Ask the MSSC—You have questions. We have answers from the USCG Marine Safety and Security Council.

I would like to see an update on the Towing Safety Advisory Committee. What has been accomplished? What is the path forward? Are there going to be third-party inspectors? How would an organization become approved to be an inspector or auditor?

Answered by the USCG Office of Operating and Environmental Standards.


TSAC updates the public on its activities via its website at http://homeport.uscg.mil/tsac. The site contains background information as well as past meeting minutes, a current members list, task statements (past and present), recommendations the committee has made to the Coast Guard, and notices of future meetings.

The “path forward” is embodied in the committee’s current efforts to provide recommendations for the new towing vessel inspection regulations, the revision of NVIC 4-01 regarding licensing and manning for officers of towing vessels, and clarification on the apprentice mate (steersman) license.

Lessons Learned—Thirteen Perish in Water Tour Casualty—Part II

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. To read Part I, please see our January 21 post.

The Incident
The Coast Guard investigation concluded that, as the vessel entered the water or shortly thereafter, the aft boot seal came off of the shaft housing, causing the vessel to flood. Several bilge pumps began discharging this water, but the operator did not notice this discharge, since the outlets were hidden from view and because she was focused on her tour guide duties.

The flooding continued unchecked, and the working pumps didn’t have the capacity to keep up with the water entering the vessel. Since the bilge high-level alarm had not been installed, the operator remained unaware of the amount of water the vessel was taking on until it was too late. Once it became obvious that the vessel was sinking, the operator gave the order to abandon it.

Tragically, that proved impossible for most of the passengers. As the vessel quickly sank, many became trapped beneath the canopy. Retrofitted vinyl windows further entrapped them.

The Aftermath
One can only imagine the horror as this scene unfolded. What began for these passengers as a pleasant family outing quickly turned into a struggle for their lives. Most lost that struggle. Only the operator and seven passengers managed to free themselves.

The casualty investigation report noted the incomprehensible losses. One passenger lost his mother, father, and sister; another lost husband, son, and daughter. By all accounts, only one family unit aboard remained intact after this disaster.

The Causes
The picture at left (from the USCG investigation report) shows the recovered vessel.

The main cause of this calamity was the owner’s failure to keep the vessel in seaworthy condition. The mechanic did not test the replacement boot seal to see if it would remain watertight in operation, and, indeed, it did not. Neither the mechanic nor owner questioned the missing hinge assembly, nor were they aware of the stress this would place on the seals.

Further, the pumps that would remove water from the vessel in a flooding event were not regularly tested, and, in fact, were not all operational at the time of the incident.

Finally, the high-level bilge alarm that would have alerted the operator to the flooding was not installed by the mandated deadline. It can be argued that if the owner had taken any of the above actions, this calamity may have been averted.

Never Again
While there is little anyone can do to ensure that a vessel owner takes his responsibilities seriously, the Coast Guard resolved to do all it could to ensure a tragedy like this one was not repeated. It convened a group of experts to develop comprehensive guidelines relating to the design, maintenance, safe operation, and inspection of these vessels.

On December 11, 2000, the U.S. Coast Guard promulgated Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 1-01, “Inspection of Amphibious Passenger Carrying Vehicles,” which places special emphasis on the hinge assembly and reiterates that this component must be in place for safe operation.

These exhaustive guidelines were distributed to all known owners and operators, state oversight agencies, and appropriate Coast Guard units.

For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and "2008 Volume 65, Number 2" (Summer 2008: Focus on Safety).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned—Thirteen Perish in Water Tour Casualty—Part I

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Ms. Barbara Chiarizia, executive editor, Proceedings.


Lessons learned from USCG casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent U.S. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

It is important to note that lives were lost in some of the marine casualties we present. Out of respect for the deceased, their families, and surviving crewmembers, we do not mention the name of any person involved.

On May 1, 1999, the passenger vessel Miss Majestic departed for a trip on Lake Hamilton, near Hot Springs, Ark. The vessel, a rare hybrid craft, was originally built for military use as an “amphibious truck.” As such, it combined elements of an on-road vehicle with the ability to operate as a waterborne passenger vessel.

Since they operate on both land and water, these vehicles are commonly referred to as “ducks” or “duck boats,” and are used primarily for commercial land and water tours. This was the type of outing passengers planned on that pleasant day in May. The “water” portion of the tour normally lasted about a half-hour, but minutes into the tour, the operator realized something was wrong.

Tragedy Strikes
According to the U.S. Coast Guard casualty investigation report,

“Approximately seven minutes after entering the water, [the operator] felt the [vessel] react sluggishly … and list to port.”

