The Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness—a collaborative approach to government information sharing

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CAPT George McCarthy, CAPT Dale Ferriere, and CAPT Rafael Nieves, Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness.


More than one million mariners aboard nearly 95,000 vessels flagged in more than 150 nations move millions of passengers and billions of tons of cargo around the globe each year. Millions of pleasure and fishing craft operate in U.S. waters alone.

Around the world, competition for marine resources is accelerating. No single country, department, or agency can develop an effective understanding of everything that could affect the global maritime domain’s safety, security, economy, and environment.

Maritime Situational Awareness
Much of the data needed to build this maritime domain awareness (MDA) is already being collected by organizations around the world, and the technology already exists to pool it. For now, most of it is locked in stovepipes within hundreds of agencies and organizations, which makes using it like trying to connect dots, when every dot is on a different page.

The Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness (OGMSA) was created as a national office to partner with the maritime community and build working relationships that increase our ability to find those dots and connect them.

As an independent national office with an interagency staff, the OGMSA represents the maritime information sharing needs across our government. Within the overall MDA stakeholder infrastructure, OGMSA partners with designated points of contact throughout the interagency.

Expansive MDA Growth
The MDA concept of operations calls for “spiral development,” in which layers of MDA capability are successively envisioned, tested, and then built upon. There is a staggering amount of data available to build a global maritime picture, and new sources are constantly being developed.

The global maritime community of interest is beginning to form a network, and the first layer of the spiral is coalescing. With the enterprise architecture management hub moving forward, the pace of information sharing will accelerate.

Meanwhile, OGMSA is engaging stakeholders in the private sector whose business models rely on uninterrupted, efficient operations throughout the global maritime infrastructure. Fully integrated maritime information sharing is still over the horizon, but actionable information is already being shared with increasing effectiveness.


For more information:
Full article and “Interagency Success Stories” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Petty Officer 1st Class Anastasia M. Devlin.


A rainbow of uniformed guests milled around the reception. The conversation, hesitant and politely formal at first, flowed freely after dozens of meetings and discussions.

These guests were delegates at a recent meeting of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF), which has fostered cooperation among the six countries bordering the North Pacific Ocean since its inception in Tokyo in 2000.

The Experts Meeting
These common interests among the six countries, including drug trafficking, illegal immigration, maritime security, and fisheries enforcement, cultivate an environment where recommendations can be developed.

“Our chief goal is to exchange information to improve security and safety of vessels at sea, as well as coastal nations in the region,” said VADM Charles Wurster, head of the U.S. Coast Guard delegation. “The NPCGF provides an opportunity to foster multilateral cooperation.”

Collaboration
To synchronize 71 delegates, 17 agencies, six countries, five languages, and hundreds of support staff takes an amazing amount of coordination and communication. Different security measures taken by each country about what information could be discussed was also a challenge that had to be worked through in order to achieve the level of collaboration needed to be productive.

This preparation served to make the delegates feel comfortable so they could successfully do the job they came here to do: collaborate. The ideas that pass during these meetings have the potential to change policy and create an environment to make our world safer and more peaceful.

Results
Although conceptual at first, the forum has slowly generated results. Beginning in 2004, the international fleet of ships held communications drills, then full-scale drills, and, finally, combined law enforcement operations. By summer of 2007, the cooperative law enforcement effort had led to the apprehension of several vessels convicted of illegal fishing. The picture at left depicts part of a ceremony honoring the seizure of six fishing boats that were engaged in high-seas drift net fishing.


For more information:
Full article and “Interagency Success Stories” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Interagency Success Stories

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Captain Anthony (Tony) Regalbuto (USCG, Retired), Chief, Office of International and Domestic Assessments.


The U.S. Coast Guard has a proud tradition of collaborating with our partners throughout our long history. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks required that we build upon these relationships since addressing these new threats exceeded the capability of any one agency.

