Ask the MSSC - You have questions. We have answers from the USCG Marine Safety and Security Council.

Why is the TWIC not required for public vessels sailors (Navy/Coast Guard)? CG places this on commercial mariners, but is it required for mariners who sail on public vessels?

Answered by the USCG Office of Prevention Policy, Cargo & Facilities Division.

Under Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations, by April 15, 2009, all mariners holding an active license, certificate of registry, MMD, or STCW endorsement must hold a valid Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) issued by the Transportation Security Administration under 49 CFR Part 1572. Title 46 does not apply to a public vessel of the United States (a “public vessel” means a vessel that is owned, or demise chartered, and operated by the United States government or a government of a foreign country; and is not engaged in commercial service). Mariners who sail on public vessels are not required to hold a license, certificate of registry, MMD, STCW endorsement, or TWIC.

Even though these individuals are not required to hold a CG-issued credential by law, many (for example: mariners aboard Military Sealift Command vessels) are required by the operator to hold a valid qualification document as a condition of employment. As such, they will be required to obtain a TWIC before their credential will be renewed.

In addition, Under 33 CFR § 101.514, federal officials, including employees of the armed services, are not required to obtain or possess a TWIC.

Additional information on TWIC is available on the U.S. Coast Guard’s Homeport website at http://homeport.uscg.mil/twic.

The Care and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas

This "Chemical of the Quarter" excerpt is from the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine, by Dr. Alan Schneider, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Operating and Environmental Standards.

Liquefied Natural Gas

What is it?
Natural gas is a flammable gas we use to heat our homes, cook our food, and make electricity. It is made up of over 90 percent methane. The U.S. no longer produces enough natural gas to meet our needs, so we import it as liquefied natural gas (LNG) in tank ships.

How is it shipped?
Natural gas must be converted to a liquid before you can put it on a ship. If you didn’t, you’d need 600 ships to carry the same amount as a gas! Natural gas cannot be liquefied by compressing; it must be cooled to below its boiling point, -258°F.

Why should I care?
Shipping concerns. Engineers design LNG tank ships with special metals and materials placed where LNG makes contact (cargo tanks, pumps, piping). They do this because liquefied natural gas is so cold that it will crack ordinary steels. For example, whenever you make or break a line, you need to put a drip pan made of a material that is not brittle at LNG temperatures underneath. Aluminum makes a great drip pan.

Health concerns. As noted, liquefied natural gas is extremely cold, and will give you frostbite if you get even a small amount on you. Additionally, LNG is an asphyxiation concern in unventilated areas; as it vaporizes, it pushes air out of the space. Great care needs to be taken when entering an area containing LNG that does not receive air exchanges on a timely basis.

Fire or explosion concerns. LNG is very flammable. If spilled on water, it will boil off and form a potentially flammable vapor cloud. If it catches fire (on land or water), it will rapidly burn with a tall, hot flame.

Does that mean that an LNG ship is a “floating bomb”? No. LNG won’t burn unless it is a vapor, and only then if it is diluted to between five and 15 percent LNG vapor in air. LNG does not explode, even if it catches fire.

What’s the Coast Guard doing about it?
LNG’s safety record is excellent due to the high safety standards that have been implemented throughout the industry. The Coast Guard normally escorts LNG carriers in and around ports and also routinely creates a restricted area around moving LNG tank ships and shoreside terminals.

For more information:
Full article and “Environmental Protection” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/Winter2008-09//.

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

The Hawaii Superferry—information sharing leads to operational success

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By CAPT Vince Atkins, former commander, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Honolulu, and ENS Meghan Hough, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Honolulu.


Hawaii Superferry (HSF) came to Hawaii to start a high-speed ferry service between the Hawaiian islands of Oahu, Maui, and Kauai. The Superferry vessel, the Alakai, is a 350-foot high-speed catamaran designed to carry 866 passengers and 282 vehicles.

A Hostile Operating Environment
Citizens and environmental groups opposed to this new service voiced several concerns, citing Alakai’s lack of an environmental impact study, the possibility of increased traffic congestion, and the potential for introducing invasive species and harming marine life.

Alakai’s initial operations were greeted by an estimated 300 protestors in Kauai, endangering public safety at sea and ashore. USCG Station Kauai’s small boat is shown removing protesters on surfboards from the path of the Alakai into Nawiliwili Harbor, Kauai. The crowd forced the HSF facility to close its gates due to security concerns and, due to continuing public unrest, HSF decided to temporarily halt its Kauai operations altogether.

As the courts wrestled with the legalities of the situation, law enforcement agencies had to prepare for the ferry’s possible return to full service and the subsequent widespread civil disturbances it could cause ashore and in the harbors.

Unique Challenges
Federal, state, and local authorities faced the challenge of balancing seemingly contradictory objectives: upholding the law, ensuring public safety, ensuring the safe arrival and departure of the ferry in multiple ports and jurisdictions, and protecting and promoting constitutional freedoms. Information sharing was critical for successful operations, and for them to be viewed with the broadest scope—not just as an exchange among government agencies, but with the public at large.

Achieving Interagency Alignment
The Coast Guard; its port partners; and various county, state, and federal government officials routinely worked together on a number of committees, at exercises, and during other operational incidents to understand and align the various legal authorities and jurisdictional concerns.

The mechanism that provided for information sharing and interagency alignment was a unified command structure consistent with the National Incident Management System. The Incident Command System (ICS) provides an organizational structure and process wherein agencies with differing authorities, competencies, and equities may come together to work toward a common goal. The operational challenges, varying agency concerns, and differing agency capabilities were laid bare and discussed thoroughly during the frequent meetings of the unified command.

Execution of the Operation
The unified command worked together to develop a plan that recognized differing authorities and competencies. The two operations/groups (onshore and waterborne security operations) created an overall plan designed to reduce the number of on-water protesters, provided a pre-designated protest zone, and developed coordinated methods to deal with illegal and unsafe protests. The coordinated plan also required a temporary fixed security zone to ensure the safety of the vessel and its passengers.

Operational Success
The implementation of the new security/protest zone required extensive public affairs efforts to ensure the affected maritime stakeholders and ocean recreation community understood the scope of the security regulations. To increase compliance, the unified command formed a joint public information staff to meet with the public to outline security zone boundaries and explain the legal consequences of violating the zone. Public outreach proved successful in deterring a large number of protesters from illegally entering the on-water security zone.

It’s important to note that the intended result of this information sharing process and interagency collaboration was not to change the protestors’ opinions regarding the ferry operation.

In this instance, information sharing achieved its intended goals: allowing the Alakai to transit in and out of Maui without incident, allowing protestors to voice their dissent, and helping agencies to make the best use of unique authorities and competencies.

The complexities of maritime operations are often compounded by factors such as the variability of the sea itself, differing and sometimes overlapping legal authorities, and the presence of a wide range of concerned agencies with varying competencies and capabilities. Information sharing reduces operational complexity and sets the stage for success.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

The International Trade Data System—a global data-sharing initiative

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LCDR Mike Dolan, chief, Cargo Security Branch, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities.