The operator and several passengers also noticed water washing onto the deck. The operator attempted to turn the vessel back to shore. The vessel continued to take on water, however, and sank in less than 30 seconds.

Of the 21 persons aboard, only eight survived.

How could this have happened? Why did it sink so quickly? How did 13 people drown just yards from shore? What can be done to prevent anything like this from happening again?

These were among the questions U.S. Coast Guard investigators sought to answer.

The Investigation Begins
The USCG investigation initially focused on what caused the vessel to take on water. Investigators determined that the vessel flooded through the aft shaft housing after a seal became dislodged, but this should not have caused the vessel to sink so quickly.

The Timeline for Tragedy
During an inspection of the vessel on February 23, 1999, the Coast Guard investigator noted nine items that needed attention and left a work list with the owner. The investigator considered most of these repair items to be minor, and only entered two into the inspection record:

“ … the owner is in process of installing … high-level bilge alarms required by 11 Mar 99. Owner is researching the availability of flammable vapor detection system required by 11 Mar 99.”

The owner made arrangements to address the work list and continued operation of the vessel. He later stated that he was unaware of the March 11, 1999, deadline, and neither of the noted items was installed on the vessel by May 1, 1999—the day of the incident.

Several days before the incident, the vessel’s operator noted problems and cut the tour short. Subsequent examination revealed water in the bilge and a hole in a boot seal to the aft shaft housing.

The mechanic performed regular maintenance, replaced boot seals, and returned the vessel to service on May 1. The mechanic later stated that he did not “water-test” the repairs because it was not company policy.

At some point, the original hinge assembly for the aft shaft housing had been removed (apparently to allow access to lubricate the u-joints). Unfortunately, since the hinge assembly was missing, the seals were subjected to stresses they were not designed to withstand.

In part II, we will further examine the incident and subsequent Coast Guard investigation.


For more information:
Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and "2008 Volume 65, Number 2" (Summer 2008: Focus on Safety).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil

Proceedings Winter 2009-10 Available Online

The current edition of Proceedings (Winter 2009-10) is available online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/.

This "grassroots efforts" issue showcases the maritime safety, security, and environmental protection improvements fostered through our working partnerships with other federal agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; marine industries; and individual mariners. Readers/stakeholders will learn how our missions benefit mariners, the maritime companies that employ them, and the regional environment and economy.

A Delicate Balance—cargo, language, and logistics challenge inspectors and investigators

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by CDR Kathy Moore, chief, Prevention Department, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Honolulu.


In December of 2006, the M/V Tong Cheng departed South Korea bound for the Caribbean via the Panama Canal. Three days into the voyage, heavy weather damaged the fully loaded vessel, flooding its number two cargo hold. Twenty-six officers and crewmembers spent the following three weeks battling the flooding as they crossed the storm-tossed Pacific Ocean. As the situation further deteriorated, they diverted toward Hawaii with plans to make temporary repairs.

The vessel’s damaged condition and uncertain stability led the Coast Guard captain of the port (COTP) at Sector Honolulu to assemble decision makers and initiate a unified command to coordinate the response to the stricken vessel using the Incident Command System, as directed by the National Response Plan.

The discussions between the inspectors and the vessel crew while the vessel was still offshore were critical to getting good quality information on the vessel’s condition back to the unified command, as well as to salvage engineers responsible for monitoring the vessel’s stability.

Assessing the Damage
A dive was made to assess the damage to the port side of the ship. The onboard inspectors were critical in coordinating the dive, as it was necessary to bring the ship to a full stop in the open ocean and tag out every piece of gear or pump that could pose a safety risk to the divers. The amount of coordination was also critical because the dive was performed in an 8- to 10-foot swell, which posed a significant risk to the vessel’s stability if left too long without power in the seaway in its flooded condition.

Anchorage: Preparations for Port Entry
At this point, the unified command engaged with the maritime operational threat response agencies to make arrangements for the vessel to enter U.S. waters and come safely to anchorage. One issue involved hashing out agreements concerning the fate of the vessel’s schedule and cargo as it pertained to U.S. law. The vessel was instructed to proceed to a rendezvous location to meet with U.S. Coast Guard forces for a security boarding. They completed the remainder of the transit into anchorage and the Coast Guard enforced a security zone around the vessel while it was at anchor.

While the emergency phase of the response concluded with the ship safely at the pier, inspection and investigation activity began in earnest as cargo was removed from the vessel to inspect for damage and plan and carry out repairs. Of note throughout this evolution was the interagency cooperation that allowed these tasks to take place in the midst of all the appropriate security measures being applied to the ship and its embargoed cargo. Customs and Border Protection, the Hawaii Department of Transportation Harbors, several Coast Guard marine safety and security teams, and many of the members of Sector Honolulu worked diligently over the next six weeks of delicate cargo operations, damage assessments, and repairs.