The U.S. Coast Guard brings some unique competencies to the playing field when it comes to collaboration. We like to call ourselves “governmentally bilingual”—we speak the language of the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as the language of the civilian agencies.

We also serve to bridge relationships among DoD forces and non-DoD agencies such as Customs and Border Protection and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The U.S. Coast Guard also has bilateral relationships with coast guards and navies around the world.

In this next set of blogs excerpted from the Spring 2009 issue of Proceedings, we will share our successes in building international partnerships, outline accomplishments on the home front, and illustrate joint training and joint operational efforts. We will cover organizational efforts and illustrate these “best laid plans” with accounts of how they played out strategically and operationally.

I would like to thank this issue’s authors, many of whom took on their assignments while participating in activities and operations far from the comfort of a cubicle. As we are challenged by old and new threats, we will continually learn how to build upon our common interests and cooperate in interesting and innovative ways.


For more information:
Full article and “Interagency Success Stories” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2009.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned—Collision, Fire in Tampa Bay—Part IV

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click on Part I, Part II, or Part III for previous entries.

As a result of the collisions, B. No. 155’s port tank was ruptured and spilled its cargo of oil into the waterway; the Ocean 255 was in flames. Balsa 37 suffered damage to both cargo holds.

Fortunately, there were no fatalities or serious injuries.

There was plenty of blame to go around, and the USCG Marine Board of Investigation apportioned it among all the mariners involved.

The captain of the Seafarer received the lion’s share, due to his ill-advised attempt to overtake another tow near a turn, with approaching traffic.

The pilot of the other inbound tow was cited for assenting to being overtaken and the pilot and captain were blamed for not alerting the outbound vessel of the overtaking when the captain of the overtaking vessel failed to do so.

The report also noted that the pilot of the outbound freighter was inattentive to his duties, as he failed to ensure that the vessel kept to his side of the channel, and did not recognize that the Seafarer was overtaking.

Lessons Learned
Although there were many factors that led to this casualty, the lessons learned from it can be summed up in two phrases:

· Don’t assume.
· Pay attention.

In this incident, the assumptions ran rampant.

Those aboard the inbound vessels assumed that the outbound freighter would steer a course that would keep it well to the north side of the channel at the turn.

Indeed, the pilot of the vessel thought he had ordered that course change. He did not, however, ensure that his order was understood or carried out, and no one aboard the two oncoming vessels questioned the pilot on the delay in initiating the turn.

Many assumptions were made on the basis of radio communications. The USCG report mentioned that the various operators made navigational decisions based on what they overheard in radio transmissions.

For example, the pilot of the Bouchard tow overheard a pilot make arrangements to overtake the Seafarer. Since his tow was ahead of them both and only making 6 knots, the Bouchard pilot radioed that vessel and also made arrangements to be overtaken. He then made the same offer to the mate on the Seafarer, who declined.

The mate probably assumed that the captain had overheard him decline the offer to pass or thought he had mentioned it when he briefed the captain on the traffic situation. He did not ensure that he successfully communicated this.

It can also be inferred that the captain of the Seafarer assumed that the pilot of the outbound freighter overheard the radio conversation in which he requested permission to overtake the Bouchard tow.

This is where the next admonition—pay attention—comes into play.

When the Seafarer’s captain and the pilot of the Bouchard were discussing the overtaking, the freighter pilot was making arrangements to be picked up for his next assignment. He wasn’t paying attention to the oncoming traffic or (apparently) to the course of his vessel.

Additionally, had the Seafarer captain paid attention to his mate’s explanation of the traffic situation, or checked the radar himself, he probably would not have attempted to pass.

Fortunately, incidents such as the one described here are rare. This incident, however, serves as a reminder that mariners must remain ever vigilant, since even small errors or lapses in attention can have huge consequences.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

An Advance Look at the 2010 Update to the Marine Safety Performance Plan

Here's a preliminary link to the 2010 Update to the Marine Safety Performance Plan.* 

The 2010 Update is our annual review of the original  Marine Safety Performance Plan (Dec 2008). While this update highlights the significant progress we've made over the past year, there is still much more work to be done. 