On January 24, 2008, RADM Brian Salerno, the U.S. Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, signed a letter of intent for the Coast Guard to become the 43rd participating government agency in the International Trade Data System. This decision opened the door for the Coast Guard to explore new ideas for using information to improve programs, harmonize processes with other agencies, and reduce regulatory burden on industry.

When announced at the February 2008 meeting of the Commercial Operators Advisory Committee, this decision generated applause and acclaim. The senior industry leaders who comprise the committee represent major companies that import the consumer goods our nation relies on. These leaders know that the global marketplace’s future progress requires an emphasis on data and technology. As a heavily regulated community, they were happy to see the Coast Guard join a project intended to streamline the process of delivering required information to the government.

What Is the International Trade Data System?
The International Trade Data System (ITDS) is an ongoing, long-term U.S. interagency community of interest. The Customs and Border Protection automated commercial environment (ACE) major acquisition project, which is creating and modernizing computer network interfaces with the international trade community, supports the ITDS community. The ITDS members’ requirements will shape the spiral development of ACE capabilities. The objective is to provide a single portal for commercial entities to submit all trade data and information required by the federal government. Once through the ACE portal, the data then goes into the ITDS community’s repository.

The project intends to facilitate more streamlined operations in that commercial entities will submit information to the government only once, in paperless form. Regulatory agencies will benefit by having complete visibility of all trade data along with connection to all the other agencies’ programs and activities.

Opportunities for interagency coordination and program improvement abound, and some agencies have already reaped benefits. For example, the Federal Safety Inspection Service achieved a 44-fold increase in the tonnage of ineligible product detected, detained, and removed from the food supply in one year using information obtained through an early version of the ACE portal.

Why Is This Important to the Coast Guard?
Like most high-level policy issues, the decision to participate in ITDS had both political and pragmatic drivers and implications. First, the politics. Signed into law in October 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 states, “All federal agencies that require documentation for clearing or licensing the importation and exportation of cargo shall participate in the ITDS.” The act also states, “It is the sense of Congress that agency participation in the ITDS is an important priority of the federal government …”

Additionally, Coast Guard leadership began to see potential value in the concept. Program managers started to recognize that participation in the International Trade Data System could give the Coast Guard not only access to information, but to other agencies’ processes and programs, as well. This access would have a cumulative value that exceeded any cost of participation.

Finally, because the ACE system and the ITDS agency network interfaces were already being built, the Coast Guard realized that the window of opportunity was limited. The longer the wait to join, the less influence it would have had on the design of the network interface. And so, with a leap of faith, the Coast Guard joined the International Trade Data System with some visionary ideas of what it might achieve.

As a large, complex organization, we are at the most exciting phase of this new initiative. We are envisioning all the wonderful things that we can achieve, and stand ready to deal with the challenges that lie ahead. Participation in the International Trade Data System gives us a powerful tool and a path forward to make sure that the Coast Guard stays current with technology and stays engaged with the regulated community.


For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Creating a Culture of Information Sharing

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By Ms. Susan Henry, U.S. Coast Guard Information Sharing executive agent.


The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 was signed into law on August 3, 2007, bringing assessment of federal information sharing practices and performance into sharper focus. Though annual assessment of federal information sharing had already been mandated under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the ownership and scope of the process were uncertain, and the reorganization of the intelligence community was still in progress.

The interpretation of information sharing within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also been evolving since 2004. Within DHS, the vision of our responsibility to share stretches across all threats, all hazards, and all missions under the department’s purview. The Coast Guard is accountable for our information sharing performance across all maritime regimes and all missions, with a huge number and variety of partners.

New Annual Performance Measures
A few months after the 9/11 Commission Act was passed, the program manager for the information sharing environment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) began working closely with DHS and other federal departments and agencies to identify specific, achievable measures of information sharing performance. The baseline measures focus on several key improvement categories, including:

· establishing integrated policy and practices, such as international agreements, privacy policy, and interagency reporting of suspicious activities;
· establishing agency-level information sharing governance;
· implementing joint federal/state/local fusion centers and “common terrorism information sharing” standards;
· cultural transformation (including personnel incentives and disincentives) and training.

In the summer of 2008 ODNI used an overall list of 14 key measures to create and present the first annual report to Congress.

How Do We Measure Up?
Coast Guard missions have always required information sharing with international, federal, state, local, tribal, industry, public, and private partners. As a result of our tradition of information sharing, our entering position against the new baseline measures is strong. Coast Guard sector commanders have actively pursued new collaborative planning, prevention, and response partnerships at the local level. Regional alliances promoted by federal law, policy, sponsorship, and grants, such as area maritime security committees, have been added to existing area contingency plan-based and Incident Command System-oriented partnerships.

DHS has formed several focused shared mission communities already. New shared mission communities will focus on other aspects of the “all threats, all hazards” DHS realm, establishing policy-level collaboration in critical infrastructure, incident response, and other concerns crucial to safety and security. These will cut across all Coast Guard missions, and all will require Coast Guard representation.

What Do We Still Need to Do?
To account for the information sharing we already do, we need to establish enterprise information sharing governance. We need to develop an agency-level information sharing strategy that publicly articulates the improvements we intend to support and invest in for the future. We need to continue to develop an information sharing segment architecture to ensure that our essential exchanges of information with our partners become part of our capability requirements. We also clearly need better collaborative, networked capabilities to work efficiently and effectively with our partners at local and regional levels.

Consistent with the 9/11 Commission Report’s call to “unity of effort” in information sharing, the new federal annual performance measures also call us to create a culture of information sharing. To facilitate this, we must include measurable improvements to our personnel evaluation and appraisal standards and institute incentives and rewards for excellence in information sharing, as well as disincentives for obstructing information sharing with our partners.

As a whole, our monitoring of Coast Guard field units’ information sharing practices shows a multi-mission federal agency stretching to the limits of its resources to share information in order to increase operational effectiveness. The new federal information sharing performance measures give us additional opportunities to showcase successful partnering, better document our constraints, and continue to improve the safety and security of the U.S. maritime domain.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

USCG Marine Safety Performance Plan Specific Safety Initiatives—improve commercial fishing vessel safety

Excerpt originally published in the Summer 2008 issue of the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine as part of a special section—Capacity, Communication, Culture: The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Performance Plan.

Commercial fishing continues to be one of the most dangerous occupations in America. The industry also faces severe economic pressures, including depleted stocks and limits on fishing, increasing fuel and other costs, and prices that have stagnated since at least 2000. This fosters an attitude of greater risk tolerance that can lead to less emphasis on training, safety equipment, and maintenance.

The Coast Guard has pursued improvements in safety in the commercial fishing industry since before World War II. Voluntary commercial fishing safety programs received considerable attention in the 1970s, and the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 provided authority to require survival equipment, but did little to address prevention efforts. http://www.uscgboating.org/

Outreach and Communication
To improve our impact, we will seek to add full-time civilian commercial fishing vessel safety examiners and coordinators. This will allow us to expand the voluntary dockside examination program and reach out to those in the fishing industry to help them understand and come into compliance with regulations for basic safety equipment and lifesaving devices.

The Coast Guard Auxiliary performs a significant number of these safety exams and is an integral part of the fishing vessel safety team. We will seek to expand auxiliary involvement and institutionalize its role. In particular, we will use auxiliarists in boarding officer training and include auxiliarists in fishing vessel casualty investigations.