Pier Side: Investigation and Repairs
Sector Honolulu inspectors monitored repair progress daily, working closely with a host of surveyors and officials with oversight responsibilities for the work. Repair plans, cargo loading plans, and amendments were reviewed not only at Sector Honolulu, but also by the Coast Guard’s traveling inspections staff and the naval architects at the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Center.

Over the course of two months, inspectors and investigators from Sector Honolulu contributed to the Herculean efforts of the Coast Guard and other members of the unified command in one of the most complex responses to a vessel in need of assistance. As a result of sound risk-based decision making and hard work by a host of personnel, the M/V Tong Cheng was able to get underway and return to her departure port. In the process, 26 lives were saved, 140,000 gallons of fuel did not enter the pristine marine ecosystem of the main Hawaiian Islands, and the effort’s success contributed to good will between the U.S. and People’s Republic of China.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil

Tabletop Exercise: Alaska Cruise Ship Mass Rescue Exercise 2001

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine.


A tabletop exercise enacted in Sitka, Alaska, uses a gaming board to bring realism to the exercise and take into account the capabilities of the ship and response elements in relation to their actual locations, weather, and response capabilities. During this exercise, participants play out the scenario in turns that represent one hour of actual time. Realistic complications are incorporated into the rules of play.

The gaming concept, which was developed in 2001 by Mr. Thomas M. Deely and Mr. Cecil McNutt at the Coast Guard 17th District in Juneau, Alaska, allows participants to see the evolving results of their combined actions to answer such questions as “How long is it going to take to get everyone to shore?” Participants adjust their tactics as play continues in order to improve the final outcome.

The scenario pictured shows participants conducting a tabletop exercise in which a cruise ship grounds on Vitskari Rocks, just outside of Sitka, Alaska. Navigation channels are depicted with one nautical mile movement spaces. Green and red boxes were used to track hourly resource movements (i.e. each turn, assets move from green to red to denote turn completion).


For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Information Sharing Case Study: America’s Anniversary Weekend

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By Mr. Ben Thomason, program analyst, CACI Corporation.


Jamestown 2007 commemorated the 400th anniversary of the first permanent English settlement in North America. The president of the United States and the Queen of England were among the 63,000 visitors during the three-day celebration. James City County was responsible for public safety and for ensuring security for the president and royal family—a huge undertaking. What the municipal government needed most was a planning process and an operational structure.

Fortunately DHS mandated the use of the Incident Command System (ICS). Although ICS was developed to respond to incidents, it is now the preferred system to provide the unity of command for non-emergency management settings.

The Official Language
Because of its reputation for ICS “literacy,” USCG Sector Hampton Roads was designated as the senior federal official and assigned key roles in all sections of the unified command. In choosing which provisions might best suit its needs, sector planning staff used the exercise format to effectively prepare and respond during Jamestown 400.

The plans incorporated provisions for awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The staff also arranged for members of the Coast Guard Training Center Yorktown Contingency Planning School and subject matter experts from previous national events to conduct onsite assessments and critiques during the three-day weekend.

During the event, the majority of the Coast Guard’s resource hours were dedicated to the maritime operations branch, which focused on the James River. The mission was to prevent and deter waterborne terrorist attacks, mitigate their effects on the public, minimize impact on maritime commerce, and establish maritime emergency response plans in event of actual attack.

One of the primary ways to the event grounds was via the Jamestown-Scotland ferry, which transported over 6,000 vehicles across the James River during the event. Performing vehicle security inspections, coordinating the historic vessel movements, and patrolling the fireworks area presented a significant resource drain to the USCG operations section, maritime operations branch, and on-the-water patrol commander.

Working Together Equals Success
More than 40 federal and commonwealth agencies and local participants comprised the unified command, including:

• Transportation Safety Administration: DHS-designated federal coordinating officer;
• Federal Bureau of Investigation: shared law enforcement databases;
• Virginia Army National Guard: weapons of mass destruction technical expertise;
• Virginia Dept. of Environmental Management: hazmat response;
• James City County: provided county employees for the unified command, preplanning activities, fire, police, pre-event planning;
• Coast Guard: senior federal official.

Additionally, when the USCG command discovered a shortfall of experienced and knowledgeable ICS staff for key positions, Coast Guard members became the “pinch hitters and relief pitchers” due to their knowledge, training, and experience.

For more information:

Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Information Sharing Case Study: Things That Go “Bump” in the Night

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By Mr. Ben Thomason, program analyst, CACI Corporation.