We've made the initial commitment and investment to rebuilding an infrastructure that will ensure greater competency and consistency from Coat Guard Marine Safety professionals.  In essence, we have laid a strong foundation upon which to build.

There are still many challenges before us, but there is also evidence that some of the initiatives are already working.  Two of our National Centers of Expertise [Investigations (New Orleans, LA) and Outer Continental Shelf (Morgan City, LA)] are supporting the joint Marine Board of Investigation of the Deepwater Horizon.  We have significantly increased the throughput of students through the Marine Safety School in Yorktown, Virginia.  The National Maritime Center's net processing time for issuing Merchant Mariner Credentials is less than thirty days.   More is detailed in the 2010 update. 

It is important to note that the Coast Guard cannot acheive its goals alone.  We must acknowledge the terrific support we've received from senior officials in the Dept of Homeland Security, the Administration, and our Congressional Leadership, as well as from our industry parters. 

To make sure we continue be on the right track, we encourage you to read this progress report carefully, and to send us your thoughts on the Marine Safety Performance Plan and the 2010 update.

*In a few days, the update will be properly posted to the Marine Safety Program page on http://www.usgc.mil/ , and the internal links will be energized.  The CG Prevention Blog will note when the posting to uscg.mil is completed.  Until then, please post your comments and questions about the 2010 Update here.

Lessons Learned—Collision, Fire in Tampa Bay—Part III

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. Click on Part I or Part II for previous entries.


Aboard the Seafarer
After the collision with the outbound freighter, the captain was unable to disconnect the Seafarer from the flaming tank barge.

As heavy, black smoke surrounded the pilothouse, he placed the throttles ahead slow, rudder position hard left, to ground the tow near Mullet Key. He then left the pilothouse to muster personnel.

As noted in the Marine Board of Investigation report:

“[As] captain … and mate … reached the last flight of stairs leading to the wheelhouse, captain … could hear windows exploding and glass hitting the deck. The two men abandoned their attempt to enter the pilothouse.

By now, the smoke had increased to the point that personnel at deck level were having difficulty seeing and breathing. The life raft was inaccessible because of its location on the upper deck. Captain … ordered the crew to abandon ship.

When the crew entered the water … they could see smoke and flames above them. Captain … heard … two or three explosions.

The crew was later rescued by the pilot boat Manatee. The fire burned throughout the day ... The Seafarer suffered extensive fire damage, and the Ocean 255 was a constructive total loss.”

On the Bridge of the Balsa 37
This vessel was involved in both collisions and suffered much damage. The main concern was that the vessel would capsize or sink and block the channel. As stated in the USCG report:

“Captain … arrived on the bridge and ordered all hands to muster for the emergency and had pilot … take the ship to anchorage near Egmont Key.

As the Balsa 37 proceeded toward anchorage, the chief mate opened the cargo hatches and observed sea water in both cargo holds ... Concerned for the vessel’s stability, captain … grounded the [vessel] near Egmont Key.

The ship remained aground for several days until lightering and salvage operations could be completed.”

On the Capt. Fred Bouchard
The USCG report set the scene:

“Pilot … immediately made a distress call on Channel 16. Pilot … advised captain … to make a course correction to keep the tow in the channel. He then called the pilot boat Manatee and directed [it] toward the scene to pick up any survivors [from the Seafarer].

Following the two collisions, the [assist tug] initially let out 60 meters of line to move away from possible hazards. After determining it was safe, the master had his crew again make the tug fast alongside the B. No. 155.

The Bouchard tow later anchored approximately one and one-half miles west of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge. The B. No. 155 was later offloaded and taken to dry dock … for damage survey and repairs.”