We will continue to promote safety and best practices through active participation at conferences and industry trade shows and through printed materials.

Partnerships
We will come together within the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Advisory Committee to improve safety communications and risk tools to assist fishermen. Additionally, we will join forces with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (that staffs a field office in Alaska focused on fishing industry safety) and take advantage of this expertise to develop future strategies to reduce commercial fishing vessel deaths and injuries.

We will also seek to improve information sharing with insurance companies to better understand injury mechanisms and potential interventions, and will leverage relationships with safety equipment manufacturers to identify areas where new or improved products are needed.

We intend to maintain close relationships with state fisheries regulators and seek to leverage their authority to favorably impact commercial fishing vessel safety. We will also work with Canadian regulators to share solutions and develop common approaches to minimize deaths and injuries.

Maritime Law Enforcement
We will direct a robust program of fishing vessel safety enforcement to deter unsafe operation, detect violations, and educate the industry. We will encourage operational commands to provide capable and sufficient resources, to schedule activities to maximize access to vessels and crews, and to provide ample advance publicity to effectively announce the program and explain its purpose.

We will encourage effective coordination of at-sea boardings, by identifying vessels that pose a greater safety concern because the operators refused to allow a voluntary dockside examination or were found not in compliance.In all instances, we will emphasize the importance of keeping the process cooperative and non-adversarial.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

USCG Marine Safety Performance Plan Specific Safety Initiatives—recreational boating safety

Excerpt originally published in the Summer 2008 issue of the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine as part of a special section—Capacity, Communication, Culture: The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Performance Plan.


Recreational boating is a fun and generally safe activity, yet each year some 700 boaters are lost and thousands more are injured. Recreational boating results in the third-highest annual number of transportation fatalities, and boating deaths are on the National Transportation Safety Board’s “Most Wanted” list.

To improve recreational boating safety, the Coast Guard is aggressively implementing a strategic plan developed in consultation with the National Boating Safety Advisory Committee.

Elements of the plan address:

Boating education. We will work with our partners to track the use and effectiveness of training and education courses.

Safety communications. We will act with key stakeholders and partners to improve safety communications and increase awareness of safe boating practices.

Safety equipment. We will increase boaters’ knowledge of required safety equipment and monitor trends for carriage.

Compliance with navigation rules. The Coast Guard will collaborate with the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators and other boating safety partners to improve the awareness and enforcement of navigation rules.

Additional Safety Measures
We will aggressively work with our partners to increase life jacket wear rates. We will join forces to assess factors affecting life jacket usage, encourage availability of life jackets, and strengthen the enforcement regime. In addition, we will seek to curb boating under the influence. The Coast Guard will create a baseline measurement to track trends in alcohol use by boaters, assess the effectiveness of field sobriety penalties, and increase the effectiveness of enforcement.

Performance Measurement and Reporting
We will team with National Association of State Boating Law Administrators to pursue a Memorandum of Agreement with all federal land management agencies to ensure proper and timely accident reporting to state authorities.

Manufacturer Compliance Efforts
The Coast Guard will identify boats involved in accidents where carbon monoxide, flotation, capacity, or fuel systems are factors and enhance manufacturer understanding of USCG regulations. We will verify any non-compliance via a factory visit program, and ensure corrective actions are implemented.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

USCG Marine Safety Performance Plan Objectives—improve program management

Excerpt originally published in the Summer 2008 issue of the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine as part of a special section—Capacity, Communication, Culture: The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Performance Plan.

We must deploy dynamic performance management practices through all levels of the program to maintain capacity, performance, and service, while delivering best value to the taxpayer.

Improve Management Accountability
We will restore transparency to the management of the marine safety program, and improve industry accessibility to Coast Guard leadership.

Service leaders at all levels will create opportunities to improve stakeholder engagement. We will capitalize on the Coast Guard’s modernization efforts to strengthen accessibility and timely service without jeopardizing transparency.

Strengthen Program Management
Ensuring that management structures and practices align with customer and other stakeholder needs—and that they are completely understood—is central to improving service delivery to the marine industry.

We will provide program direction that supports close, cooperative relationships with operational commands, industry customers, and other stakeholders. To the greatest extent possible, we will provide single-point accountability for all program outcomes, and designate management authorities and line-of-service responsibilities that correspond with key industry segments.

Develop a Balanced Scorecard
We will expand and improve our performance measurement capabilities and practices and develop a balanced scorecard that includes customer satisfaction metrics as well as a complete suite of outcome, output, activity, capability, and efficiency measures.

Implement a Quality Management System
We will implement a defined set of policies, processes, and procedures to execute marine safety mission activities. Implementing a quality management system throughout the program will enable us to identify, measure, control, and improve the core processes that will ultimately lead to improved mission performance.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

USCG Marine Safety Performance Plan Objectives—improve marine safety program capacity and performance

The next few blog excerpts were originally published in the Summer 2008 issue of the U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine as part of a special section—Capacity, Communication, Culture: The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Performance Plan.


For the past decade, our marine inspector and investigator workforce has remained relatively constant despite a growing demand for domestic inspections, increasing port state responsibility, and increased homeland security requirements. Our ability to keep abreast of this evolving maritime industry is fundamentally linked to our potential to develop and retain an experienced cadre of technically savvy professionals.

Increase Capacity
To accomplish this, the Coast Guard must increase marine inspector and investigator capacity. To retain expertise and geographic-specific competencies while ensuring long-term continuity in critical mission areas, many of these will be civilian positions.

Achieve Appropriate Blend of Military/Civilian Workforce
Military personnel must continue to serve as marine inspectors and investigators to ensure innovation and to garner experience for management and command responsibilities. We will distribute civilian positions according to need and to complement the military workforce.

Maintaining proficiency within the marine safety program begins with recruitment and accession of additional maritime professionals. We intend to strengthen recruiting efforts at the maritime colleges through additional liaison officers and by seeking opportunities for Coast Guard officers to serve as faculty at those institutions.

Support and Reward Competency
To support these marine safety program recruits, we will work to ensure a viable career path to the most senior ranks of the Coast Guard. We must recognize and reward those who advance from apprentice, to journeyman, to expert marine safety professional status.

In addition, we will expand training and education programs, including engaging industry (within applicable legal and ethical guidelines) to maximize training opportunities and immerse our personnel in industry operations.

Expand Professional Education
Increased complexity in ship design and construction, including high-speed ferries, liquefied natural gas ships, mega-container and mega-cruise ships, and novel structural designs, calls for an innovative and knowledgeable technical staff to develop guidance, standards, and policy. We will work toward additional capacity and expertise to meet this demand.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Upcoming in Proceedings

Winter 2009-2010: Grassroots efforts
• What’s the Coast Guard done for me lately?
• Local and regional efforts

Spring 2010: Rulemaking Update
• Rulemaking 101
• Interagency interaction
• Supporting analysis
• Public participation

Summer 2010: Maritime Domain Awareness
• Transforming MDA policy
• Transforming MDA capabilities
• Transforming MDA through technology

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Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

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Ask the MSSC—you have questions, we have answers

Many of you have already utilized the Proceedings online reader survey. We’re grateful for your input and we carefully read and consider each submission. In addition to your feedback on the magazine, you have also used this question form to pose questions of your own, such as:

“Why is celestial navigation still a test subject for merchant marine officers, and are there are any plans to discontinue it?”