At 5:30 a.m. on Nov. 8, 2007, the Spirit of Nantucket struck a submerged object while cruising from Alexandria, Va., to Charleston, S.C., and began taking on water in the Intracoastal Waterway near Pungo, Va. To stabilize the situation, the captain elected to ground the vessel. In the photo, the vessel sits in the Intracoastal Waterway after being run aground.

Sector Hampton Roads dispatched an HH-60J from Elizabeth City that lowered a rescue swimmer and dewatering pumps to the vessel. To facilitate information sharing, the command:

• initiated a command center critical incident communication to simultaneously brief the Fifth District, Atlantic Area, and Coast Guard headquarters within minutes of notification;
• alerted the maritime incident response team, which dispatched local municipal maritime first responders to the scene;
• briefed members of the Virginia Maritime Association and Virginia Port Authority of potential maritime transportation system issues.

The Two-Minute Drill – Thursday, 08 NOV 07
0610 - Incident reported to Coast Guard
0700 - Air Station Elizabeth City and Stations Portsmouth and Elizabeth City responders on scene; commenced dewatering and boom deployment
0740 - Maritime incident response team responded: EMS, police, fire
0745 - Incident command post established
1030 - Disembarked passengers via Coast Guard utility boat
1200 - Interagency planning initiated to stabilize vessel, mitigate pollution, draft salvage plan, secure waterway, and implement safety zone: issued urgent marine information bulletin and press release
1330 - Commenced dive/salvage operations
1700 - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) surveyed area, found navigational hazard (NAVHAZ), marked channel

Friday, 09 NOV 07
1300 - Salvage plan approved
1700 - USACE awarded commercial contract for NAVHAZ removal
1800 - Alternate channel marked for shallow-draft vessels
1830 - Sector conducted interagency operations brief

Saturday, 10 NOV 2007
1200 - Vessel salvage operations completed
2000 - NAVHAZ removed
2200 - Waterway reopened, mission complete

Fast-tracked Recovery
During the post-incident hotwash, several interagency players commented that the operation almost seemed scripted, reminiscent of previous exercises. The sector’s relationship building within the maritime community had promoted a cooperative spirit and a level of trust that fast-tracked vessel recovery and NAVHAZ removal.

CAPT Patrick Trapp of Sector Hampton Roads remarked, “I can’t say enough about the immediate support the sector received from the maritime incident response team, Virginia maritime community, and, most particularly, the Corps of Engineers. Within hours of the grounding, the Corps’ side scan sonar located the hazard and contracted its removal. We moved quickly to close the waterway, and more importantly, to reopen it as soon as it was safe for commerce.”

For more information:

Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

RDML James Watson’s new CG Atlantic Area blog - Coast Guard operations and cases you should know about

As longtime readers may remember, RDML James A. Watson started this marine safety blog while serving at CG headquarters as the Director of Prevention Policy. In his new position as CG Atlantic Area Director of Operations, he has instituted a new blog that you may also be interested in:

http://cglantareadirectorofoperations.blogspot.com/

We will use his own words to describe the content:

“This blog is for you. As Director of Operations, I am responsible for cases and Coast Guard operations you should know about. My goal is to promote safety, security, and stewardship in the maritime. As a seafarer, you should have the same goal.

You and I are bound by law and tradition to serve one and other as seafarers and stewards of the waterways. Good seamanship and stewardship takes commitment, experience, and appreciation for the sea and your fellow seafarer.

I hope these postings will motivate you as captains and crew to do your duty. Keep your vessel ship shape. Maintain a vigilant watch. Follow the rules of the road. And communicate, communicate, communicate. Don't ever assume anything. Your crew and passengers are depending on you.

RDML W”

For more information:
RDML Watson’s CG Atlantic Area Director of Operations blog: http://cglantareadirectorofoperations.blogspot.com/

RDML Watson’s YouTube channel: http://www.youtube.com/user/jamesawatson

Follow RDML Watson on Twitter: http://twitter.com/USCGLantAreaPA

Upcoming in Proceedings

Winter 2009-2010: Grassroots Efforts (Coming out this month!)
• What’s the Coast Guard done for me lately?
• Local and regional efforts

Spring 2010: Rulemaking Update
• Rulemaking 101
• Interagency interaction
• Supporting analysis
• Public participation

Summer 2010: Maritime Domain Awareness
• Transforming MDA policy
• Transforming MDA capabilities
• Transforming MDA through technology

Your Opinion
• What do you want to read in Proceedings?
• What area under the Coast Guard’s marine safety, security, and environmental protection missions affects you most?
• What do you want to know more about?

Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

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