

Shipriders made 12 arrests and seized more than 200 pounds of marijuana, over one million contraband cigarettes, $38,000 in illicit cash, and six vessels used in illegal smuggling operations.

Fish Have Become the New Drugs
Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing is a global problem. As fish stocks decline around the world, IUU fishing vessels continue to loot the living resources in the exclusive economic zones of nations incapable of enforcing their own fishing rights.

In addition to violating the sovereign rights of coastal states, IUU fishing vessels continue to fish the ocean clean through illegal high-seas driftnet practices. Driftnets, composed of monofilament lines, are effective “curtains of death” that wreak havoc in the oceans. International law has outlawed these driftnets, but illegal fishing continues.

The Coast Guard has enjoyed a legacy memorandum of understanding and shiprider agreement with the People’s Republic of China since December 1993, which is routinely put into practice, with excellent effect.

For example, USCG Cutter Boutwell participated in a multi-national IUU fisheries enforcement patrol from July through November 2007. Boutwell spent 29 days in a high-threat area and embarked a People’s Republic of China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command shiprider.


In the picture at left, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell transfers custody of a fishing vessel to the Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command.

The operation “netted” six vessels configured for illegal high-seas driftnet fishing, which were later transferred to a People’s Republic of China patrol vessel for further investigation and prosecution.

Shipriders and Africa
In June 2008, the United States and the Republic of Cape Verde completed an agreement authorizing the USCGC Dallas to embark a law enforcement detachment from the Cape Verde Coast Guard and conduct combined law enforcement operations.

Over two weeks, the combined U.S.–Cape Verde law enforcement team conducted extensive operational familiarization, completed six law enforcement boardings in Cape Verde waters, conducted inquiries of several other vessels, and located a suspected drug smuggler’s “station” on a small uninhabited island in the Cape Verde archipeligo.


The photo at left shows Chief Petty Officer James Moerls in one of the Coast Guard Cutter Dallas’s over-the-horizon small boats, equipped with a Cape Verdian flag, while en route to conduct a multi-national vessel boarding off the coast of San Vincente, Cape Verde.


A Parting Shot
The “bang for the buck” with shiprider operations is high, and the operations are win-win situations for all participants. As recent Coast Guard shiprider projects have demonstrated, these operations greatly enhance and extend the authority and capabilities of both the Coast Guard and the shiprider partner and further improve the competency of our foreign partners in all law enforcement mission areas.

For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Say No to Drugs, Say Yes to Shipriders—Part I: What’s a Shiprider?

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by LCDR Brian W. Robinson, U.S. Coast Guard Operations Law Group.


So you’re losing sleep about the multitude of threats to legitimate maritime traffic, eh? Who could blame you?

With drug runners using vessels of every type to move tons of cocaine around the world, pirates attacking and hijacking everything that floats off the Horn of Africa, and rogue fishing vessels devouring everything in their path with driftnets, there is plenty to worry about.

Fortunately, there’s hope. The U.S. continues to complete bilateral agreements with partner states around the globe that extend the ability of the Coast Guard and other maritime law enforcement agencies to check illegal activity.

Shiprider agreements, by which U.S. Coast Guard personnel and foreign maritime law enforcement officers literally ride on each other’s ships, are at the core of this strategy.

How Does This Work?
Put simply, law enforcement authority is portable and travels with the officer. When foreign shipriders embark in U.S. patrol assets, it extends the authority of that asset to patrol in waters and to board vessels that are subject to the shiprider’s jurisdiction.

Shiprider operations are particularly effective in coastal waters that smugglers often exploit with “go-fast” vessels. In a typical go-fast case, there is very little time to obtain authorization from a coastal state to pursue a suspect vessel into territorial seas. By the time the state gives authorization to pursue into its territorial seas, the go-fast may be long gone.

However, when a shiprider is aboard a U.S. patrol asset, the shiprider has authority to act immediately and authorize pursuit and entry into the territorial seas of his home state.

Part two shares success stories.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009.

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Catching Polluters: Marine Pollution Enforcement—Part 2

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Read Part I here.


International Outreach and Cooperation
In an effort to strengthen MARPOL compliance internationally, Coast Guard and Department of Justice (DOJ) personnel have presented training sessions on port state control and MARPOL Annex I compliance, focusing on methods of detection, enforcement, investigation, prosecution, the oil record book, and other inspection issues.

Punishing the Perpetrators
Additionally, the Coast Guard and DOJ have received international cooperation in several recent high-profile vessel pollution cases.

In 2007, a maritime operator agreed to a $37 million criminal settlement—the largest to date involving deliberate vessel pollution, 12 of its vessels in six separate U.S. ports.

The investigation was based upon a tip from Transport Canada, after an investigation into a mystery oil spill revealed suspicious entries in the vessel’s oil record book. The information was sent to the Coast Guard and resulted in a case that spread to six different ports.

Later in the investigation, Transport Canada provided aerial images of another of the operator’s vessels potentially engaged in illegal discharges.

In another incident, a maritime operator was convicted of 13 counts of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, three counts of falsifying records, one count of conspiracy, and one count of obstruction of justice. The operator was fined $4.9 million for its role in falsifying records to conceal overboard dumping of oily waste in international waters and efforts to conceal those discharges from the Coast Guard. (The operator is appealing this conviction.)

During the prosecution of this case, the Netherlands Royal Military Police, Ministry of Transport, and Coast Guard provided assistance. Netherlands government officials were able to provide aerial surveillance images of a vessel discharging oily waste within the Netherlands’ exclusive economic zone and testified to the same at trial.

Keep it Clean
Without the fear of discovery and prosecution, polluters have no incentive to change their illegal and destructive ways. The U.S. Coast Guard, through its international training and outreach efforts, seeks to ensure that all port states can detect and prosecute violations of MARPOL, forcing polluters to take corrective action.


For more information:
Full article is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.