“Why is the TWIC not required for public vessels sailors?”

“I would like to see an update on the Towing Safety Advisory Committee. What has been accomplished? What is the path forward? Are there going to be third-party inspectors? How would an organization become approved to be an inspector or auditor?”

Good questions—all. Better still: We have answers from the USCG Marine Safety and Security Council. We’ll post answers to these questions monthly here on the Coast Guard Marine Safety blog.

Why is celestial navigation still a test subject for merchant marine officers, and are there are any plans to discontinue it?

Answered by the USCG National Maritime Center and the Office of Operating and Environmental Standards.

Celestial navigation is still included on license exams for ocean routes for a number of reasons.

First, celestial navigation is among the required competencies in the applicable part of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW). For example, the minimum standard of competence for an officer in charge of a navigational watch includes the “[a]bility to use celestial bodies to determine the ship’s position.” The STCW is undergoing a comprehensive review and celestial navigation is among the areas receiving attention.

While it is too early to tell the outcome of this review, the position of the United States is that while the role of celestial navigation has significantly diminished, it should not be eliminated entirely. Celestial navigation performs an important function as a backup means of navigation in the event that other navigation modes fail.

Second, the use of either azimuths or amplitudes of a celestial body is the only way to determine accurately a ship’s compass error when operating outside of the visual range of terrestrial objects. The United States supports limiting the celestial navigation requirements to those necessary to perform its backup navigation role and in order to perform compass error corrections.

It is worth noting that although we have not eliminated celestial navigation from our license examinations, we have made changes that reflect its diminished use in everyday watchkeeping. In early 2002, we reduced the minimum passing grade for celestial navigation exam modules from 90 percent to 80 percent. We believe this reduction is consistent with the reduced (but not eliminated) role celestial navigation plays in modern watchkeeping.

Notwithstanding our agreement that the role of celestial navigation has diminished, its use in prudent navigation has not been entirely eliminated, and the Coast Guard does not have any immediate plans to eliminate celestial navigation from its license examinations through the amendment of our regulations found at 46 CFR §10.910.

For more information:
If you have more questions, please send an e-mail to
HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil, subject line “Ask the MSSC.” We’ll forward your questions to the Marine Safety and Security Council and publish the answers.

Boundless Brotherhood and Heroism on the Western Rivers

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LTJG Jesse Garrant, chief of Boat Operations, and LTJG Jodi Min, assistant chief of Prevention, both of U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Pittsburgh.


It was a cloudy, frigid January night on the Ohio River as the motor vessel (M/V) Elizabeth M began its lock upbound through the Montgomery Locks and Dam. Despite high water conditions and swift currents in the area, operations appeared normal as the vessel executed a “knockout” lockage, a procedure that involves the towboat disconnecting from the barges due to a lack of space lengthwise within the lock chamber, then reconnecting after following the barges through the lock.

As the lock gates opened and the motor vessel exited the lock chamber with its six loaded open-hopper coal barges, an incident occurred that caused the Elizabeth M, her seven-man crew, and two of her barges to be swept over the treacherous Montgomery Dam.

As the vessel sank nearly instantly, the crew had little time to prepare for the cold, turbulent water. The powerful river current forced one crewmember overboard, which left him drifting downriver, clinging to floating debris until rescuers could arrive. Additional crewmembers clung to the small, exposed portion of the pilothouse (see picture), battling the powerful current while also trying to fight hypothermia.

All of the barges subsequently sank, posing hazards to navigation above and below the dam. Tragically, as a result of this casualty, four of the seven crewmembers perished.

Heroism
That morning, mariners along the Ohio River clearly demonstrated the true meaning of brotherhood and heroism. After hearing desperate requests for assistance from the crew, Good Samaritan responders performed actions that displayed bravery and demonstrated the underlying bond among mariners. Crewmembers from the M/Vs Lillian G, Rocket, and Sandy Drake responded, placing their lives in imminent danger.

To render assistance despite the known risk, crews maneuvered their vessels while combating high water conditions and avoiding floating debris and the threat of collision with partially submerged barges that were set adrift during the casualty. Crews from the Lillian G and Sandy Drake demonstrated commendable valor while retrieving men who had fallen overboard. As a result of their immediate response, one crewmember’s life was saved.

When faced with a decision that could cause the crew of the Rocket to suffer the same fate as the Elizabeth M, the crew unanimously decided to attempt rescue efforts for the two remaining survivors. As a result of the Rocket’s actions, both survivors, who battled frigid 34°F temperature water and 33°F air temperature, were safely rescued and successfully treated for severe hypothermia and minor injuries.

Brotherhood
These heroic actions may not have been possible without the strong bond that has been witnessed daily on the Western Rivers. In a river community such as the Pittsburgh operating region, the rivermen form a small group that is extremely protective of one another. Strong bonds like these have been in existence since people started working the rivers.

Though not always as life-or-death as the acts of the Elizabeth M survivor or Rocket’s crewmembers, it is very common to see smaller acts of help and heroism on an everyday, smaller scale. When towboats and barges go aground or have breakaways, calls of distress from any riverboat captain will be responded to by others willing to help.

River conditions warrant decisions that are based on risk management, safety, and necessity, which are juggled by all vessel captains and crewmembers. The maritime community continues to work diligently to prevent casualties, but when they inevitably do occur, the river community will continue to extend its help to its brothers.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

McAlpine Lock Allision—a misaligned approach sets off a chain reaction

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LCDR Phillip Ison, chief, Prevention Department, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Ohio Valley.


On January 26, 2006, while southbound on the Ohio River near Louisville, Ky., a towboat pushing three loaded asphalt barges during a period of high water attempted to enter the approach to the McAlpine lockway. It was a clear day with excellent visibility, but the pilot did not line up his approach correctly. The tow allided with the vane dike at the head of Portland Canal and the force of the blow snapped the barges’ connecting wires.

The tow broke apart, with each barge drifting downstream individually. Tugs attempted to recover all the barges before they drifted down to the dam, but two barges escaped this recovery effort and went over the dam. The first over was recovered. The second struck a railroad bridge sideways. Within a few minutes, the current forced the upstream edge of the barge down and flipped the barge onto its port side.

There it sat, 300 feet long, 54 feet wide, with 900,000 gallons of asphalt, heating oil, and diesel aboard, bottom pressed firmly against two bridge supports, its port side on the bottom of the river.

Over the next four months, the incident command worked as a cooperative group to address all aspects of the incident, from oil recovery to salvage, from site safety to cargo recovery. Conflicting concerns, needs, and recommendations were invariably resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.

Cargo offload was finally complete in late May 2006. The asphalt required re-heating before pumping could proceed, which involved cutting into the barge at each cargo tank and inserting heating coils. This was river-level dependent, and operations were suspended numerous times due to rising water levels. Once ready for removal, the barge was salvaged over a two-day period, using an A-frame crane to lift the barge while it was pulled away from the railroad bridge.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Barge Break-aways—an ever-present risk

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LT Matthew Meskun, chief, Prevention Department, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Pittsburgh, and CWO William Perkins, marine inspector/investigator, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Upper Mississippi River.