In part IV we will explore the aftermath, the conclusions from the Marine Board of Investigation, and lessons learned from this calamity.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned—Collision, Fire in Tampa Bay—Part II

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. To read Part I, please see our May 6 post.


The Seafarer
When his tow was approximately 1.5 miles astern, the mate declined an offer to overtake the slower Bouchard. As stated in the USCG report:

“Mate … briefed the captain on the traffic situation. In a radio conversation with pilot [of the Bouchard tow], mate … declined a second offer to overtake.”

It can be inferred that the mate assumed the captain overheard him decline the offer to overtake. The report continued:

“…captain … assumed the watch. … mate … advanced the throttles to full ahead as he left the pilothouse. Captain … steered the … tow toward the center of the channel to pass the Bouchard tow.”

As he moved to overtake, the captain of the Seafarer overheard a conversation between the other two pilots, arranging a port-to-port meeting.

The captain then radioed the pilot of the slower inbound vessel and requested permission to overtake. The Bouchard pilot consented to the overtaking, if the outbound Balsa agreed. The report noted:

“… captain … called pilot [of the Balsa 37], who replied that a port-to-port meeting was agreeable. Captain … did not communicate … that the … tow was in the process of overtaking ...”

The USCG report continued:

“Captain … was expecting the [freighter] to make a hard turn into Egmont Channel. Mate … checked the radar. It was apparent that the [freighter] has passed the point where it had to make its turn.

While captain … was reaching for his radio, pilot [of the Balsa 37] urgently called as to Seafarer’s intentions. Captain … replied that they had agreed on a port-to-port meeting. By now [they] were beyond the point of ‘in extremis.’ Pilot … replied that they would have to make it a starboard-to-starboard meeting. Captain … replied he would come to port.”

The mariners were unsuccessful in avoiding the collision that caused massive damage to both vessels. Additionally, Ocean 255’s no. 1 starboard tank ruptured, and its cargo caught fire.

The Capt. Fred Bouchard
The vessel had experienced problems with its starboard main engine and the assist tug was made up to the tank barge as the tow transited Tampa Bay.

After hearing a pilot on another vessel make arrangements to overtake the Seafarer, which was astern of his vessel, Bouchard’s pilot also made arrangements to be overtaken. He then called the Seafarer, and stated that the vessel could overtake him as well. Seafarer’s mate declined.

The USCG report set the scene:

“[Bouchard’s] pilot … called pilot … on the [outbound freighter] Balsa 37 and arranged a port-to-port meeting. … Captain [of the trailing tow] then called, indicating his position off the tow’s port quarter and his desire to overtake.

Pilot … consented to the overtaking as long as it was agreeable with [oncoming freighter’s] pilot. [Bouchard’s] pilot heard [Seafarer’s] captain call [the pilot of the outbound freighter] immediately and arrange for a port-to-port meeting, but he heard no discussion of the overtaking in progress.”

The mariners aboard the Bouchard tow reported they overheard the urgent radio conversation between the mariners on the other vessels as they tried to avoid collision.

The report continued:

“… Seconds later, the [two vessels] collided …

Struck first on its starboard bow, the [freighter] yawed to port, then abruptly to starboard as … the Ocean 255 moved along its side. The two vessels separated, and, seconds later, the bow of the Balsa 37 impacted the … B. No. 155 ...”

The Balsa 37
As noted in the USCG report:

“[The freighter] passed under the Sunshine Skyway Bridge at 5:24 a.m. at its sea speed of 11 knots … [The pilot] advised the captain that a bow look-out was not needed.”

The report continued:

“Passing abeam buoy 21, the [vessel] continued on its previous course of 261° T. However, pilot … believed he had ordered a change to 262° T, which would bring the ship closer to buoy 19 at the turn.”

Just after passing buoy 21, the pilot received a radio call from the pilot of the lead inbound vessel, proposing a port-to-port meeting. A minute later, the captain of the trailing vessel radioed, also proposing a port-to-port meeting. The Balsa 37 pilot agreed to each meeting.