Because of their efficiency, barges are the primary commercial cargo transportation mode. Unfortunately, from time to time, barges can break free from their mooring or towing arrangements and are swept down the river, potentially wreaking havoc to the river system until they are either corralled by assisting towing vessels or salvaged (if the barges have sunk).

For example, this picture shows what’s left of a hopper barge after an allision with the Eads Bridge in 2005. The vessel was traveling southbound on the upper Mississippi River as part of a 15-barge tow when it hit a bridge and broke away from the tow.

Barge Break-away Locations
There are two primary locations where barge break-aways occur: either at a fleeting area facility, or from a towing vessel underway.

Many factors can contribute to a barge break-away that originates from a fleeting area, such as impact from large items floating downriver, high winds and current, rapid changes in water levels, or human error. Break-aways may also occur when other barges hit the fleeting area.

Normally when a barge breaks from a towing vessel underway, the tow hits some drift or other obstruction. This collision then breaks the wire gear holding the barges together as a unit. This event can also cause a chain reaction, as the break-away barges can hit other barges further down the river.

Barge Break-away Prevention
Federal regulatory bodies, river industry associations, working groups, and companies have all taken active roles to promote methods that reduce barge break-aways. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) oversees the location and placement of each fleeting area facility. Each fleeting area operator is required to submit a fleeting area operations manual that provides detailed information and procedures for a river’s different stages and conditions.

Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Pittsburgh has created additional preventive measures that have been adopted by other Coast Guard units on the Western Rivers. One very successful outreach effort is an annual barge break-away seminar that highlights the importance of properly maintaining the fleet in order to prevent barge break-aways.

Another initiative that MSU Pittsburgh spearheaded is random fleeting area facility inspections, conducted with USACE partners. The joint inspection teams visit fleeting facilities to:

• check the condition of the materials used to secure the barges,
• ascertain overall worker safety efforts,
• verify training practices,
• affirm the use and currency of the approved fleeting area operations manual.

Barge Break-away Response
Coast Guard response to a barge break-away notification typically seeks to mitigate any hazard to navigation. The operations specialist standing radio watch in the sector command center receives the notification and issues an urgent marine information broadcast to alert all vessels in the area of the barge break-away and to request assistance from any available vessels in the area.

Once the situation is under control and all hazards have been removed, the Coast Guard will stop all operations at the source of the break-away. The operator of the responsible fleeting area will be required to investigate and determine the cause of the break-away, and submit a proposal on how to rectify the discrepancy to prevent a similar reoccurrence.

The Western Rivers system is a vital part of America’s economy, and preventing barge break-aways on it is critical. The industry, USACE, and the Coast Guard are working to ensure that the inland river transportation system remains open and free-flowing for the efficient trade and movement of commerce.

For more information:

Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Measuring the Economic Impact of Marine Casualties

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By CAPT Denise L. Matthews, former commanding officer, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Paducah; LTC Steven J. Roemhildt, Nashville District engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and LCDR Thomas J. Kaminski, former supervisor, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment Nashville.


On August 3, 2006, a tank barge carrying 20,000 barrels of mixed xylene was damaged while locking upbound through Wilson Lock and Dam (L/D) in Florence, Ala. The towing vessel M/V Potomac was pushing the jumbo barge (297 feet by 54 feet), HTCO-3016, at the time of the incident. As the lock chamber filled, the barge came into contact with the upper lock gate, dislocating it from its track. As this upper gate fell back into place, the barge became wedged beneath it, as seen in the picture.

For more than four months, local, state, and federal agencies worked closely to safely remove the damaged tank barge and repair and reinstall the damaged lock gate. They also had to manage constantly changing vessel queues to minimize economic impact to the marine transportation system, its suppliers, and customers.

The Response
The actions taken following this major marine casualty exemplify the interagency coordination and teamwork required for effective and efficient marine transportation system recovery on the inland waterways. During the emergency response and prolonged post-emergency phases of this incident, key stakeholder issues included:

• potential pollution,
• possible toxicity and explosion hazards,
• resumption of safe navigation and normal locking operations,
• repair of the main lock chamber,
• waterways safety/security,
• economic impact due to lock delays.

By late afternoon on August 3, a unified command was established that included senior representatives from Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Paducah, TVA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE is the operator of the lock and dam), the Florence Fire Department, and Maryland Marine Inc. (owner of barge HTCO-3016). The initial objectives of the unified command were protecting the community, responders, and maritime industry; safely securing and removing HTCO-3016 from under the lock gate; and beginning operation of the Wilson auxiliary lock to keep barges moving through the area.

Barge Removal
USACE also began construction of a temporary dam and a support structure for the damaged lock gate. Since the dislocated and damaged lock gate was sitting atop—and therefore supported by—the damaged barge, the plan was to pump out water to lower the barge, thereby transferring the lock gate’s weight to the newly constructed support. On August 5, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the removal of HTCO-3016.

Restoring Traffic
On the morning of August 6, USACE reopened the auxiliary lock to commercial vessel traffic, which had grown to seven towing vessels and 90 barges awaiting lockage. By the afternoon of August 9, the vessel queue had increased to 15 towing vessels and 139 barges loaded with a variety of cargoes.

Economic Impact
The significant decrease in Wilson L/D’s ability to lock commercial vessel traffic resulted in significant economic impact to the towboat industry and the Tennessee River marine transportation system—approximately $29 million. Additional costs were prevented due to outstanding stakeholder cooperation.

Stakeholder Communication and Cooperation
On August 8, the MSD Nashville supervisor attended a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers briefing where USACE expressed its understanding and concern for the economic impact this incident would have on the river industry.

In general, USACE used “first-in, first-out” prioritization to lock barges but also requested representatives to serve on an industry-led queue management board to help make decisions on priority lockage requests. Priority lockage decisions were made based on type/amount of cargo and impact on industry.

On August 17, USACE removed the damaged lock gate, and on August 18 commenced use of the temporary caisson configured for main gate lockage. USACE then began weekly teleconferences to communicate lock repair, vessel queue status, and caisson-use schedules to the Coast Guard, TVA, and industry stakeholders. This process continued until the damaged main chamber lock gate was repaired and reinstalled. Wilson L/D resumed normal operations on December 5.

For more information:

Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp. Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Safety is at Our Core

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By ADM Thad Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.


One of the Coast Guard’s greatest strengths is our multi-mission character. It allows us to conduct a wide range of functions in the maritime domain, from marine safety, to law enforcement and national defense, to environmental protection and humanitarian response. The Coast Guard has accrued these roles and missions over two centuries of service because these duties serve a collective good and are most efficiently and effectively accomplished by a single federal maritime force.

Our marine safety mission remains the bedrock of the Coast Guard’s value to the nation, and it underpins our security and environmental stewardship programs. This focus on safety pervades all of our mission areas; it is woven into the very fabric of our service, and is the ultimate focus of all we do.

We secure our ports and waterways to keep America safe from terrorist attack, safe from the ravages of illegal drugs, and safe from unlawful entry of any kind. We protect the world’s oceans and our living marine resources. In the event of any natural or man-made disaster, we act to ensure the safety of our citizens and to remove them from harm’s way.

The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety & Security Council supports these missions, and its members direct and drive these efforts. Our operational model is flexible, adaptive, efficient, and capable of succeeding with innumerable maritime scenarios. This positions the Coast Guard to meet a broad range of national interests.

As we seek to continually improve maritime safety, we will also strive to balance each of our essential mission requirements. Coast Guard men and women serve across the nation and around the world keeping people safe, ports secure, and our waters protected. For hundreds of years, we’ve been there when the nation needed us most. While we live in a changing world, one thing is certain: Marine safety will forever be at our core.

We will be sharing examples of this sentiment in action in the next series of blogs, excerpted from the “Focus on Safety” issue of Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine.

For more information:
Full article and “Focus on Safety” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2008 Vol. 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned – Fire Aboard a Cruise Ship, Part II

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. To read Part I, please see our Nov. 3 post.


Lessons learned from marine casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent casualty investigation, and describe the lessons learned as a result.

As the fire raged aboard the cruise ship, four couples struggled for survival:

Rooms A344 and A320: The two married couples in these rooms encountered a closed fire screen as they attempted to escape, and became separated. One wife assumed her husband had made it to safety when she heard a door slam shut ahead of her. Both wives escaped.

Between 3:44 and 4:02 a.m., the engine fire party recovered the male passenger of room A320 in that alleyway. They pulled the semi-conscious man to safety, and he survived.

Just 30 feet away, the party found the male of room A344. Though he, too, was quickly transported to safety, where a medical party quickly came to assist, they found he had stopped breathing, had no pulse, and could not be revived.

Room A402: This married couple was able to escape their stateroom, but the elderly man suffered a respiratory arrest and collapsed on his way to their muster station. He was later recovered and taken to safety.

Room A340: This couple was trapped in their room, unable to get through when calling 911. The fire party evacuated them.

Of 2,690 passengers and the 1,123 crewmembers, there was one casualty. The autopsy of the man in room A344 reported his immediate cause of death was asphyxia, secondary to inhalation of smoke and irrespirable gases. Another 13 passengers and four crewmembers were treated for smoke inhalation.

The Aftermath
The cruise ship in this casualty seemed to be doing everything it should be. The ship was up to code and following the required regulations. Additionally, the crew’s quick and decisive actions prevented the situation from becoming worse.

There was no evidence that accelerants were used to intentionally set the fire, and the only electrical fittings on the balcony were the enclosed light fittings above the balcony doors. The damage to the light fittings was consistent with exposure to an external heat source; there was no evidence of arcing or failure.

The most likely source of ignition was a discarded cigarette. It was determined that the fire probably smoldered for about 20 minutes before flames developed.

Although passengers aboard the cruise ship were instructed to properly extinguish cigarettes in ash trays during a safety video shown throughout the day on embarkation, as well as in stateroom safety literature, rules such as these are not always followed.

Updated Regulations
After the fire, the International Council of Cruise Lines published a safety notice with recommended practices for balcony fire safety. IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee also initiated urgent measures to address cruise ship balcony fire safety, which were adopted just nine months after the fire.

Under the new amendments, partitions separating balconies must be constructed of non-combustible materials. Furniture on cabin balconies must be of restricted fire risk unless fixed fire extinguishing systems, fixed fire detection, and fire alarm systems are fitted to the balconies.

The photo shows polycarbonate balcony partitions, plastic furniture, and polyurethane deck tiles after the fire. These materials were highly combustible and produced very thick black smoke.

Lessons Learned
In this case, not even the most experienced maritime organizations thought of every possible scenario, as evidenced by the lack of regulations regarding balcony materials.

Perhaps this example will provide food for thought by prompting all vessel owners to evaluate whether all areas of their vessels are safe, what potential problems may arise, and whether the persons aboard are ready to respond to emergencies at all times.

Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and “2008 Volume 65, Number 2” (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp. Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Lessons Learned – Fire Aboard a Cruise Ship, Part I

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine by Ms. Diana Forbes, managing editor, Proceedings.

Lessons learned from marine casualty reports are regularly featured in Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council magazine. These articles explore marine incidents and the causal factors, outline the subsequent casualty investigations, and describe the lessons learned as a result. We will post a "Lessons Learned" feature on this blog once every two months.

It is important to note that lives were lost in some of the marine casualties we present. Out of respect for the deceased, their families, and surviving crewmembers, we do not mention the name of any person involved.

On March 23, 2006, the passenger ship Star Princess suffered a serious external fire. Even though the ship met the necessary fire protection requirements, a fire broke out on a balcony then spread rapidly from balcony to balcony. As a result, 13 passengers and four crewmembers suffered smoke inhalation, and one passenger died.

The Incident
On the morning of the incident, the sea was calm and visibility was good. At 2:50 a.m., a security patrol smelled something burning. This was reported to the officer of the watch and the area was checked. Nothing was found, but the officer instructed the security patrol to include the area during overnight rounds.

Nineteen minutes later the fire turned from smoldering to fully blown. At that time (3:09 a.m.), the officer of the watch received a call from a passenger. The bridge lookout reported the same fire almost simultaneously. The photo is a still from a video taken two minutes after the first alarm.

Quick Reaction
Amidst a steady stream of smoke detectors, heat detectors, and alarms going off on multiple decks, the crew’s response also occurred in rapid succession.

The officer of the watch made a broadcast over the public address system and sent the assessment party to the area (3:10 a.m.). The senior first officer saw the scale of the fire and immediately requested the bridge to broadcast the crew alert (3:13 a.m.).

The fire’s location was pinpointed and at 3:14 a.m. the fire screen doors were closed. In the next few minutes, the ventilation was also stopped, and the captain reduced speed to lessen the wind over the deck. During this maneuver, the relative wind shifted and the flames became more vertical.

At 3:20 a.m., the passengers were instructed to go to their muster stations. Lifeboats were prepared, but the port boats waited for protection from fire hoses because the fire was on the ship’s port side.

Firefighting Efforts
The fire started on a port side balcony and spread rapidly to adjacent balconies and up several decks. It also spread into staterooms as heat shattered the balcony doors, but was contained by each stateroom’s fire-smothering system.

As the fire progressed, the balcony partitions and other combustible materials generated dense black smoke which entered staterooms and alleyways and hampered evacuation.

Passenger Rescue Complications
Section leaders attempted to clear every stateroom by using keys to enter and evacuate passengers. However, one section leader didn’t have keys to dozens of staterooms, and had to bang on doors.

Because telephone lines were busy, the section leader couldn’t call his zone commander to request additional master keys, nor could he inform the commander that he was unable to check those locked rooms.

There was much confusion trying to piece together who was safe, especially when passengers went to incorrect muster stations. Initial headcounts and roll calls took hours because they had to be repeated several times, especially in one muster station that did not have a megaphone.

The Cause
The fire was likely started by a discarded cigarette that ignited combustible materials on a balcony, then spread rapidly from balcony to balcony.

But why did the fire burn so quickly and densely? Aren’t regulations in place to fireproof passenger ships?