At that time, the outbound pilot made a call to the pilot boat operator to arrange his next assignment. He did not hear a radio conversation in which the captain of the trailing tow informed the Bouchard tow’s captain that he was overtaking.

The report continued, “pilot [of the Balsa 37] observed a green sidelight crossing his bow. The bows … were about 1,000 to 1,400 feet apart. Pilot … called … to determine the intentions of the Seafarer. Captain … replied that they had agreed to a port-to-port meeting. Pilot urgently replied that it needed to be starboard-to-starboard. Captain … radioed that he would attempt to turn to port.

At approximately 5:45 a.m., the starboard bow of the Ocean 255 struck the starboard side of the Balsa 37 … flames erupted … as the Ocean 255 raked [the outbound freighter].

As [that] tow moved away, pilot … observed that the freighter was headed toward collision with the Bouchard tow. In an attempt to make a port-to-port passing, pilot … ordered the helm hard to starboard, but there was too little time to regain control.

Less than one minute after striking the Ocean 255, the bow of the Balsa 37 impacted the port bow of the B. No. 155.”

In Part III we will outline the scene aboard each vessel in the aftermath of the collisions.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned—Collision, Fire in Tampa Bay—Part I

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Ms. Barbara Chiarizia, executive editor.


Lessons learned from marine casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

It is important to note that lives were lost in some of the marine casualties we present. Out of respect for the deceased, their families, and surviving crewmembers, we do not mention the name of any person involved.


August 10, 1993 dawned clear and warm in Tampa, Fla. Visibility was good, sea conditions normal. So why did three vessels—piloted by seasoned mariners—meet in collisions that caused a catastrophic oil spill and fire?

The vessels in question, the M/V Balsa 37, a 4,337-gross-ton freighter; the integrated tug barge Seafarer; and the tug Capt. Fred Bouchard were transiting Tampa Bay.

The Balsa 37 was outbound, carrying 6,000 metric tons of phosphate. The other vessels were inbound. Seafarer was made up to the tank barge Ocean 255, which was carrying 236,000 barrels of petroleum products. The Bouchard was pushing the petroleum-laden barge B. No. 155.

Egmont Channel and Mullet Key Channel
Just before dawn the vessels approached the confluence of Egmont Channel and Mullet Key Channel. The Bouchard had suffered a starboard engine casualty and was only making six knots.

The other inbound tow was approximately one-half mile astern in Egmont Channel as they both approached the turn into Mullet Key Channel. The outbound vessel was at that time transiting Mullet Key Channel.

The USCG Marine Board of Investigation report noted that all conferred regarding meeting arrangements. It is reported that the pilot of the lead inbound tow radioed to the outbound vessel, proposing a port-to-port meeting. This request was echoed by the captain of the trailing inbound tow. It was agreed that all would pass port to port.

Faulty Assumptions
There were many factors that led to the subsequent marine casualty. The various mariners made assumptions regarding the intentions of the other vessels.

For example, the pilot of the outbound vessel assumed that he would meet the Bouchard first, as it was the lead inbound vessel when the meeting arrangements were made. Those aboard the inbound tows assumed that the outbound freighter would steer a course that would keep it well to the north side of the waterway at the turn into Egmont Channel.

Neither of these (or several other) assumptions was correct, and the outbound freighter collided with the inbound Seafarer tow near mid-channel, as that vessel was overtaking the slower inbound Bouchard. The outbound vessel then collided with the Bouchard tow.

The results were catastrophic. More than 5,000 barrels of oil spilled from the B. No. 155, and Ocean 255’s no. 1 starboard tank ruptured, its cargo set alight by the sparks from the collision. Subsequently, the Ocean 255’s no. 6 starboard tank, which was loaded with more than 16,000 barrels of jet fuel, exploded.

This incident closed the main ship channel for the Port of Tampa and caused significant environmental damage. The U.S. Coast Guard convened a Marine Board of Investigation to determine how this occurred.

To better understand the interactions that led to this calamity, in Part II we will review the voyage of each vessel.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

The Successful Use of the Auxiliary in the Sector

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Mr. Michael LaRue, AUX, S.T.M., M.S., planning assistant, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Delaware Bay.


Auxiliarists at Sector Delaware Bay
In the last few years, Sector Delaware Bay has experienced significant success in attracting a small but devoted and professional group of volunteers to forward our mission.

We are now successfully employing auxiliarists on the aids to navigation team, as our interim educational services officer, in the command center and command suite, on the quarterdeck as watchstanders, and in planning. Auxiliarists provide administrative support and have also successfully headed up projects of their own. Our first picture shows Auxiliarist Bill Hougar working with the Grant County Sheriff during a holiday weekend patrol at Wanapum Lake, Wash.

The Care and Feeding of Auxiliarists
Some key factors played into this success. Our auxiliarists have always been professional, dependable, and comfortable working in a military environment. It helps that two of our volunteers are retired senior military officers.

We also have been selective about the auxiliarists to whom we have given orders. It is hard to say no to volunteers, but sometimes you have to. Additionally, our auxiliarists have been willing to go out of the way to be responsible, be quick to admit and correct mistakes, and even to seek out correction. Not everyone has this level of patience or humility.

We also found it useful to look for self-starters—people who can be given projects and then run with them. Conversely, having auxiliarists who are cheerful about doing grunt work is also a great help.

Having a good auxiliary sector coordinator (ASC) is key to the success of our program. Our present ASC clearly demonstrates the important traits necessary—being diplomatic, having good people skills, and using good judgment.

Welcome Them In
We should consider how best to attract the kinds of volunteers we need into the auxiliary. The most attractive things about the auxiliary are its traditions, its mission set, and the opportunity for fellowship with others of similar interest.

As with the active duty Coast Guard, custom and tradition are very important in maintaining professionalism and dedication. Sociologically, learning about its history and engaging folks in the customs and traditions of an organization reinforce their sense of belonging and their commitment to being responsible members of that organization.

We have seen the benefits of having a brief on sector history. It raises our people’s awareness of the past accomplishments of the Coast Guard in this region, makes them proud of being members of the sector, and sets good examples for them to follow.

Get Them on the Water
Search and rescue is probably the most attractive mission that the auxiliary has involvement in. In the second picture, Auxiliarist Larry Owens, right, and SN David Jacobson exit the water after a rescue demonstration. Getting people involved in on-the-water activities is a powerful recruiting tool, and often leads to willingness to perform other kinds of missions. Working directly with the active duty personnel in any kind of operational activity is also a powerful motivator.

Acknowledgment
The only pay that auxiliarists receive is the sense of belonging to an important team accomplishing an important mission, and the “thank you” when they have done a good job.

At Sector Delaware Bay, we have a small annual event for auxiliarists. The command has also been good about ensuring that auxiliarists receive awards when deserving. However, even a habit of saying “thank you” has great benefit and is a powerful motivator. Remember, these people are not doing it for money, and showing gratitude is a very inexpensive way of paying for the hours of service they provide.


For more information:
Full article and “Environmental Protection” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/Winter2008-09/.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Upcoming in Proceedings

Summer 2010: Maritime Domain Awareness
• Transforming MDA policy
• Transforming MDA capabilities
• Transforming MDA through technology

Fall 2010: Recreational Boating Safety (RBS)
• RBS program synopsis
• State RBS involvement
• RBS partners
• Manufacturing standards
• USCG Auxiliary
• Small vessel security

Winter 2010-11: Fishing Vessel Safety


Your Opinion
• What do you want to read in Proceedings?
• What area under the Coast Guard’s marine safety, security, and environmental protection missions affects you most?
• What do you want to know more about?

Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

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