The material used for the partitions and deck covering was determined by several factors, such as durability in a marine environment, weight, aesthetics, cost, and availability. Combustibility and toxicity when burning, however, were not evaluated.

Previous to this incident, such concerns were only defined in regulations that were applicable to internal spaces, not outdoor balconies. This incident brought to light that the regulation’s purpose to contain a fire in its space of origin was by no means achieved.

In Part II we will detail rescue efforts and lessons learned in the aftermath.

Full article is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and "2008 Volume 65, Number 2" (Summer 2008).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp. Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Fall 2009 Available Online

The current edition of Proceedings (Fall 2009) is available online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/.

The issue examines preparedness through the lens of the Coast Guard’s Marine Environmental Response (MER) program and crosses a broad range of topics, including international and industry partnerships, response tools, past responses, exercises, and lessons learned.

Upcoming in Proceedings

Winter 2009-2010: Grassroots efforts
· What’s the Coast Guard done for me lately?
· Local and regional efforts

Spring 2010: Rulemaking Update
· Rulemaking 101
· Interagency interaction
· Supporting analysis
· Public participation

Your Opinion
· What do you want to read in Proceedings?
· What area under the Coast Guard’s marine safety, security, and environmental protection missions affects you most?
· What do you want to know more about?

Post a comment here or send us an e-mail at HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

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A Day in the Life of a Lead Deckhand

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By Captain Richard L. Ehringer, Consul Energy, General Manager of Mon River Towing.

Up Before Dawn
I start my day at 4:30 a.m., one hour before the start of the watch. This gives me time to grab a cup of coffee and a quick breakfast. I also take the fuel report at this time. At 5:30 a.m. I relieve the leadman on the back watch.

If we are in a landing, my stern deckhand and I will finish any remaining work. After tow is completed, I’ll check every barge for water. I then place the pumps where needed and return back to the pilot house to check the orders and attend a safety meeting.

At Daybreak
At this point it is daylight and I am able to go out to shovel and sweep the barges. While sweeping, I’ll check the safety lines and clean up any busted lines or wires. After this, I usually head back to the boat for a short break.

After my break, I’ll report to the captain for tasks like painting or specific cleaning jobs. After I have completed those, I check the engines and light plants in the engine room. This check is the responsibility of the lead deckhand.

Between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., I will start to prepare lunch for my watch and the next watch. At 11:30 a.m., my watch is completed.

Downtime Between Watches
The next six hours are my time to shower, eat, call home, relax, and wind down. This is also where I get to sleep. I usually tend to get about 3 to 4 hours of sleep.

Around 4:30 p.m. I will wake up and start all over again.

I’ll grab a cup of coffee, a quick bite, and relax until 5:30 p.m., when it’s time to relieve the previous watch. I start by checking the barges for water and move pumps if needed. I then report back to the pilothouse for another safety meeting. After the meeting I find out what tasks the captain has for me. I’ll then head to the engine room to check the engines, drain any water, and clean up any oil on the floor.

Miscellaneous Tasks
At this point, I will take a break and get a snack or cold drink. After my break, I will start on any tasks the captain has given to me. After this, I will spend some time on some odds and ends, like putting eyes in lines, checking batteries for water, wiping down walls, and checking the light bulbs around the boat. Some other tasks also include sweeping the gunnels, picking up trash off the decks, and anything else I see that needs to be done.

All of these tasks are completed in between building a tow and guiding the pilot through the locks. Every watch is different, depending on the orders and any situations that could occur. At 11:30 p.m., my watch is over.

And So it Goes …
… pretty much the same, day after day, for 14 days. As the forward lead deckhand, I work from about 6:00 a.m. until noon, and again from 6:00 p.m. until midnight, a total of 12 hours per day.

A lead deckhand’s days vary from one task to another, depending on what our delivery and pick-up orders are. One watch, I may be just riding out the watch between landings. That’s when I catch up on cleaning, chipping, painting, or whatever else needs to be done on the boat. Maintenance and cleaning on the boat is an ongoing process.

Other watches, I’ll find myself in a landing, wiring a tow together for the entire watch. Not too often, but it happens.

My hitch will be over in a couple more days and then I’ll be home for seven days (actually six full days). I’ll have to readjust my sleep patterns with the absence of the engine noises that I got accustomed to for 14 days.

All in all it’s a pretty good life once you adapt. The pay and benefits are decent. I’m saving some for retirement and my co-workers are all pretty good guys. There’s a lot of worse ways to make a living.

About the author:
Captain Ehringer started with J&L Steel Corporation as a deckhand in March of 1963 and soon earned his first mate, master, and first class pilot licenses for inland river steam and motor vessels (all gross tonnage). Since 1983, he has managed various aspects of customer service and operations for the Mon Valley Transportation Division, Ingram Barge Company, and Mon River Towing, where he now serves as general manager. He has also held several leadership positions for the Waterways Association of Pittsburgh, the Port of Pittsburgh Commission, and both the Pittsburgh Maritime and Propeller Clubs.

For more information:
Full article and “U.S. Coast Guard Western Rivers Sectors” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Rivermen’s Lingo

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LT Mark Sawyer, U.S. Coast Guard.

One can quickly identify a riverman by his nomenclature. Rivermen have developed a vocabulary unique to the river industry. For example, calling a riverman’s vessel a “tugboat” will make him cringe. This simple slip identifies you as a “blue water” person with little knowledge of the rivers.

TOWBOATS vs. TUGS
In the May 2007 issue of "Workboat," an article entitled “Tug or Towboat: Which Is It?” helps to clarify the difference. The author explains “a towboat is flat on the front, not a V-bow, and has push knees or toe knees to ‘face up’ to the end of a barge or barges.” In other words, tugs are used primarily on the coast to assist vessels coming into/out of port, while towboats are used to push barges. Towboats are used mainly on the inland rivers; therefore, a riverman’s vessel is called a towboat.

PILOTHOUSE vs. BRIDGE
A “pilothouse” is the common navigational bridge of a towboat. It is the location where the master or pilot navigates the vessel. If one uses the term “bridge” on the rivers, the rivermen will be looking for a structure that spans a waterway, such as a highway or railway bridge.

HITCH vs. CONTRACT
When one asks a riverman how much longer he has on the towboat, he will give the days left on the “hitch.” A hitch varies depending on the company; typically they are 20 to 30 days. A “contract” is usually reserved for deep-draft vessels, when a mariner signs a contract to serve on a vessel for a specified period of time.

TOWBOAT PILOT vs. BAR or HARBOR PILOT
A “towboat pilot” is a member of the towboat’s crew and is the officer in command on the after watch (12 a.m. - 6 p.m.). A towboat pilot holds a Coast Guard license as a mate (pilot) of towing vessels, whereas a bar or harbor pilot holds a first-class pilot license. Furthermore, a bar or harbor pilot is assigned to a vessel temporarily to help the crew aboard navigate a particularly hazardous area. The bar or harbor pilot has an intimate knowledge of the area in which the vessel is operating, moreso than the crew aboard the vessel. Bar or harbor pilots are often used to bring deep-draft vessels into and out of a coastal port.

WHEEL vs. PROPELLER
On a towing vessel operated on the rivers, the term “wheel” is used to describe the propeller, the steering wheel, or a paddlewheel. On the coast, mariners do not use the term wheel, unless occasionally referring to the helm. Coastal mariners call the fan-like devices that move the vessel along by lift created when the angled blades turn in the water as the “propellers” or “screws.” Very seldom will you hear rivermen call the propellers anything but wheels. This term originated from paddlewheels, which were used as the main source of propulsion on the rivers long before propellers.

Unique Terms Used by Rivermen

Acorn Float - A wooden float, shaped like an acorn, measuring about eight inches in diameter by a foot long, used as a life preserver on the old steamboats before personal flotation devices and work vests were invented.

After Watch/Forward Watch - The “after watch” is the working shift on towboats from 12 a.m. – 6 p.m. The “forward watch” is the working shift on towboats from 6 a.m. – 12 p.m.

Backwater - Water that backs up into a tributary when the river rises.

Bull Roaster - A towboat cook.

Chasin’ Frogs - Running aground.

Choke a Stump - Moor to a tree on the bank.

Clorox Bottle Raise - Sudden increase in flow after a dry spell that brings out a lot of drift.

Drift - (1) To float with the current, (2) motion of a vessel caused by current or wind, (3) floating debris in the river, (4) distance between the hook block and boom sheaves of a crane.

Face Up - To bring the head of the boat up against the stern of the tow and secure it with the face wires.

Face Wires - Steel cables from the head winches or capstans used to connect the tow boat to the barges.

Lower Gauge - Water level gauge on the downstream side of a lock.

Mule Train - Maneuver sometimes used in ice, where the barges are pulled single-file behind the towboat.

Splitting on the Head - Facing up with the boat straddling two barges.

Trip Pilot - A pilot employed on a single trip, rather than employed on a regular basis.

Upper Gauge - Water level gauge on the upstream side of a lock.

Yawl - Small dingy or tender carried aboard towboats.

About the author:
LT Mark Sawyer has served as chief of prevention at USCG Marine Safety Unit Huntington. He is a graduate of Officer Candidate School and holds a Master of Science in occupational safety and health and a Master of Business Administration.

For more information:
Full article and “U.S. Coast Guard Western Rivers Sectors” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.

Baseball in the Heartland

Excerpt from U.S. Coast Guard “Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council” magazine. By LT Michael Anderson and Mr. Todd Epperson, U.S. Coast Guard; and Mr. James Holman, City of Pittsburgh Emergency Medical Services/River Rescue Division.


What do Pittsburgh’s PNC Park, Cincinnati’s Great American Ballpark, and St. Louis’s Busch Stadium have in common? The answer is not that they all serve $5 draft beers and foot-long hot dogs. Although that may be true, the answer is that they are all located on the banks of the Western Rivers system.

The Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, and other tributary rivers that form this river system play host to many other professional sports on their shores, but perhaps none more prominent than the great American pastime—baseball. Because many of these real-life fields of dreams are in such close proximity to the waterways, they pose unique safety and security concerns for the Coast Guard units that serve those communities.

Baseball, Major and Minor
The shorelines of the Western Rivers are peppered with professional baseball stadiums—some big, some small. Minor league baseball stadiums such as John O’Donnell Stadium and Riverview Stadium are both located on the banks of the Mississippi River.

When the Majors Come to Town
Major league baseball is not only extraordinarily popular, it’s also big business. With big business comes high-profile events like the World Series and All-Star games.

Both of these events have occurred at venues located on the Western Rivers system—Busch Stadium and PNC Park, respectively. Both of these events created significant operational, tactical, and logistic challenges.

In hosting the MLB All-Star game and related events, the City of Pittsburgh Police Bureau and PNC Park officials took the lead in developing the overall security plan. Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit Pittsburgh and the City of Pittsburgh River Rescue Unit coordinated closely to provide maritime safety and security for the five-day event, and co-chaired the maritime operations working group.

Coast Guard forces, working closely with Pittsburgh River rescue resources, conducted more than 300 security sweeps and security spot-checks of passenger and recreational vessels and dozens of dive sorties on commercial vessel hulls and sea walls. They also executed over 35 passenger vessel physical security escorts.

The photo depicts Coast Guard 25-foot defender-class boats operating during the All-Star game home run derby competition, as kayakers attempt to retrieve balls hit out of PNC Park and into the Allegheny River.

All-Star AMSTEP
To prepare, Coast Guard forces and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies participated in an area maritime security training and exercise program (AMSTEP) tabletop exercise (TTX) sponsored by the Coast Guard and hosted by MSU Pittsburgh. The exercise took place three months prior to the All-Star game and was a key element in enhancing strong partnerships across a broad spectrum of stakeholders.

The objectives of the All-Star game AMSTEP TTX were consistent with many of those emphasized in the overall Pittsburgh area maritime security committee plan and included becoming aware of vulnerabilities, developing strategies to reduce risk, implementing procedures to manage consequences if needed, improving communication, and conducting training to increase responder/personnel preparedness.

World Series Preparations
In preparing for three World Series games at St. Louis’s Busch Stadium, Coast Guard Sector Upper Mississippi River (SUMR) faced many of the same challenges. One major difference, though, was significantly less time to prepare.

With the All-Star game scheduled as far as 12 months in advance, officials in Pittsburgh had more time to plan, acquire resources, and test contingencies. Once it had been determined that St. Louis would host at least one game of the World Series, city, state, and federal entities had just a few weeks to bolster existing public safety and security plans and establish a comprehensive plan.

SUMR coordinated closely with the St. Louis City Emergency Management Agency to stand up a unified command, and surged to meet unified command needs while providing active duty and civilian personnel support.

Busch Stadium’s close proximity to area highways, interstates, and the Mississippi River compounded the importance of maintaining full visibility to all threats. Plans were put in place to monitor all hazardous material and hazardous cargo transits on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of St. Louis, as well as around St. Louis’s light rail mass transit systems and area bridges.

The seamless integration of local, state, and federal response and law enforcement agencies during the All-Star game and World Series resulted in incident-free events enjoyed by thousands of enthusiastic baseball fans.

About the authors:
LT Michael Anderson served as a helicopter rescue swimmer prior to attending Officer Candidate School in 1998. He has since completed a joint staff and tours in the marine safety field. He holds a Master of Science degree in business ethics from Duquesne University.

Mr. Todd Epperson has worked as the port security specialist for Sector Upper Mississippi River. Mr. Epperson retired after 25 years of service from the Air Force as a security specialist. He graduated from Webster University in 2005 with a Master of Arts degree in business and organizational security management.

Mr. James D. Holman has been the administrative chief of the City of Pittsburgh's River Rescue Division. He has served on the area maritime security committee and other public safety committees, and co-chaired port security operations for the 2006 All-Star games.

For more information:
Full article and “U.S. Coast Guard Western Rivers Sectors” edition of USCG Proceedings is available at www.uscg.mil/proceedings. Click on “archives” and then “2007-08 Vol. 64, Number 4” (Winter 2007-08).

Subscribe online at http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/subscribe.asp.

Online survey available at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/survey.asp.

Direct requests for print copies of this edition to: HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil.